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INTRODUCTION 
This Article examines the severe constriction of the inequitable 
conduct defense to patent infringement accomplished in 2011 by the 
issuance of the Federal Circuit’s decision in Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, 
Dickinson & Co. (Therasense) and the enactment of the America Invents 
Act (AIA).
1
  The Article argues that Therasense and the AIA have unduly 
narrowed the inequitable conduct doctrine and thus undermined core 
functions of United States patent law.  Those core functions include: (1) 
nurturing and rewarding innovation; (2) encouraging full and early 
disclosure of inventions, to promote further innovation and to permit the 
public to practice the inventions once the patents expire; (3) avoiding 
monopolies that unnecessarily stifle competition; and (4) assuring that 
ideas in the public domain remain there for free use by the public.
2
  The 
Article concludes that Therasense and specific features of the AIA, 
particularly its adoption of new post-issuance review proceedings and a 
new best mode amendment, will operate in tandem to sharply curtail the 
availability of the inequitable conduct defense and thereby impair the 
operation of the U.S. patent system.  Simultaneously, Therasense will 
unduly limit the opportunity for parties to assert Walker Process antitrust 
claims.  In short, the cure has been worse than the plague on the patent 
system that critics have commonly attributed to the inequitable conduct 
doctrine. 
I. THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF INEQUITABLE 
CONDUCT 
Inequitable conduct in procuring a patent before the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (PTO) is a judicially created defense to patent 
infringement that has been described as the “key gatekeeper policing the 
 
 1.  Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified in scattered sections of 35 
U.S.C.). 
 2.  See, e.g., Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998) (observing that U.S. 
patent system seeks to balance promotion of innovation with avoidance of monopolies that 
unreasonably suppress competition); Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 
(1979) (identifying primary purposes of the federal patent system). 
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[U.S.] patent system’s integrity.”
3
  No federal statute expressly provides for 
the defense, although 35 U.S.C. § 282 does mandate the availability of a 
defense of unenforceability in any action involving the validity or 
infringement of a patent.
4
  The 1952 Patent Act (the last major revision of 
U.S. patent law prior to the AIA)
5
 and its legislative history are both silent 
concerning the grounds and standard of proof for an inequitable conduct 
defense.
6
 
Instead, the non-statutory doctrine evolved from the equitable defense 
of unclean hands,
7
 which is based on the equitable maxim that “he who 
comes into equity must come with clean hands.”
8
  The defense of unclean 
hands was applied in a trilogy of pre-1950 Supreme Court patent cases — 
Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maintenance Machinery Co. 
 
 3.  See Katherine E. White, “There’s a Hole in the Bucket:” The Effective Elimination 
of the Inequitable Conduct Doctrine, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 716, 717 
(2012).  Accord Tun-Jen Chiang, The Upside-Down Inequitable Conduct Defense, 107 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1243, 1295 (2013) (describing the inequitable conduct defense as “the primary 
doctrinal safeguard against patent dishonesty”). 
 4.  35 U.S.C. § 282(b) (2000).  Cf. John M. Golden, Patent Law’s Falstaff: Inequitable 
Conduct, the Federal Circuit, and Therasense, 7 WASH.  J.L., TECH. & ARTS 353, 356 (2012) 
(“Arguably, the defense is implicit in statutory law.”); David Hricik & Seth Trimble, 
Congratulations on Your Hallucinations: Why the PTO’s 1992 Amendment to § 1.56 is 
Irrelevant to Inequitable Conduct, 38 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 4 (2010) (“[I]n 1952, Congress 
codified the defense of inequitable conduct at 35 U.S.C. § 282.”). 
 5.  David S. Abrams & R. Polk Wagner, Poisoning the Next Apple? The America 
Invents Act and Individual Inventors, 65 STAN. L. REV. 517, 519 n.6 (2013) (describing the 
development of the 1952 Patent Act). 
 6.  B.D. Daniel, Heightened Standards of Proof in Patent Infringement Litigation: A 
Critique, 36 AIPLA Q.J. 369, 382 (2008) (“The 1952 Act and its legislative history are both 
silent on the issue of the grounds for an ‘inequitable conduct’ defense, much less a 
heightened standard of proof for such a defense.”). 
 7.  See Gen. Electro Musical Corp. v. Samick Music Corp., 19 F.3d 1405, 1408 (Fed. 
Cir. 1994) (“‘The concept of inequitable conduct in patent procurement derives from the 
equitable doctrine of unclean hands: that a person who obtains a patent by intentionally 
misleading the PTO can not [sic] enforce the patent.’”) (quoting Demarco Corp. v. F. Von 
Langsdorff Licensing Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387, 1394 (Fed. Cir. 1988)); Shieldmark, Inc. v. 
Creative Safety Supply, LLC, No. 1:12CV221, 2013 WL 123567, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 9, 
2013) (same). 
 8.  See, e.g., Apotex, Inc. v. UCB, Inc., No. 12-60706-CIV, 2013 WL 4811231, at *21 
(S.D. Fla. Sept. 9, 2013); see also Nordock Inc. v. Sys., Inc., 927 F. Supp. 2d 577, 607 (E.D. 
Wis.  2013)  (quoting Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 
806, 814 (1945)) (“The defense of unclean hands is based on the equitable maxim that ‘he 
who comes into equity must come with clean hands’”).  To prove the defense of unclean 
hands in patent cases a defendant must show that the patentee “conducted itself as to shock 
the moral sensibilities of the judge, or stated otherwise, that the patentee’s conduct was 
offensive to the dictates of natural justice.”  Multimedia Patent Trust v. Apple Inc., No. 10-
CV-2618-H (KSC), 2012 WL 6863471, at *22 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2012).  Accord Honeywell 
Int’l, Inc. v. Universal Avionics Sys. Corp., 398 F. Supp. 2d 305, 310 (D. Del. 2004) 
(outlining the same legal standard for proving unclean hands). 
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(Precision),
9
 Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford Empire Co.,
10
 and Keystone 
Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co.
11
 — involving clear-cut scenarios of 
perjury, the manufacture of false evidence, and the suppression of 
evidence.  The doctrine of inequitable conduct was first clearly articulated 
by the Supreme Court in Precision, which held that courts could dismiss 
patent infringement suits based on inequitable conduct committed during 
the patent’s prosecution.
12
 
The Supreme Court in Precision and the Federal Circuit in Therasense 
confirmed that the inequitable conduct doctrine serves multiple important 
policy objectives, and scholars are in accord.  These objectives include 
protecting the integrity of the patent system by ensuring applicant candor, 
encouraging patent applicants to internalize costs of the patent system, 
avoiding patent monopolies that stem from inequitable conduct, and 
punishing patentees who behave inequitably toward the public during the 
patent acquisition process.
13
 
A. Elements of the Inequitable Conduct Defense 
Traditional inequitable conduct analysis in patent cases involves two 
elements. The accused patent infringer must show by clear and convincing 
evidence that: (1) an individual associated with the filing and prosecution 
of a patent application made an affirmative misrepresentation of a material 
fact, failed to disclose material information, or submitted false material 
information to the PTO; and (2) did so with the intent to deceive the PTO.
14
  
If both requirements are met, the trial judge has the discretion to declare the 
subject patent unenforceable.  An unenforceable patent is effectively 
useless to the patentee.  As courts have recognized, “because only the 
 
 9.  324 U.S. 806 (1945) (finding unclean hands where patentee suppressed evidence of 
perjury before the PTO and attempted to enforce perjury-tainted patent). 
 10.  322 U.S. 238 (1944) (finding unclean hands where patentee manufactured false 
article in support of its patent application and later suppressed the article), overruled on 
other grounds by Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 429 U.S. 17 (1976). 
 11.  290 U.S. 244 (1933) (finding unclean hands where patentee submitted false 
affidavit to PTO to overcome a prior use). 
 12.  324 U.S. at 819 (concluding that “inequitable conduct impregnated Automotive’s 
entire cause of action and justified dismissal”). 
 13.  See id. at 816 (noting that the public maintains “a paramount interest in seeing that 
patent monopolies spring from backgrounds free from fraud or other inequitable conduct”); 
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en 
banc) (noting that “[a]s an equitable doctrine, inequitable conduct hinges on basic 
fairness”); Lee Petherbridge, Jason Rantanen & Ali Mojibi, The Federal Circuit and 
Inequitable Conduct: An Empirical Assessment, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1295 (2011) 
(discussing the punishment function of inequitable conduct doctrine). 
 14.  Astrazeneca Pharms. LP v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 583 F.3d 766, 770 (Fed. Cir. 
2009) (citing Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 872 (Fed. 
Cir. 1988)). 
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patent holder possesses the right to enforce a patent against infringement,
15
 
the inequitable conduct doctrine operates solely against the patent 
holder.”
16
 
The defense of inequitable conduct is wholly equitable in character 
and therefore a matter for the court to decide.
17
  The courts are “not bound 
by the definition of materiality in PTO rules.”
18
  Nevertheless, prior to 
Therasense, the Federal Circuit commonly followed PTO Rule 56
19
— 
which was originally adopted as part of the Rules of Practice in 1949 and 
then substantially reformulated in 1977 and 1992 — in determining 
whether information was material.
20
  Rule 56 imposes on each individual 
associated with the filing and prosecution of a patent application a duty of 
candor to the PTO, including a duty to disclose to the PTO all information 
known to that individual to be material to patentability.
21
 
While courts commonly followed Rule 56, five different standards of 
materiality emerged
22
 and the judiciary vacillated on which standard to 
use.
23
  As noted in Therasense, the proliferation of materiality standards 
produced ambiguity and contradiction in the development of the doctrine of 
inequitable conduct.
24
  But in recent years, the choice of standards often 
narrowed to those reflected in the 1977 and 1992 amendments.  The 
 
 15.  35 U.S.C. § 281 (2006). 
 16.  Shieldmark, Inc. v. Creative Safety Supply, LLC, No. 1:12CV221, 2013 WL 
123567, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 9, 2013). 
 17.  PerSeptive Biosystems, Inc. v. Pharmacia Biotech, Inc., 225 F.3d 1315, 1318 (Fed. 
Cir. 2000) (“The defense of inequitable conduct is entirely equitable in nature, and thus not 
an issue for a jury to decide.”); ABT Sys., LLC v. Emerson Elec. Co., No. 4:11CV00374 
AGF, 2013 WL 425399, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 4, 2013) (citing PerSeptive Biosystems, Inc. 
v. Pharmacia Biotech, Inc., 225 F.3d 1315, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). 
 18.  Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1294; CoStar Realty Information, Inc. v. CIVIX-DDI, 
LLC, Nos. 12 C 4968, 12 C 7091, 12 C 8632, 2013 WL 2151548, at *5 (N.D. Ill. May 15, 
2013) (citing to Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1294). 
 19.  37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2013).   
 20.  See Avid Ident. Sys., Inc. v. Crystal Imp. Corp., 603 F.3d 967, 972 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(“In evaluating materiality, this court typically refers to the definition provided in 37 C.F.R. 
§ 1.56, by which the PTO promulgated the duty of disclosure.”).   
 21.  37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2013).  This duty applies to (1) each named inventor, (2) each 
attorney or agent who prepares or prosecutes the application, and (3) to anyone who is 
substantively involved in the patent prosecution.  37 C.F.R. § 1.56(c) (2013); Avid Ident. 
Sys., Inc. v. Crystal Import Corp., 603 F.3d 967, 973 (Fed. Cir. 2010).  A person is 
substantively involved if the involvement relates to the content of the application or 
decisions related thereto and is not wholly administrative or secretarial in nature.  Id. at 974.  
 22.  See Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Patent Law’s Inequitable Conduct 
Doctrine, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 735, 744 (2011) (describing the five different standards for 
defining materiality); White, supra note 3, at 724-25. 
 23.  See generally Hricik & Trimble, supra note 4, at 3 (providing an overview of the 
development of different standards for determining materiality) 
 24.  Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(en banc). 
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remaining three standards were reflected in case law developed before the 
Federal Circuit, the near-exclusive appellate court for patent cases,
25
 was 
formed in 1982, primarily to instill uniformity in patent law and permit 
more expert review of patent appeals by a specialized court.
26
 
Rule 56 as originally adopted prohibited fraud but said nothing about 
inequitable conduct.  The original version, adopted in 1949 (several years 
after the Supreme Court decided Precision), stated that “any application 
fraudulently filed or in connection with which any fraud is practiced or 
attempted on the Patent Office, may be stricken from the files.”
27
  The 
definition of fraud in this context was unclear.
28
 
The 1977 amendment transformed Rule 56 from a provision enabling 
the PTO to strike applications for fraud to one that formally established a 
duty of candor and good faith by patent applicants and their attorneys to 
disclose information they were aware of that was material to the 
examination of the application.  The 1977 amendment adopted a 
“reasonable examiner” standard by defining information as “material” if 
there was a substantial likelihood that a reasonable examiner would 
consider it important in deciding whether to allow the application to issue 
as a patent.
29
  In making this change the PTO stated that the amendment 
“codifie[d] the existing Office policy on fraud and inequitable conduct, 
which is believed consistent with the prevailing case law in the federal 
courts.”
30
  In the ensuing years the Federal Circuit regularly referred to this 
standard as the one to use in cases raising claims of inequitable conduct.
31
  
Pursuant to the 1977 amendment, a false statement or nondisclosure could 
be material for purposes of an inequitable conduct determination even if the 
invention in question would otherwise be patentable.
32
 
 
 25.  Paul R. Gugliuzza, Rethinking Federal Circuit Jurisdiction, 100 GEO. L.J. 1437, 
1453 (2012). 
 26.  David Olson & Stefania Fusco, Rules Versus Standards: Competing Notions of 
Inconsistency Robustness in Patent Law, 64 ALA. L. REV. 647, 681 (2013) (inferring from 
legislative history that Congress hoped for a consolidation of all patent appeals in one circuit 
court in order to promote standardization and expertise); James R. Barney, A Guide to 
Appealing Patent Cases to the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 2013 WL 
574526, at *11 (Aspatore, 2013) (noting that the Federal Circuit was created to realize 
uniformity in patent law).  But cf. Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a Federal 
Court, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1791, 1802 (2013) (“It is not clear whether the Federal 
Circuit has brought uniformity, quality, or efficiency to patent law.”). 
 27.  37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1949).   
 28.  Dashiell Milliman-Jarvis, The State of Ethical Duties After Therasense, 25 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 695, 699 (2012) (observing that the definition of “fraud” in this context was 
largely unknown). 
 29.  37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (1977). 
 30.  Duty of Disclosure, 42 Fed. Reg. 5588, 5589 (Jan. 28, 1977). 
 31.  Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 
2003) (applying the “reasonable examiner” standard to determine inequitable conduct). 
 32.  Digital Control, Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 
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The PTO amended Rule 56 in 1992 in response to criticism that the 
reasonable examiner standard was vague and unrelated to any concept 
applied in other areas of patent law.
33
  The 1992 amendment continued to 
impose a duty to disclose material information, but it provided a more 
refined definition of materiality.  The amended Rule 56, which remained in 
effect at least until 2014, imposes a duty on individuals
34
 associated with 
the filing and prosecution of an application to disclose to the PTO all 
information known to be material to patentability as defined in the rule.  
Information is material when 
it is not cumulative to information already of record or made of 
record in the application and (1) [i]t establishes, by itself or in 
combination with other information, a prima facie case of 
unpatentability of a claim; or (2) it refutes, or is inconsistent with, 
a position the applicant takes in: (i) [o]pposing an argument of 
unpatentability relied upon by the [PTO], or (ii) [a]sserting an 
argument of patentability.
35
 
When it adopted the 1992 amendment, the PTO considered and 
rejected the adoption of a but-for test of materiality.  It did so because it 
concluded that use of such a narrow standard would not enable the PTO to 
obtain the information it required to properly evaluate patentability.
36
  Rule 
56’s materiality standard, as adopted in 1977 and refined in 1992, was also 
consistent with the materiality standard applied in a range of analogous 
contexts.  As the Therasense dissent noted,
37
 the use of a but-for standard 
has been rejected in the context of, inter alia, fraudulent registration of 
copyrights and trademarks,
38
 proxy solicitations regulated under section 
 
2006) (noting that a misstatement or omission can be material notwithstanding a 
determination that the invention is unpatentable). 
 33.  Donald S. Chisum, Best Mode Concealment and Inequitable Conduct in Patent 
Procurement: A Nutshell, a Review of Recent Federal Circuit Cases and a Plea for Modest 
Reform, 13 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 277, 296 (1997) (detailing what the 
changed reasonable examiner standard entails).   
 34.  Only individuals owe a duty of candor to the PTO under Rule 56.  Corporations do 
not.  Avid Ident. Sys., Inc. v. Crystal Imp. Corp., 603 F.3d 967, 974 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(explaining that only a breach of the duty of candor to the PTO by an individual may give 
rise to a finding of inequitable conduct); see also Aevoe Corp. v. AE Tech. Co., No. 2:12-
cv-00053-GMN-NJK, 2013 WL 876036, at *6 (D. Nev. Mar. 7, 2013) (discussing which 
specific party failed to disclose material prior art and holding that defendants’ failure to 
name a specific individual in a general counterclaim alleging that “Applicants . . . did not 
comply with their duty of disclosure” should result in dismissal of the claim). 
 35.  37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b) (2012). 
 36.  Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1310-14 (Fed. Cir. 
2011) (Bryson, J., dissenting) (explaining why Rule 56 clearly extends beyond the but-for 
standard). 
 37.  Id. at 1315-16 (Bryson, J., dissenting) (listing situations where the but-for test was 
rejected). 
 38.  Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, 861-62 (2d Cir. 1984) (“Only the 
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14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
39
 criminal prosecutions under 
the federal mail and fraud statutes,
40
 and the element of materiality in 
common law fraud.
41
 
The amended Rule 56, consistent with the 1949 and 1977 versions, 
continued to omit use of the term “inequitable conduct.”  The PTO has 
justified this continuing omission on the ground that inequitable conduct 
encompasses too expansive a range of conduct to be subject to mandatory 
striking.
42
  The 1992 version of Rule 56 was never fully embraced by 
federal courts,
43
 and until Therasense was decided, the Federal Circuit 
continued to cite the reasonable examiner standard for materiality that was 
set forth in the 1977 version.
44
  Indeed, some post-Therasense federal 
 
‘knowing failure to advise the Copyright Office of facts which might have occasioned a 
rejection of the application constitute[s] reason for holding the registration invalid and thus 
incapable of supporting an infringement action . . . or denying enforcement on the ground of 
unclean hands . . . .’”) (internal quotation omitted); see also generally 2 MELVILLE B. 
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 7.20[B][1] at 7-212, 4(1) & n.21 (rev. 
ed. 2010). 
 39.  TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (rejecting a standard 
that would require a showing that a voter would have changed his vote but for a 
misstatement or omission in proxy materials and instead adopting a standard requiring the 
injured party to show that the misstatement or omission was material, i.e., that “there is a 
substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding 
how to vote”). 
 40.  18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2006).  As the dissent noted, when a charge of mail or 
wire fraud is based on the nondisclosure of material information in violation of a duty to 
disclose, proof of materiality does not require a showing of actual reliance on the part of the 
victim.  All that is required is proof that the nondisclosure or concealment was capable of 
influencing the intended victim.  649 F.3d at 1315 (Bryson, J., dissenting) (citing Neder v. 
United States, 527 U.S. 1, 16 (1999)). 
 41.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538 (1977) (stating that not all fraudulent 
misrepresentations are material). 
 42.  Sean M. O’Connor, Defusing the “Atomic Bomb” of Patent Litigation: Avoiding 
and Defending Against Allegations of Inequitable Conduct After McKesson et al., 9 J. 
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 330, 349 (2010). 
 43.  See George G. Gordon & Stephen A. Stack, Aligning Antitrust and Patent Law: 
Side Effects from the Federal Circuit’s Cure for the Inequitable Conduct “Plague” in 
Therasense, 26 ANTITRUST 88, 89 (2011) (observing that before Therasense, the Federal 
Circuit’s interpretation of the elements of inequitable conduct contrasted with the 
interpretation by the PTO under Rule 56).  In Digital Control Inc. v. Charles Machine 
Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2006), the Federal Circuit reasoned that the 1992 
version of Rule 56 was “not intended to replace or supplant the ‘reasonable examiner’ 
standard.” 
 44.  See, e.g., Golden Hour Data Sys., Inc. v. emsCharts Inc., 614 F.3d 1367, 1373-74 
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (determining the materiality of information by whether the reasonable 
examiner considers it important for issuing the patent); Avid Ident. Sys., Inc. v. Crystal Imp. 
Corp., 603 F.3d 967, 972 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Information is material where a reasonable 
examiner would find it important to a determination of patentability.”); Astrazeneca Pharm. 
LP v. Teva Pharm. USA Inc., 583 F.3d 766, 773 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing the reasonable 
examiner standard as the most often-employed standard for establishing materiality). 
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courts continued to cite the reasonable examiner standard.
45
 
The other element of inequitable conduct is intent.  In Precision, the 
Supreme Court’s only major discussion of inequitable conduct, the Court 
failed to delineate the requisite level of intent, although it did refer to, inter 
alia, willful conduct.
46
  The requisite level of intent has varied considerably 
since Precision, ranging on the spectrum from negligence to gross 
negligence to recklessness to specific intent.
47
  Because direct evidence of 
intent to deceive is rare,
48
 a finding of intent pre-Therasense was often 
based on the totality of the circumstances, including circumstantial 
evidence.
49
 
B. Effects of the Inequitable Conduct Defense 
The inequitable conduct defense has been described as a “critical part 
of the complicated system of checks and balances that constitutes U.S. 
patent law.”
50
  Specifically, the defense can help correct for: (1) the PTO’s 
limited ability to carefully review all material potentially relevant to 
patentability; (2) the strong incentive for deception provided by an issued 
patent’s presumption of validity in litigation; and (3) the absence of 
procedures to challenge the validity of patent rights that are as robust as 
those found in Japan and the European Union.
51
  The defense is especially 
 
 45.  See, e.g., Seiko Epson Corp. v. E-Babylon, Inc., No. 3:07-CV-896-BR, 2011 WL 
5554447, at *2 (D. Or. Nov. 15, 2011) (holding that a material reference is one that a 
reasonable examiner would consider important in considering the patent application). 
 46.  Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814-15 
(1945) (explaining what is required of the nature of misconduct to be punished as a crime or 
to justify legal proceedings). 
 47.  See generally Robert J. Goldman, Evolution of the Inequitable Conduct Defense in 
Patent Litigation, 7 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 37 (1993) (tracing the development of inequitable 
conduct and the requisite level of intent); Thomas L. Irving, Lauren L. Stevens, Scott M.K. 
Lee & Alexis N. Simpson, The Evolution of Intent: A Review of Patent Law Cases Invoking 
the Doctrine of Inequitable Conduct from Precision to Exergen, 35 U. DAYTON L. REV. 303 
(2010) (addressing the unpredictability of inequitable conduct in patent law). 
 48.  Gen. Elec. Co. v. Mitsubishi Heavy Indus. Ltd., No. 3:10-CV-276-F, 2013 WL 
2338345, at *36 (N.D. Tex. May 28, 2013). 
 49.  See Paragon Podiatry Lab., Inc. v. KLM Labs., Inc., 984 F.2d 1182, 1189-90 (Fed. 
Cir. 1993) (noting that in inequitable conduct cases, intent “must generally be inferred from 
the facts and circumstances surrounding the applicant’s overall conduct”); Dorothy Auth & 
Jason M. Rockman, Federal Circuit Considers ‘Inequitable Conduct’ En Banc, N.Y.L.J., 
Aug. 16, 2010, at 1 (“Because direct evidence of an intent to deceive is rare, ‘intent to 
deceive’ is often based on the totality of the circumstances, including circumstantial 
evidence.”).  
 50.  Golden, supra note 4, at 359. 
 51.  Id. at 359-60.  Accord Jason Rantanen & Lee Petherbridge, Toward a System of 
Invention Registration: The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 110 MICH. L. REV. FIRST 
IMPRESSIONS 24, 30 (2011), 
http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/110/rantanenpetherbridge.pdf (describing the 
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important because patent prosecution in the U.S. is generally ex parte.
52
 
But the defense has an army of critics.  One scholar has concluded that 
the inequitable conduct doctrine “attracts more passionate loathing, and 
stronger criticism, than any other doctrine in patent law.”
53
  The inequitable 
conduct defense has frequently been referred to as the “atomic bomb” of 
patent law
54
 because its success renders the entire patent permanently 
unenforceable, even if the undisclosed information was material to only a 
single claim,
55
 and may also render related patents unenforceable.
56
  
Inequitable conduct may also generate claims under the antitrust and 
securities laws,
57
 taking the form of counterclaims or ensuing cases, such as 
antitrust class actions brought by private parties.
58
  The defense, insofar as 
it focuses on the moral turpitude of the patentee, can have negative 
reputational consequences for the prosecuting attorney and thereby may 
deter settlements.
59
  In other cases, assertion of the defense can multiply the 
cost of litigation,
60
 particularly by expanding discovery, and thereby have a 
 
inequitable conduct defense as “[t]he clearest tool of pre-[AIA] patent law to discourage” 
nondisclosure of relevant information to the PTO). 
 52.  Brett Ira Johnson, The Inequitable Conduct Defense in Patent Litigation: Where 
We Are, Where We Have Been, and Where We Should Go from Here, 28 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 197, 234 (2012) (describing patent prosecutions as ex parte 
proceedings). 
 53.  Chiang, supra note 3, at 1244. 
 54.  See, e.g., Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1288 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quoting Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 525 F.3d 
1334, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2008)) (Rader, J., dissenting). 
 55.  Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 877 (Fed. Cir. 
1988) (en banc) (“When a court has finally determined that inequitable conduct occurred in 
relation to one or more claims during prosecution of the patent application, the entire patent 
is rendered unenforceable.”). 
 56.  See Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1288 (“[T]he taint of a finding of inequitable conduct 
can spread from a single patent to render unenforceable other related patents and 
applications in the same technology family.”); Fox Indus., Inc. v. Structural Pres. Sys., Inc., 
922 F.2d 801, 803-04 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (stating that inequitable conduct “may render 
unenforceable all claims which eventually issue from the same or a related application”).  
 57.  Lawrence T. Kass & Nathaniel T. Browand, ‘Therasense’: Vaccine for a Plague, 
NAT’L L.J., June 6, 2011, at 38  (discussing the requisite proof to render a patent 
unenforceable for inequitable conduct).  
 58.  Gordon & Stack, supra note 43, at 91 (discussing collateral effects of inequitable 
conduct defenses in patent cases). 
 59.  Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1288; Ian G. McFarland, Comment, In the Wake of 
Therasense & Nisus Corp., How Can Patent Attorneys Defend Themselves Against 
Allegations of Inequitable Conduct?, 78 TENN. L. REV. 487, 499 (2011) (observing that 
patent attorneys who are the subject of inequitable conduct findings confront both the threat 
of formal discipline from the PTO and public ridicule).  
 60.  See Christopher A. Cotropia, Modernizing Patent Law’s Inequitable Conduct 
Doctrine, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 723, 740 (2009) (noting that “litigation of inequitable 
conduct claims is particularly costly”). 
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coercive effect on settlements.
61
 
The draconian nature of the defense, in combination with its pre-
Therasense low threshold of proof, makes it appealing to accused patent 
infringers.  One study, prepared by a committee of the American 
Intellectual Property Law Association and cited by Therasense,
62
 estimated 
that eighty percent of patent infringement suits contain an allegation of 
inequitable conduct.
63
  But this study contained no data or other evidence to 
support its estimate,
64
 and other accounts of the frequency with which the 
defense is asserted are considerably lower — ranging from less than twenty 
percent
65
 to approximately twenty-five percent
66
 to sixteen to thirty-five 
percent
67
 to forty percent.
68
  Moreover, appeals involving inequitable 
 
 61.  In a survey by the American Bar Association, 69.4% of approximately 3,300 
responding attorneys agreed or strongly agreed that discovery is commonly used as a tool to 
force settlement in civil litigation.  See Am. Bar Ass’n Section of Litig., Member Survey on 
Civil Practice: Full Report 69 (Dec. 11, 2009), 
http://www.abanet.org/litigation/survey/docs/report-aba-report.pdf (presenting empirical 
evidence on the beliefs of lawyers on the current system of civil litigation).  In a separate 
survey, 71% of approximately 1,400 responding Fellows of the American College of Trial 
Lawyers agreed that discovery is used as a tool to force settlement.  Am. College of Trial 
Lawyers & Inst. for the Advancement of the Am. Legal Sys., Final Report on the Joint 
Project of the American College of Trial Lawyers Task Force on Discovery and the Institute 
for the Advancement of the American Legal System 9 (rev. ed. Apr. 15, 2009), 
http://www.actl.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cf
m&ContentID=4008. 
 62.  Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1288. 
 63.  Committee Position Paper: The Doctrine of Inequitable Conduct and the Duty of 
Candor in Patent Procurement: Its Current Adverse Impact on the Operation of the United 
States Patent System, 16 AIPLA Q.J. 74 (1988) (position paper on inequitable conduct and 
duty of candor). 
 64.  Jason Rantanen, Recalibrating Our Empirical Understanding of Inequitable 
Conduct, 3 IP THEORY 98, 99 (2013), available at 
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ipt/vol3/iss2/3/ (commenting on the absence of 
empirical evidence on rate of inequitable conduct pleadings).  
 65.  Benjamin Brown, Comment, Inequitable Conduct: A Standard in Motion, 19 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 593, 608 (2009) (providing statistical analysis 
and analyzing possible consequences of reforming the defense through legislation). 
 66.  Cotropia, supra note 60, at 739 (providing a comprehensive, theoretical analysis on 
the inequitable conduct doctrine). 
 67.  Kevin Mack, Note, Reforming Inequitable Conduct to Improve Patent Quality: 
Cleansing Unclean Hands, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 147, 155-56 & tbl.1 (2006) (noting that 
the inequitable conduct defense is adjudicated in 16-35% of all patent infringement cases 
that proceed to trial).  
 68.  Christian E. Mammen, Controlling the “Plague”: Reforming the Doctrine of 
Inequitable Conduct, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1329, 1358-60 (2009) (noting that between 
2000 and 2008, inequitable conduct pleadings at the district court level increased from four 
to forty percent).  This study, representing perhaps the sole empirical data supporting the 
claim that there has been a dramatic increase in pleadings of inequitable conduct, has been 
criticized.  See, e.g., Rantanen, supra note 64, at 100, 103-05 (citing two significant 
limitations of Mammen’s research). 
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conduct are infrequent.  One survey found that the annual number of cases 
appealed on inequitable conduct rose from thirteen to thirty between 2004 
and 2007, and then declined to twenty-six in 2008.
69
  Inequitable conduct is 
rarely a successful defense,
70
 but the common perception that the doctrine 
is asserted to excess in patent litigation is “empirically unverified.”
71
 
Patent applicants often attempt to negate the defense by providing the 
PTO with voluminous prior art
72
 references—many of which are 
inconsequential or unavailing
73
—and concurrent patent applications for the 
same technology in other countries.
74
  This purported deluge may have 
 
 69.  See The Honorable Randall R. Rader, Always at the Margin: Inequitable Conduct 
in Flux, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 777, 779 (2010) (presenting data on the number of cases 
appealed on inequitable conduct).  The number of cases appealed on inequitable conduct has 
not kept pace with the number of new patent lawsuits, which has continued to rise in recent 
years.  For example, the total number of new patent lawsuits jumped twenty-two percent in 
2011, totaling more than four thousand new cases.  Robert Harkins, How the Leahy-Smith 
America Invents Act (AIA) is Changing Patent Protection and Litigation, ASPATORE, 2013 
WL 571334, at *1 (Jan. 2013) (detailing how the AIA might cause companies to pursue 
different strategies in pursuing patents and engaging in patent litigation). 
 70.  See Petherbridge, Rantanen & Mojibi, supra note 13, at 1340 (reporting that the 
Federal Circuit reached an ultimate conclusion that inequitable conduct was committed 
approximately 2.5 times a year during the period 1983-2010); Mammen, supra note 68, at 
1358-60 (concluding that during the period 1983-2008 an inequitable conduct defense 
succeeded on appeal to the Federal Circuit no more than five times a year); LEX MACHINA, 
INEQUITABLE CONDUCT DEFENSE IN PATENT LITIGATION: 2005-2010 (Jan. 5, 2011), 
https://lexmachina.com/files/Inequitable%20Conduct%20Study.pdf (reporting 41 instances 
of inequitable conduct findings by federal courts in 13,786 total patent infringement cases 
during the period January 2005-May 2010); Steve Carlson, Changes in the Law of 
Inequitable Conduct: New Pleading and Proof Standards 5 (May 10, 2012), available at 
http://www.fr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/6%20-%20Changes%20in%20the%20Law 
%20of%20Inequitable%20Conduct%20-%20Carlson.pdf (noting that inequitable conduct is 
“[p]led routinely, tried frequently, and occasionally won”).  In the vast majority of cases 
where the defense succeeds, the patent is also invalidated.  Melissa Feeney Wasserman, 
Limiting the Inequitable Conduct Defense, 13 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 23 (2008). 
 71.  Lee Petherbridge, Jason Rantanen & R. Polk Wagner, Unenforceability 26 (Feb. 
21, 2013), Univ. of Penn. Law School, Public Law Research Paper No. 12-28; Univ. of 
Penn. Inst. for Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 12-15; Univ. of Iowa Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 12-10; Loyola-LA Legal Studies Paper No. 2012-28; available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2167417 (evaluating the impact of the 
inequitable conduct doctrine).   
 72.  “Prior art” refers to preexisting knowledge and technology already available to the 
public.  See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006) (defining the documents and activities that can 
function as prior art); Kimberley-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1453 
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (discussing the competing views of the definition of prior art and 
concluding that the hypothetical person standard was correct). 
 73.  Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(en banc); Robert C. Scheinfeld & Parker H. Bagley, Inequitable Conductors: All Aboard 
the ‘Therasense’ Train, N.Y.L.J., July 27, 2011, at 3.  
 74.  Sheri Qualters, ‘Therasense’ a Strong Candidate for High Court Review, Patent 
Lawyers Say; Decision Raising the Bar for Inequitable Conduct Defense Departs from 
Position of PTO, DOJ, NAT’L L.J., May 26, 2011.  Some portion of this deluge may be 
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contributed to the PTO’s backlog of pending patent applications.  
Approximately 500,000 patent applications are filed every year with the 
PTO,
75
 and in September 2012 approximately 608,000 applications were 
awaiting their first action.
76
  This backlog shows few signs of abating.  The 
average pendency of U.S. patent applications exceeded three years each 
year during the period from 2009 to 2013.
77
 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the oft-criticized deluge of prior art 
references is suspect for multiple reasons.  First, there is remarkably little 
empirical evidence supporting the rote argument—highly persuasive to the 
Therasense majority
78
—that a deluge has occurred.
79
  What evidence does 
exist tends to rebut the point by demonstrating that a small sliver of patents 
accounts for the bulk of voluminous prior art references.  In 2012, the 
average patent cited forty-three references and only eight percent of patents 
cited more than one hundred references.
80
  The median submission was a 
mere eight references
81
 and more than two-thirds of the seven million prior 
 
attributable to efforts by patent applicants to “bury” examiners with hundreds of references 
so as to distract them from highly relevant references.  Such efforts, even if they do take 
place, probably do not constitute inequitable conduct.  See, e.g., Seaboard Int’l, Inc. v. 
Cameron Int’l Corp., No. 1:13-CV-00281-MLH-SKO, 2013 WL 3936889, at *6 (E.D. Cal. 
July 30, 2013) (agreeing with plaintiff’s argument and several federal cases that concealing 
material information in extensive extraneous citations to the PTO is not, by itself, enough to 
show inequitable conduct); ParkerVision, Inc. v. Qualcomm, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 
1318 (M.D. Fla. 2013) (noting that specific intent to deceive was not the single most 
reasonable inference capable of being drawn when Parkervision provided voluminous prior 
art references, since it was equally likely, if not more likely, that it did so to insulate itself 
from claims of inequitable conduct for under-disclosure).  But cf. CoStar Realty 
Information, Inc. v. CIVIX-DDI, LLC, Nos. 12 C 4968, 12 C 7091, 12 C 8632, 2013 WL 
2151548, at *12 (N.D. Ill. May 15, 2013) (“[T]he Federal Circuit has not established 
definitively whether or under what circumstances burying may constitute inequitable 
conduct.”). 
 75.  Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709, 746 
(2012). 
 76.  U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2012 25 (Nov. 7, 2012), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/USPTOFY2012PAR.pdf.  This number was 
significantly lower than the backlog of approximately 750,000 applications in 2008.  Id.  
 77.  Dennis Crouch & Jason Rantanen, Average Pendency of US Patent Applications, 
PATENTLY-O (Mar. 20, 2013, 9:05 AM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2013/03/average-
pendency-of-us-patent-applications.html.  
 78.  Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(en banc). 
 79.  Jason Rantanen & Lee Petherbridge, Therasense v. Becton Dickinson: A First 
Impression, 14 YALE J.L. & TECH. 226, 257-58 (2012). 
 80.  Dennis Crouch, Citing Patent References, PATENTLY-O (Jan. 10, 2013, 7:24 AM), 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2013/01/citingreferences.html.  
 81.  Dennis Crouch & Jason Rantanen, Citing References at the PTO, PATENTLY-O 
(Oct. 23, 2012, 8:05 AM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/10/citing-references-at-
the-pto.html.  
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art citations in the data set were associated with just ten percent of the 
patents.
82
  Moreover, there is no significant upward trend in recent years.  
During the period from 2005 to 2011, the median number of references 
increased from thirteen to just seventeen.
83
  In any event, it is unclear that 
the inequitable conduct defense is responsible for the submission of 
numerous prior art references.  There are many other factors that provide 
incentives to patent applicants to submit references to the PTO.  For 
example, “such submissions bolster a patent against post-issuance 
challenges at the Patent Office and strengthen the presumption of validity 
that attaches to an issued patent.”
84
 
Second, recent empirical research indicates that historically the 
inequitable conduct defense has worked in practice as it is supposed to 
work in theory.  Those “patents found unenforceable have statistically 
significantly fewer citations to prior art than patents in other similarly 
tested groups.”
85
  As Professors Petherbridge, Rantanen and Wagner have 
noted, “[t]he doctrine seems to be working as expected . . . . [E]liminating 
the doctrine of inequitable conduct may be a mistake.”
86
 Third, while patent 
“examiners are required to consider all prior art references,”
87
 evidence 
suggests that examiners use the results of their own prior art searches, 
rather than the purportedly voluminous references provided by applicants.
88
  
Such evidence weakens the link between preemption of the inequitable 
conduct defense and delay at the PTO. 
In short, the negative and unintended consequences of the inequitable 
conduct doctrine have been exaggerated—perhaps significantly so.  But a 
dearth of damning empirical evidence has not discouraged critics from 
 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Dennis Crouch & Jason Rantanen, Average Number of References Cited Per 
Patent, PATENTLY-O (July 22, 2011, 9:03 AM), 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/07/average-number-of-references-cited-per-
patent.html.  But cf. Dennis Crouch & Jason Rantanen, References Cited Per Patent, 
PATENTLY-O (Jan. 24, 2014), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/01/references-cited-
patent.html (“Over the past 13 years the number of references cited per patent has grown 
dramatically.”). 
 84.  Arpita Bhattacharyya & Michael R. McGurk, IDS Practice After Therasense and 
the AIA: Decoupling the Link Between Information Disclosure and Inequitable Conduct, 29 
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 605, 611 (2013). 
 85.  Petherbridge, Rantanen & Wagner, supra note 71, at 22. 
 86.  Id. at 25. 
 87.  TouchTunes Music Corp. v. Rowe Int’l Corp., 847 F. Supp. 2d 606, 623 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012). 
 88.  See Christopher A. Cotropia, Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Do Patent 
Applicant Citations Matter?, 42 RESEARCH POLICY 844, 844 (2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1656568 (concluding that patent 
examiners rely almost exclusively on prior art they find themselves); Robert Brendan 
Taylor, Burying, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 99, 115-16 (2012) (citing a study 
that found PTO examiners often use their own prior art searches to make their decisions). 
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frequently describing the doctrine as an absolute plague on the courts and 
the United States patent system.
89
 
To date the plague has not moved the Supreme Court, which has 
provided no guidance concerning inequitable conduct since it issued its 
opinion in Precision almost seventy years ago.  The lower courts have 
grappled with the contours of the defense in this vacuum.  Therasense 
represented the Federal Circuit’s second attempt in two decades to reduce 
inequitable conduct claims in patent cases.  The court’s prior attempt to 
reduce inequitable conduct claims occurred in Kingsdown Medical 
Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc.
90
  In that case, the court did not address 
materiality, but it overturned precedent
91
 which held that a showing of 
gross negligence was sufficient to establish the intent prong of the defense.  
Kingsdown held that the patentee’s conduct must indicate sufficient 
culpability to require a finding of intent to deceive.
92
  In subsequent years, 
however, Federal Circuit panels routinely ignored the case
93
 and the 
requisite culpability was watered down to a “should have known” standard, 
which was perhaps a lower standard than gross negligence.
94
 
Until Therasense, some courts also employed a sliding scale approach 
to materiality and intent that allowed a lesser showing of either element 
based on a stronger showing of the other.
95
  In theory, use of a sliding scale 
was restricted to situations in which there was clear and convincing proof 
of both materiality and intent.  But in practice, use of the scale sometimes 
produced findings of inequitable conduct with essentially no independent 
support for a finding of intent.
96
  As noted by the Federal Circuit, use of a 
 
 89.  See, e.g., Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876 
n.15 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (en banc); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 
1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“[T]he habit of charging inequitable conduct in almost every major 
patent case has become an absolute plague.”). 
 90.  Kingsdown, 863 F.2d 867. 
 91.  See Driscoll v. Cebalo, 731 F.2d 878 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding that the intent to 
deceive prong of a claim of inequitable conduct may be satisfied by a showing of gross 
negligence; this ruling was subsequently overturned in Kingsdown). 
 92.  Kingsdown, 863 F.2d at 876. 
 93.  Zhe (Amy) Peng, Stacy Lewis, Deborah Herzfeld, Jill McAlpine & Tom Irving, A 
Panacea for Inequitable Conduct Problems or Kingsdown Version 2.0? The Therasense 
Decision and a Look into the Future of U.S. Patent Law Reform, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 373, 
390 (2011) [hereinafter Panacea]. 
 94.  See Bhattacharyya & McGurk, supra note 84, at 614 (stating that the “should have 
known” standard is lower than the “gross negligence” standard). 
 95.  See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 326 F.3d 1226, 
1234  (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[W]hen balanced against high materiality, the showing of intent 
can be proportionately less.”); Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 
1350, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (noting that issues of materiality and culpability are often 
related and intertwined); Digital Equip. Corp. v. Diamond, 653 F.2d 701, 716 (1st Cir. 
1981) (same). 
 96.  Kass & Browand, supra note 57.  See also Jeffrey J. Oelke, Inequitable Conduct, 
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sliding scale “conflated, and diluted, the standards for both intent and 
materiality.”
97
  The foregoing factors prompted the Federal Circuit to 
consider Therasense en banc. 
II. THERASENSE 
The Federal Circuit’s decision in Therasense imposed significant 
limitations on potential use of the inequitable conduct defense.  These 
limitations included, but were not restricted to, the adoption of elevated 
standards for intent and materiality. 
A. Procedural History of Therasense 
Therasense owned U.S. Patent No. 5,820,551 (the ‘551 patent), which 
involves disposable blood-glucose test strips for diabetes management.
98
  
Therasense had prosecuted the original application for the patent for more 
than thirteen years, beginning in 1984, during which time it was repeatedly 
rejected over U.S. patent No. 4,454,382 (the ‘382 patent), also owned by 
Therasense.
99
  Following amendment of the claim, the examiner finally 
allowed the ‘551 patent to issue.
100
  In March 2004, Therasense sued 
several defendants, including Becton, Dickinson & Company, alleging 
infringement of the ‘551 patent, in response to Becton’s declaratory 
judgment action asking for recognition that its own patents did not infringe 
the ‘551 patent.
101
  Following trial, the federal district court held that the 
‘551 patent was unenforceable due to inequitable conduct because 
Therasense did not disclose to the PTO allegedly inconsistent statements 
that had previously been made to the European Patent Office regarding the 
European counterpart to the ‘382 patent.
102
 
Therasense appealed to the Federal Circuit, where a three-judge panel 
affirmed the holding of unenforceability due to inequitable conduct.
103
  
 
Willful Infringement, and Antitrust Law: Navigating New Challenges in Patent Litigation, 
2012 WL 6636454, at *4, ASPATORE (Nov. 2012) (attributing adoption of sliding scale in 
part to “the fact that direct evidence that a patentee intended to deceive the PTO is rarely 
available”).  
 97.  Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(en banc). 
 98.  Id. at 1282. 
 99.  Id. at 1283. 
 100. See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 565 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1093-94 
(N.D. Cal. 2008), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en 
banc). 
 101.  649 F.3d at 1284. 
 102.  Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 565 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1114-25 (N.D. 
Cal. 2008), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
 103.  Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 593 F.3d 1289, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 
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Therasense then successfully petitioned for rehearing en banc.  Eleven 
judges participated in the decision, which was six–one–four (four 
dissenting votes and one concurrence).  The majority opinion, which 
vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings,
104
 noted that 
the court granted en banc review because it recognized the problems 
created by the expansion and overuse of the inequitable conduct doctrine.
105
 
B. Majority Opinion 
The majority opinion highlighted four key points.  First, to prevail on 
its inequitable conduct defense, an accused infringer must show by clear 
and convincing evidence a specific intent to deceive, which requires proof 
that the applicant knew of the reference, knew that it was material, and 
made a deliberate decision to withhold it.
106
  There is no requirement that 
intent be shown by direct evidence,
107
 but in the absence of such direct 
evidence a “specific intent to deceive must be ‘the single most reasonable 
inference able to be drawn from the circumstantial evidence.’”
108
  This 
holding has elevated the importance of witness credibility in assessing 
allegations of inequitable conduct.
109
  The intent requirement is not satisfied 
by a finding that a misrepresentation or omission constitutes negligence or 
even gross negligence.
110
  All eleven judges agreed on this last point. 
Second, as a general rule, the materiality required to establish 
 
2010), vacated, 374 Fed. App’x 35 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 104.  The outcome of the further proceeding is reflected in the district court decision in 
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 864 F. Supp. 2d 856 (N.D. Cal. 2012).  In that 
decision, the court again held that the ‘551 patent was unenforceable due to inequitable 
conduct.  Id. at 869. 
 105.  Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1285. 
 106.  Id. at 1290. 
 107.  See Am. Calcar, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., No. 06cv2433 DMS (KSC), 2012 
WL 1328640, at *9 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2012) (“[T]here is no requirement that intent be 
shown by direct evidence.  Indeed, the Federal Circuit has repeatedly recognized that 
‘deceptive intent can be inferred from indirect and circumstantial evidence.’”) (quoting 
Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1289). 
 108.  Am. Calcar, 2012 WL 1328640, at *7 (quoting Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290-91).  
Accord In re Rosuvastatin Calcium Patent Litig., 703 F.3d 511 (Fed. Cir.  2012). 
 109.  See Sanya Sukduang & Courtney B. Casp, Assessing Materiality and Intent in a 
Post-Therasense World, BNA’S PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT JOURNAL, Feb. 15, 
2013, available at 
http://www.finnegan.com/resources/articles/articlesdetail.aspx?news=b2937063-d5a1-42b2-
ba52-db47a5d35d32 (discussing the importance of witness credibility in establishing intent).  
 110.  Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290.  Accord Outside the Box Innovations, LLC v. Travel 
Caddy, Inc., 695 F.3d 1285, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (underscoring that negligence alone 
cannot establish intent); 1st Media, LLC v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 694 F.3d 1367, 1374-75 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012) (“[I]t is not enough to argue carelessness, lack of attention, poor docketing or 
cross-referencing, or anything else that might be considered negligent or even grossly 
negligent.”). 
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inequitable conduct is “but-for” materiality.
111
  In making this materiality 
determination, courts must “apply the preponderance of evidence standard 
and give claims their broadest reasonable construction.”
112
  An undisclosed 
reference is material “if the PTO would not have allowed a claim had it 
been aware of the undisclosed prior art.”
113
  A defendant must show that it 
is more likely than not that one or more claims of the asserted patent would 
have been anticipated or rendered obvious if the patent examiner had been 
aware of the undisclosed reference. 
This new but-for standard set a higher bar for establishing materiality 
than the PTO’s own definition under Rule 56.
114
  Indeed, as the Federal 
Circuit noted in Therasense, it specifically “decline[d] to adopt the  current 
version of Rule 56 in defining inequitable conduct because reliance on this 
standard has resulted in the very problems this court sought to address by 
taking the case en banc.”
115
  Only six of the eleven judges coalesced behind 
this new but-for standard. The Federal Circuit noted that materiality is 
often congruent with a validity determination – if a claim is invalidated 
based on prior art that was intentionally withheld, then that reference is 
necessarily material.  This is because a finding of invalidity requires clear 
and convincing evidence, a more onerous evidentiary burden than that used 
in patent prosecution at the PTO.
116
  Post-Therasense, the Federal Circuit 
 
 111.  Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1291. 
 112.  Id. at 1291-92.  Accord Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Hospira, Inc., 675 F.3d 1324, 1334 
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting the standard for establishing but-for materiality set forth in 
Therasense); Avocent Redmond Corp. v. Raritan Americas, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 2d 229, 243 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting the standard for establishing but-for materiality set forth in 
Therasense); Morningware, Inc. v. Hearthware Home Prods., Inc., 898 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 
1042 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (“[T]he standard for establishing but-for materiality in the inequitable 
conduct context only requires a preponderance of the evidence. . . .”); Ohio Willow Wood 
Co. v. ALPS South, LLC, No. 2:04-cv-1223, 2012 WL 3283437, at *15 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 10, 
2012) (“Unlike the burden of proof in the intent prong, the materiality prong carries a 
preponderance of the evidence standard when assessing the ‘but-for’ materiality of a 
withheld reference.”).  But cf. Everlight Elecs. Co. v. Nichia Corp., No. 12-cv-11758, 2013 
WL 1821512, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 30, 2013) (“Both elements – intent and materiality – 
must be established by clear and convincing evidence . . . .”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 113.  Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1291.  Accord Aventis, 675 F.3d at 1334 (quoting 
Therasense in describing the test for but-for materiality); ParkerVision, Inc. v. Qualcomm, 
Inc., 924 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1319 (M.D. Fla. 2013) (quoting the test for but-for materiality 
stated in Therasense). 
 114.  The Federal Circuit was not bound by the definition of materiality set forth in Rule 
56.  Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1293-94 (citing Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549-
50 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).  The PTO has no rulemaking authority over the substantive questions 
that it addresses.  Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the Federal Circuit?, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 
335, 336-37 (Dec. 20, 2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/the-yale-law-journal-pocket-
part/intellectual-property/who%E2%80%99s-afraid-of-the-federal-circuit?/  (citing 
Therasense). 
 115.  Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1294. 
 116.  Id. at 1292 (discussing patent invalidation in the district court). 
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has reinforced the idea that but-for materiality is intertwined with 
invalidity.  A finding of invalidity based on withheld references renders 
them material
117
 and conversely a finding of validity ordinarily precludes a 
finding of materiality.
118
 
Third, there is an exception to but-for materiality in “cases of 
affirmative acts of egregious misconduct, such as the filing of an 
unmistakably false affidavit.”
119
  In these cases the misconduct is material 
regardless of the effect it had had on the PTO.  It is effectively per se 
material,
120
 possibly regardless of the triviality of the misrepresentation.
121
  
The Therasense majority noted that this exception to the but-for 
requirement is consistent with the Supreme Court’s early trio of unclean 
hands cases (Precision, Hazel-Atlas, and Keystone).
122
 
Fourth, intent and materiality are distinct requirements and district 
courts should not use a sliding scale to determine the existence of 
inequitable conduct.  Instead, courts should assess the evidence of 
materiality independent of their analysis of intent.
123
  All eleven judges also 
agreed on this fourth point.
124
 
Therasense also reaffirmed that a district court’s factual findings 
 
 117.  See, e.g., Aventis, 675 F.3d at 1334 (holding that but-for materiality was 
established because the two references withheld from the PTO were also used to invalidate 
the claims at issue).  
 118.  See, e.g., Triangle Software, LLC v. Garmin Int’l, Inc., No. 1:10-cv-1457, 2012 
WL 527223, at *4 (E.D. Va. Feb. 14, 2012) (holding that, after a bifurcated trial, withheld 
prior art could not be material because the jury determined that the same reference did not 
invalidate the patent).  Accord Casp & Sukduang, supra note 109 (stating that the analyses 
of materiality and validity are intertwined). 
 119.  Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1292. 
 120.  See Outside the Box Innovations, LLC v. Travel Caddy, Inc., 695 F.3d 1285, 1294 
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (“In other words, a false affidavit or declaration is per se material.”); In re 
Method of Processing Ethanol Byproducts and Related Subsystems (‘858) Patent Litig., 
Nos. 1:10-ML-02181-LJM, 1:13-mc-00058-LJM-DML, 2013 WL 3820593, at *1 (S.D. Ind. 
July 23, 2013) (observing that egregious acts to deceive the PTO “serve as a proxy for 
materiality”). 
 121.  See Gordon & Stack, supra note 43, at 90 (stating that the court in Therasense did 
not limit per se materiality to serious misconduct and may allow for trivial infractions to be 
per se material). 
 122.  Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1293 (discussing the evolution of the inequitable conduct 
doctrine). 
 123.  Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290 (separating the intent and materiality 
determinations).  Accord Am. Calcar, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 651 F.3d 1318, 1335 
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (vacating the lower court’s finding of intent because the lower court did not 
separately analyze materiality and intent).  But see B-K Lighting, Inc. v. Vision3 Lighting, 
930 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1131 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (noting sliding scale approvingly, post-
Therasense). 
 124.  Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290 (majority opinion) (“Intent and materiality are 
separate requirements.”); Id. at 1297 (O’Malley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“[I]ntent to deceive and materiality must be found separately.”); Id. at 1304 (Bryson, J., 
dissenting) (“Intent to mislead and materiality must be separately proved.”). 
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concerning materiality and intent are subject to appellate review for clear 
error, and a district court’s ultimate determination as to whether an act is 
inequitable is reviewable on appeal for abuse of discretion, and subsequent 
cases have agreed.
125
 
C. PTO Proposed Rulemaking 
Two months after the Federal Circuit issued its decision in 
Therasense, the PTO, which had opposed a but-for materiality standard in 
the en banc proceeding,
126
 issued a notice of proposed rulemaking with 
respect to Rule 56.  The proposed amended rule modified the duty of 
disclosure by limiting the scope of materiality in a manner consistent with 
the but-for standard announced in Therasense.  The proposed amended rule 
provided that information is material to patentability if it is material under 
the standard set forth in Therasense, and information is material to 
patentability under Therasense if: “(1) the [PTO] would not allow a claim 
if it were aware of the information, applying the preponderance of the 
evidence standard and giving the claim its broadest reasonable 
construction; or (2) the applicant engages in affirmative egregious 
misconduct before the [PTO] as to the information.”
127
  The PTO noted that 
it was not required to harmonize the materiality standards underlying Rule 
56’s duty of disclosure and the inequitable conduct doctrine, but then 
identified harmony and simplicity within the U.S. patent system as the 
primary justifications for its proposed revision.
128
  The proposed amended 
rule, like Therasense itself, gives patentees additional leeway to withhold 
 
 125.  See Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1291 (discussing the inference of intent).  Accord 
Novo Nordisk A/S v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd., 719 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2013) 
(reviewing the district court’s finding of inequitable conduct for abuse of discretion and the 
findings of materiality and intent for clear error); 1st Media, LLC v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 694 
F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (reviewing the underlying factual findings of intent and 
materiality for clear error while reviewing the finding of inequitable conduct for abuse of 
discretion).  “A factual finding is clearly erroneous if, despite some supporting evidence, the 
‘[appellate] court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed.’”  Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting 
United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)).  “A district court abuses its 
discretion when its decision is based on clearly erroneous findings of fact, is based on 
erroneous interpretations of the law, or is clearly unreasonable, arbitrary or fanciful.”  1st 
Media, 694 F.3d at 1372 (quoting Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1460 
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc)). 
 126.  See Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1305 (Bryson, J., dissenting) (noting that the PTO had 
persuasively argued in its amicus brief that the but-for standard for materiality is too 
restrictive). 
 127.  Revision of the Materiality to Patentability Standard for the Duty to Disclose 
Information in Patent Applications, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,631, 43,632 (proposed July 21, 2011) 
(to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1) (citing Therasense). 
 128.  Id. at 43,633 (discussing the reasons for the proposed changes). 
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information from the PTO during the examination process.
129
  The 
proposed amended rule had not been adopted by early-2014, and indeed 
rulemaking had been suspended indefinitely as the PTO grappled with 
implementation of the AIA.
130
 
D. The Negative Impact of Therasense 
Therasense and amendment of Rule 56 are likely to restrict the 
availability of the inequitable conduct defense in patent infringement 
actions to a degree that undermines the goals of the U.S. patent system.  
The most significant aspect of the case is the elevation of materiality to a 
but-for standard.  As indicated, the new standard means that prior art is 
“but-for” material only if the PTO would not have allowed the claim if it 
had been aware of the undisclosed art.  This rejection of current Rule 56 
constituted the critical disagreement between the Therasense majority of 
six judges and the dissent of four.  As noted by the dissent, the majority’s 
adoption of a “[d]raconian”
131
 new materiality standard departed from both 
principles of materiality commonly applied by courts in other contexts and 
the line of Supreme Court precedent set forth in the trilogy of Precision, 
Hazel-Atlas, and Keystone.
132
  In that trilogy, the Supreme Court 
recognized the importance of both uncompromising candor to the PTO by 
patent applicants and a flexible approach to equitable claims
133
—something 
 
 129.  Sona De, The Inequitable Conduct Defense: Before and After Therasense, 24 No. 9 
INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 15, 17 (2012) (discussing the impact of Therasense). 
 130.  FINNEGAN, HENDERSON, FARABOW, GARRETT & DUNNER, LLP, INEQUITABLE 
CONDUCT – JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS, 3, 15 (May 16, 2013), available at 
http://law.duke.edu/sites/default/files/centers/judicialstudies/patentlawintensive/thursday_Ir
ving-May_16_Inequitable_Conduct.pdf (discussing how a practitioner might adjust to Rule 
56); Tony Dutra, Cert Petition Attacking Therasense Standard Too Soon, Wrong Case, 
Solicitor General Says, BLOOMBERG BNA (Sept. 11, 2013), available at 
http://www.bna.com/cert-petition-attacking-n17179876976/ (reporting PTO’s decision to 
table rulemaking until after AIA’s requirements of the agency are fully implemented).   
 131.  Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1304 (Bryson, J., dissenting). 
 132.  Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1317 (Bryson, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s 
decision in Therasense eschews precedent).  Many commentators agree.  See, e.g., James J. 
Schneider, Therasense-Less: How the Federal Circuit Let Policy Overtake Precedent in 
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 53 B.C. L. REV. E-SUPPLEMENT 223, 232 
(2012) (stating that the rigid but-for test of materiality contravenes the flexible standard 
endorsed by the Supreme Court in Precision). 
 133.  See, e.g., Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 248 (1944) 
(“[T]his equitable procedure has always been characterized by flexibility which enables it to 
meet new situations which demand equitable intervention, and to accord all the relief 
necessary to correct the particular injustices involved in these situations.”); Keystone Driller 
Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 245-46 (1933)  (noting that courts applying 
unclean hands “are not bound by formula or restrained by any limitation that tends to 
trammel the free and just exercise of discretion”). 
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that is wholly lacking in but-for materiality. 
The Supreme Court has emphasized equity’s flexible nature in 
numerous other cases as well,
134
 and it has repeatedly emphasized the 
importance of discretionary standards in patent law.  It reversed the Federal 
Circuit for adopting an absolute bar to the application of the doctrine of 
equivalents,
135
 for adopting a rule that patentees were automatically entitled 
to injunctive relief once infringement and validity were decided,
136
 for 
establishing an exclusive test for granting declaratory judgments,
137
 for 
holding that method patents could never be exhausted,
138
 for relying 
exclusively on a single test for proving obviousness,
139
 and for utilizing a 
bright-line test for patentable subject matter.
140
  The Federal Circuit’s 
adoption of but-for materiality in Therasense as a response to doctrinal 
uncertainty regarding inequitable conduct rejects both the Supreme Court’s 
heavy emphasis on the use of discretionary standards in patent law and 
traditional notions of equitable flexibility.
141
 
The “egregious misconduct” exception was designed by the 
Therasense majority to mitigate the harshness of its new materiality 
standard.  The court explained that “by creating an exception to punish 
affirmative egregious acts without penalizing the failure to disclose 
information that would not have changed the issuance decision, this court 
strikes a necessary balance between encouraging honesty before the PTO 
 
 134.  See, e.g., Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982) (noting that 
flexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished equitable jurisdiction); Holmberg v. 
Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396 (1945) (“Equity eschews mechanical rules; it depends on 
flexibility.”).   
 135.  Festo Corp. v. Shoketzu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 738 (2002) 
(emphasizing that the Supreme Court consistently uses a flexible, not rigid, approach when 
applying the doctrine of equivalents). 
 136.  eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006) (holding that the 
Federal Circuit erred in its categorical grant of injunctive relief). 
 137.  MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 137 (2007) (holding that a 
patent licensee need not terminate or breach a license agreement in order to meet the “actual 
case or controversy” requirement under Article III of the Constitution and seek declaratory 
judgment). 
 138.  Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 628-30 (2008) (holding 
that the exhaustion doctrine applies to method patents). 
 139.  KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419-22 (2007) (holding that the TSM 
test for obviousness should not be used as a rigid formula and noting that “[r]igid 
preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense . . . are neither necessary 
under our case law nor consistent with it”).  Id. at 421. 
 140.  Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010) (rejecting the argument that the 
machine-or-transformation test is the exclusive test for determining what constitutes a 
patentable process). 
 141.  The failure of the Federal Circuit in Therasense to adhere to inequitable conduct’s 
equitable tradition is critiqued in T. Leigh Anenson & Gideon Mark, Inequitable Conduct in 
Retrospective: Understanding Unclean Hands in Patent Remedies, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1441 
(2013). 
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and preventing unfounded accusations of inequitable conduct.”
142
  But the 
exception has no clear definition and applies only to affirmative 
misrepresentations.
143
  It does not apply in cases of nondisclosure or failure 
to mention prior art references in an affidavit.
144
  Neither of these events 
renders an affidavit unmistakably false—the one specific example of 
egregious misconduct that the court provided.
145
  And it is “unclear 
whether . . . complete lack of diligence in submitting relevant information 
to the Patent Office, or deliberate attempts to remain unaware of potentially 
relevant information” would constitute egregious misconduct.
146
  In short, 
the exception will be rare,
147
 and will do little to mitigate the rigidity of the 
new but-for standard. 
Moreover, the exception, similar to the general standard, eschews both 
traditional notions of equity and the Supreme Court’s endorsement of the 
use of discretionary standards in patent law.  The carve-out to but-for 
materiality only applies if the rigid threshold of egregious affirmative 
misconduct is met.  Such rigidity permits no opportunity for courts to 
exercise their equitable discretion. 
Difficulty in establishing materiality post-Therasense is not the only 
obstacle confronted by accused patent infringers seeking to utilize the 
inequitable conduct defense.  Another obstacle is presented by 
Therasense’s holding about intent.  Direct evidence of intent to deceive the 
PTO is scarce,
148
 primarily because the decision to refrain from disclosure 
 
 142.  Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(en banc). 
 143.  Id. at 1293; Cotter, supra note 22, at 745. 
 144.  Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1292-93; Senju Pharm. Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 
2d 297, 308 n.15 (D. Del. 2013) (“Omissions . . . cannot constitute affirmative egregious 
misconduct.”). 
 145.  See TV Interactive Data Corp. v. Sony Corp., No. C 10-0475 PJH, 2012 WL 
6020113, at *27 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2012) (observing that filing a false affidavit is “the sole 
type of ‘egregious affirmative act’ identified by the Federal Circuit as providing an 
exception to the requirement of ‘but-for’ materiality”).  But cf. Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. 
Interlace Med., Inc., No. 10-10951-RWZ, 2013 WL 3289085, at *2 (D. Mass. June 27, 
2013) (asserting that affirmative egregious misconduct, as described in Therasense, also 
includes “suborning perjury, bribing witnesses, and actively suppressing evidence”). 
 146.  Bhattacharyya & McGurk, supra note 84, at 632. 
 147.  See Gino Cheng, Robert M. Isackson & Thomas J. Gray, Inequitable Conduct: 
Rethinking ‘Egregious Misconduct’, LAW360 (Jan. 9, 2013, 12:16 PM), 
http://about.bloomberglaw.com/practitioner-contributions/inequitable-conduct-analysis/ 
(“Far from the inside track to leapfrog over the ‘but-for’ materiality test set forth by the bare 
majority in Therasense . . . the defense tactic of alleging egregious misconduct appears to be 
a detour—at least for now.”).  Post-Therasense courts have been very reluctant to apply the 
egregious misconduct exception.  See, e.g., Galderma Labs., L.P. v. Tolmar, Inc., 891 F. 
Supp. 2d 588, 649 n.21 (D. Del. 2012) (rejecting application of exception because 
statements to PTO “were merely a statement of the hypothesis to be tested during the 
regulatory approval process”). 
 148.  Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290. 
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is rarely documented.  Even where direct evidence of intent does exist, it 
likely is shielded from discovery by the attorney-client privilege.
149
  Patent 
applicants, by involving an attorney in important discussions throughout 
the patent application process, may claim privilege over numerous 
categories of documents, including potentially “‘smoking gun’” 
documents.
150
  Thus, such documents are unlikely to emerge during 
discovery, and direct evidence of intent will be rare. 
Moreover, under applicable Federal Circuit law, the assertion of 
attorney-client privilege and/or the work product doctrine and the 
withholding of advice of counsel cannot yield an adverse inference as to 
the nature of the advice.
151
  This jurisprudence essentially forces federal 
district courts to make positive inferences and “produces a tremendous 
structural advantage for the party accused of inequitable conduct, while 
encouraging the abuse of privilege.”
152
  The crime-fraud exception
153
 to the 
attorney-client privilege is unlikely to reduce this advantage in most cases, 
because under Federal Circuit law, “a party must establish Walker Process 
fraud . . . to successfully pierce the attorney-client privilege.”
154
  As is set 
forth infra, Walker Process fraud will be virtually impossible to prove post-
Therasense. 
The unavailability of direct evidence of intent is critical.  In the 
absence of direct evidence, a post-Therasense court may find specific intent 
to deceive the PTO only if it is the most reasonable inference arising from 
the circumstantial evidence.
155
  As the Federal Circuit noted, “[i]f multiple 
 
 149.  See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Mitsubishi Heavy Indus. Ltd., No. 3:10-CV-276-F, 
2013 WL 2338345, at *5 (N.D. Tex. May 28, 2013) (noting that the record in the case had 
significant gaps because many documents were protected by the attorney-client privilege, 
and lamenting that these gaps made adjudication of intent a difficult task). 
 150.  Id. at *5 (noting the unlikelihood of such potentially incriminatory documents ever 
surfacing in inequitable conduct cases). 
 151.  See Knorr-Breme Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 
1337, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (extending to patent cases the rule that declines to impose 
adverse inferences on invocation of the attorney-client privilege); accord Golden Blount, 
Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 438 F.3d 1354, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding that a 
threshold showing of culpable behavior “cannot be satisfied merely by proof that the 
accused is asserting the attorney-client privilege to withhold an opinion of counsel”). 
 152.  Gen. Elec. Co., 2013 WL 2338345 at *8.   
 153.  “‘The party seeking discovery of privileged communications or documents must 
prove the crime-fraud exception applies by showing: (1) a prima facie case of criminal or 
fraudulent conduct, and (2) the communications were made in furtherance of the crime or 
fraud.’”  Shelbyzyme, LLC v. Genzyme Corp., No. 09-768-GMS, 2013 WL 3229964, at *1 
n.1 (D. Del. June 25, 2013) (quoting Magnetar Techs. Corp. v. Six Flags Theme Park Inc., 
886 F. Supp. 2d 466, 482 (D. Del. 2012)). 
 154.  Unigene Labs., Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 655 F.3d 1352, 1358-59 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 155.  Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290.  Accord 01 Communique Lab., Inc. v. LogMeIn, 
Inc., No. 1:10-cv-1007, 2013 WL 3270648, at *2 (E.D. Va. June 25, 2013). 
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reasonable inferences can be drawn, ‘intent to deceive cannot be found.’”
156
  
Post-Therasense, the Federal Circuit has “rigorously enforced” the most 
reasonable inference requirement.
157
 
The harsh Therasense requirements have at least two negative effects.  
First, because they are, in the words of one federal district court, “nearly 
insurmountable,”
158
 they bar numerous potentially meritorious claims.  
Post-Therasense courts have been very reluctant to infer intent based on 
circumstantial evidence.  In the first six months after the en banc 
Therasense decision was issued, district courts rendered final decisions in 
fourteen cases involving inequitable conduct.  These courts found the 
specific intent required by Therasense in only one of the cases, and they 
found inequitable conduct in none of them.
159
 
Second, they create a roadmap to success for dishonest patent 
applicants and thus encourage misconduct.  Post-Therasense, a dishonest 
patent applicant is less likely to be found to have engaged in inequitable 
conduct if it makes no disclosure of prior art than if it makes selective 
disclosure.  If it makes no disclosure then there is likely to be no written 
evidence of intent to deceive and therefore immunization of inaction.  
Conversely, if the applicant makes selective disclosure there will be some 
written evidence that it made the deliberate decision to disclose some art 
while withholding other references.  Therasense thus creates a perverse 
incentive to withhold material information from the PTO.
160
  
Therasense’s elevated standards concerning materiality and intent are 
not only applicable at trial.  The standards also apply at the summary 
 
 156.  TV Interactive Data Corp. v. Sony Corp., No. C 10-0475 PJH, 2012 WL 6020113, 
at *23 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2012) (quoting Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1920-91). 
 157.  Lisa A. Dolak, Litigating Inequitable Conduct After Therasense, Exergen and the 
AIA: Lessons for Litigants, Options for Owners, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 51, 57 
(2013).  A pattern of deceit strengthens an inference of intent to deceive.  Intellect Wireless, 
Inc. v. HTC Corp., 732 F.3d 1339, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (finding such a pattern in this 
case). 
 158.  Gen. Elec. Co. v. Mitsubishi Heavy Indus. Ltd., No. 3:10-CV-276-F, 2013 WL 
2338345, at *5 (N.D. Tex. May 28, 2013) (observing that the requirement of 
“deliberateness” creates a hurdle that is “unlikely to be jumped in all but the rarest cases”). 
 159.  Peter G. Thurlow & Maya Elbert, Inequitable Conduct: Analysis of Post-
Therasense Decisions and the Supplemental Examination Provision of the America Invents 
Act, 5 BLOOMBERG LAW REPORTS – INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 48 (Nov. 16, 2011).  The 
authors conclude that “[a]s difficult as it may be for a patent challenger to establish 
materiality, it may be even more difficult to establish the requisite level of intent.”  Id.  
 160.  See Brandee N. Woolard, Issue Brief, The Resurrection of the Duty to Inquire After 
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 12 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 42, 44 (2014) 
(noting that Therasense “disincentivizes patent practitioners from seeking out material 
information.”); Maurice Ross, A Year of Dramatic Change in Intellectual Property Law: 
Who are the Winners and Losers?, ASPATORE, 2013 WL 571327, at *8 (Jan. 2013) 
(observing that Therasense and AIA collectively provide “perverse incentives for cheating 
and fraud.”). 
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judgment stage,
161
 where the burden of proving inequitable conduct is 
particularly onerous.
162
  The standards also operate to effectively raise the 
standard for pleading inequitable conduct.  The Federal Circuit established 
the current strict pleading standard two years prior to Therasense, when it 
held in Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
163
 that inequitable conduct 
must be pleaded with particularity under Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure
164
 by identifying “the specific who, what, when, where, and 
how of the material misrepresentation or omission committed before the 
PTO.”
165
  Failure to identify each of these factual elements constitutes an 
incurable deficiency under Rule 9(b).
166
 
In Exergen, the Federal Circuit applied its own law to determine the 
appropriate pleading standard, but it adopted the approach for pleading 
fraud previously articulated by the Seventh Circuit.
167
  This adoption 
disregarded both the text of Rule 9(b), which expressly requires 
particularity only when pleading fraud or mistake,
168
 and the law of 
inequitable conduct, which does not include reliance as an element and thus 
is broader than common law fraud.
169
  Prior to Exergen, the Federal Circuit 
underscored that “[i]nequitable conduct . . . is a lesser offense than 
common law fraud.”
170
  In Exergen, the court substantially raised the 
standard for pleading inequitable conduct, whether as a counterclaim or as 
an affirmative defense,
171
 by importing the inapposite standard for pleading 
 
 161.  See Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., No. 1:10cv910 LMB/TRJ, 2013 
WL 265602, at *30 (E.D. Va. Jan. 22, 2013). 
 162.  See Leviton Mfg. Co. v. Universal Sec. Instr., Inc., 606 F.3d 1353, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 
2010) (“We rarely affirm a grant of summary judgment of inequitable conduct . . . .”); 
Morningware, Inc. v. Hearthware Home Products, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1041 (N.D. 
Ill. 2012) (“[The] burden of proving inequitable conduct at the summary judgment stage is 
particularly onerous . . . .”); TecSec, Inc. v. Int’l Business Mach. Corp., 763 F. Supp. 2d 
800, 809 (E.D. Va. 2011) (“The Federal Circuit has repeatedly indicated that inequitable 
conduct defenses are disfavored, particularly at the summary judgment stage.”). 
 163.  575 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2009).   
 164.  FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
 165.  Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1328.   
 166.  Prowess, Inc. v. RaySearch Labs., AB, No. WDQ-11-1357, 2013 WL 3480319, at 
*7 (D. Md. July 9, 2013). 
 167.  Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1326-27.  The earlier Seventh Circuit decision is DiLeo v. 
Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 168.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). 
 169.  Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (noting that 
inequitable conduct “is a broader, more inclusive concept” than common law fraud). 
 170.  Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1069 (Fed. Cir. 
1989).  See also David Hricik, Wrong About Everything: The Application by the District 
Courts of Rule 9(b) to Inequitable Conduct, 86 MARQ. L. LEV. 895, 913 (2003) (“[T]he 
Federal Circuit has . . . recognized that inequitable conduct does not require proof of 
fraud.”). 
 171.  See Senju Pharm. Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 2d 297, 306 (D. Del. 2013) 
(“Apotex’s counterclaim and affirmative defense for inequitable conduct rise or fall 
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fraud.
172
 
Exergen’s “who” requirement requires identification of the specific 
individual(s) alleged to have engaged in inequitable conduct.  General 
references to categories of persons, such as inventors or corporate entities, 
do not suffice,
173
 in part because “the duty of candor and good faith in 
dealing with the PTO is inapplicable to organizations.”
174
  The “what” 
requirement involves both the nature of the inequitable conduct (for 
example, whether there was a material omission or material 
misrepresentation) and the relevance of that conduct to specific patent 
claims.
175
 
Compliance with Exergen’s “where” requirement is a function of the 
nature of the alleged inequitable misconduct.  If the conduct involves a 
failure to disclose prior art, then defendant is required to specifically 
identify the location of the material information within the reference.
176
  If 
the conduct involves a failure to disclose relevant sales, offers for sales, or 
litigation, then defendant is required to specifically identify the location of 
the activity.  A general identification is insufficient.
177
  Compliance with 
 
together.”); XpertUniverse, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 868 F. Supp. 2d 376, 379-83 (D. Del. 
2012) (assessing the sufficiency of counterclaims and affirmative defenses of inequitable 
conduct together); Southco, Inc. v. Penn Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 768 F. Supp. 2d 715, 721-24 
(D. Del. 2011) (same); cf. ParkerVision, Inc. v. Qualcomm, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 
1321 (M.D. Fla. 2013) (construing affirmative defense of inequitable conduct as a 
counterclaim and then striking it as redundant of existing counterclaim for inequitable 
conduct). 
 172.  See, e.g., Adam R. Andrea, Case Note and Comment, Exergen v. Wal-Mart: A 
Costly Cure for the Plague of Inequitable Conduct Claims, 20 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & 
INTELL. PROP. L. 449, 462 (2010) (“The court provided virtually no justification for its 
application of Rule 9(b) to inequitable conduct.”); see also David O. Taylor, Patent Fraud, 
83 TEMPLE L. REV. 49, 73 (2010) (“Exergen may represent the first foray into the adoption 
of principles from the law of fraud into the law of inequitable conduct.”). 
 173.  See, e.g., Sepracor, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., Civil Action No. 09-cv-01302 
(DMC)(MF), 2010 WL 2326262, at *6 (D.N.J. June 7, 2010) (holding that general 
references to “patent applicants and Sepracor” were insufficient). 
 174.  Senju, 921 F. Supp. 2d at 307. 
 175.  Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(“The pleading fails to identify which claims, and which limitations in those claims, the 
withheld references are relevant to . . . .”). 
 176.  Bruce D. DeRenzi & Sean E. Jackson, A Procedural Remedy for the ‘Plague’? 
Pleading Inequitable Conduct after Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., NYIPLA 
BULLETIN (N.Y. Intellectual Prop. Ass’n), Aug./Sept. 2010, at 9-11, available at 
http://www.crowell.com/documents/A-Procedural-Remedy-for-the-Plague-Pleading-
Inequitable-Conduct-After-Exergen-Corp-v-Wal-Mart.pdf  See also Aevoe Corp. v. AE 
Tech. Co., No. 2:12-cv-00053-GMN-NJK, 2013 WL 876036, at *7 (D. Nev. Mar. 7, 2013) 
(noting that to satisfy “where” requirement, the pleading must specifically identify to which 
claims, and which limitations in those claims, the withheld references are relevant). 
 177.  See, e.g., Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Bel Fuse Inc., No. C-07-06222 RMW, 2010 WL 
246811, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2010) (holding that allegation of product sales “in the 
United States” was insufficient).   
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Exergen’s “when” requirement similarly is a function of the nature of the 
alleged conduct.  A simple allegation that inequitable conduct occurred 
during patent prosecution may suffice in some cases, but in many other 
cases defendants may be required to identify the publication dates of 
references, press release issue dates, and contract execution dates.
178
 
Compliance with the “how” requirement entails an explanation of 
“how a patent examiner would have used undisclosed information in 
determining the patentability of the claims.”
179
  This has been described as 
the “most onerous step in the Exergen analysis.”
180
  The pleading must 
explain the manner in which the information is “material and non-
cumulative.”
181
  The controlling inquiry is whether the allegations “put 
Plaintiffs on notice as to what information Defendants contend should have 
been provided to the examiner but wasn’t, and how that information would 
have changed the examiner’s decision.”
182
  There is some confusion among 
the federal district courts as to whether Exergen also imposes a separate 
“why” requirement.  It is not clear that either Rule 9(b) or the prior Seventh 
Circuit decision on which Exergen is based mandates such a showing.
183
  In 
any event, a pleading which satisfies the “how” element likely also satisfies 
the “why” element.
184
  As in the case of “how,” satisfaction of the “why” 
element requires pleading “with specificity that the undisclosed 
information is not cumulative of the information that was disclosed during 
prosecution.”
185
 
Therasense did not specifically address the pleading requirements for 
an inequitable conduct defense,
186
 and by January 2014, no federal decision 
 
 178.  DeRenzi & Jackson, supra note 176, at 11. 
 179.  Aevoe Corp., 2013 WL 876036 at *8. 
 180.  See McKechnie Vehicle Components USA, Inc. v. Lacks Indus., Inc., No. 09-cv-
11594, 2010 WL 4643081, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 9, 2010).  
 181.  Aevoe Corp., 2013 WL 876036, at *5. 
 182.  Lincoln Nat’l Life v. Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 1:07-cv-265, 2010 WL 1781013, 
at *8 (N.D. Ind. May 3, 2010). 
 183.  See, e.g., Lincoln Nat’l Life, 2010 WL 1781013 at *6 (holding that there is no 
separate “why” requirement); Johnson Outdoors Inc. v. Navico, Inc., 774 F. Supp. 2d 1191, 
1197 (M.D. Ala. 2011) (suggesting that there is no “independent ‘why’ requirement.”). 
 184.  See DeRenzi & Jackson, supra note 176, at 12 (observing that pleading 
requirements for inequitable conduct meld together the “how” and “why” elements). 
 185.  Aevoe Corp. v. AE Tech. Co., No. 2:12-cv-00053-GMN-NJK, 2013 WL 876036, 
at *8 (D. Nev. Mar. 7, 2013). See Oracle Corp. v. DrugLogic, Inc., 807 F. Supp. 2d 885, 897 
(N.D. Cal. 2011) (dismissing inequitable conduct defense and counterclaim in part for 
failure to allege facts to support inference that withheld information was not cumulative). 
 186.  See Cutsforth, Inc. v. LEMM Liquidating Co., No. 12-cv-1200 (SRN/JSM), 2013 
WL 2455979, at *4 (D. Minn. June 6, 2013) (“Therasense did not address inequitable 
conduct claims at the pleading stage nor did it override Exergen’s pleading requirements.”); 
Waters Indus., Inc. v. JJI Int’l, Inc., No. 11 C 3791, 2012 WL 5966534, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 
28, 2012) (same); Bayer Cropscience AG v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, Civil No. 10-1045 
(RMB/JS), 2012 WL 1253047, at *2 (D. Del. Apr. 12, 2012).  
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pre- or post-Therasense held that the facts set forth in a pleading alleging 
inequitable conduct must meet the clear and convincing standard.
187
  But 
Therasense did raise the hurdle in substance insofar as all of the elements 
of the new inequitable conduct standard now must be pled with 
particularity,
188
 and if they are not an inequitable conduct counterclaim 
must be dismissed and a parallel affirmative defense must be stricken.
189
  
This is true even though Rule 9(b), which requires allegations of fraud to 
be pleaded with particularity, permits the intent element to be pleaded 
without specificity.
190
  This elevated pleading standard “is the most onerous 
in all of civil litigation.”
191
  Moreover, several district courts have held that 
“Therasense raised the pleading bar so that specific intent to deceive must 
be the single most reasonable inference able to be drawn” from the facts 
alleged, rather than merely a reasonable inference.
192
  Accordingly, while 
 
 187.  See Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp. v. Hitachi Koki Co., No. 09-948, 2012 WL 
1952977, at *6 (E.D. Wis. May 29, 2012) (holding that Therasense does not apply to the 
pleading stage, and applying Exergen); W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Medtronics, Inc., 850 
F. Supp. 2d 630, 635 (E.D. Va. 2013) (“Although the facts alleged in [defendant’s] 
counterclaim may not be enough to satisfy the Therasense elements by clear and convincing 
evidence, the alleged facts are sufficient to satisfy Exergen’s pleading requirements.”); 
Human Genome Scis., Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-6519-MRP (JEMx), 2011 WL 
7461786, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2011) (“No Federal Circuit decision, before Therasense or 
after Therasense, has stated that the facts in a pleading for inequitable conduct must meet 
the clear and convincing standard.”).  
 188.  Evonik Degussa GMBH v. Materia Inc., No. 09-cv-636 (NLH-JS), 2012 WL 
4503771, at *4 (D. Del. Oct. 1, 2012) (“[T]he proper standard to apply at this stage in the 
proceedings is the standard set forth in Exergen.  As stated in Exergen, a claim for 
inequitable conduct must be plead with particularity under Rule 9(b).”); Thurlow & Elbert, 
supra note 159, at 25 (“Therasense, without changing the Exergen standard for pleading 
inequitable conduct in form, heightens it in substance since all of the elements of the new 
inequitable conduct standard, including ‘but-for’ materiality and specific intent, must be 
supported with particularized allegations.”); cf. Butamax v. Gevo, Inc., Civ. No. 11-54-SLR, 
2013 WL 571801, at *2 (D. Del. Feb. 13, 2013) (“[T]he standard for proving inequitable 
conduct is a more rigorous one than the standard for pleading inequitable conduct; 
apparently, even the Federal Circuit has been tempted to confuse the same.”). 
 189.  B-K Lighting, Inc. v. Vision3 Lighting, No. CV 06-02825 MMM (PLAx), 2013 
WL 941839, at *21 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2013); see also Mycone Dental Supply Co. v. 
Creative Nail Design, Inc., Civil Action No. 11-4380 (JBS-KMW), 2013 WL 3216145, at 
*6 (D.N.J. June 24, 2013) (“[T]he heightened standards for proving inequitable conduct 
recently set by the Federal Circuit are reflected in the heightened standards that are required 
for pleading inequitable conduct at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage.”). 
 190.  FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (“[A] party must state with particularity the circumstances 
constituting fraud or mistake.  Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s 
mind may be alleged generally.”). 
 191.  Chiang, supra note 3, at 1268. 
 192.  Hansen Mfg. Corp. v. Enduro Sys., Inc., No. 11-cv-4030, 2011 WL 5526627, at *4 
(D.S.D. Nov. 14, 2011); see also Quest Software, Inc. v. Centrify Corp., No. 2:10-cv-859, 
2011 WL 5508820, at *2-3 (D. Utah Nov. 9, 2011).  Other courts have disagreed and held 
that claimant need only allege facts from which the court could reasonably infer that the 
patent applicant made a deliberate decision to deceive the PTO.  See, e.g., Cutsforth, Inc. v. 
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Exergen alone had no significant downward impact on the number of cases 
alleging inequitable conduct,
193
 Exergen in combination with Therasense 
has had a substantial chilling effect.  The heightened pleading burden in 
tandem with the heightened substantive burden has operated to deter and 
foreclose many assertions of the inequitable conduct defense, particularly 
because Federal Circuit law controls with respect to both the pleading
194
 
and the proof
195
 of inequitable conduct.  During the period from 2008 to 
2012 the percentage of Answers that were filed in patent cases that 
contained the term “inequitable conduct” declined sharply from forty-one 
percent to twenty-one percent.
196
  This decline is likely a reaction to the 
virtually insurmountable barriers created by Exergen and Therasense.  In 
the last six months of 2011, seventeen of nineteen district court rulings on 
the pleadings resulted in the dismissal of inequitable conduct claims.
197
  
 
LEMM Liquidating Co., No. 12-cv-1200 (SRN/JSM), 2013 WL 2455979, at *4 (D. Minn. 
June 6, 2013) (holding that court must determine whether it could “reasonably infer that the 
[USPTO] would not have allowed the claim if it had been aware of the undisclosed 
reference”); CoStar Realty Info., Inc. v. CIVIX-DDI, LLC, Nos. 12 C 4968, 12 C 7091, 12 
C 8632, 2013 WL 2151548, at *11 (N.D. Ill. May 15, 2013) (holding that “[a]t the pleading 
stage, the proponent of inequitable conduct need only plead sufficient facts that the court 
‘may reasonably infer’ knowledge and intent.”); Aeveo Corp. v. AE Tech Co., No. 2:12-cv-
00053-GMN-NJK, 2013 WL 876036, at *10 (D. Nev. Mar. 7, 2013) (determining that the 
claimant need only allege facts from which court could make reasonable inferences 
regarding deliberate deceit). 
 193.  Panacea, supra note 93, at 396 (concluding that Exergen “has not appeared to stem 
the tide of inequitable conduct allegations”).  But cf. Andrea, supra note 172, at 469 
(concluding that Exergen will hinder the assertion of many legitimate inequitable conduct 
claims, thereby creating “incentives for unscrupulous applicants and attorneys to conceal 
material information from the PTO”); Lisa A. Dolak, Beware the Inequitable Conduct 
Charge! (Why Practitioners Submit What They Submit), 91 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
SOC’Y 558, 568 (2009) (observing that Exergen “has the potential to dramatically alter the 
inequitable conduct landscape by curbing misconduct allegations at their source – the 
pleadings”); Benjamin Johnson, Note, The Federal Circuit’s Inequitable Conduct Standard 
After Exergen v. Wal-Mart: A Step in the Right Direction, but Will it Really Change 
Anything?, 8 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 360, 370 (2010) (predicting that post-Exergen, 
defendants in patent infringement cases “will be considerably more conservative in their use 
of the inequitable conduct” defense). 
 194.  See Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(noting that “whether inequitable conduct has been adequately pleaded is a question of 
Federal Circuit law”).  Accord Cumberland Pharm., Inc. v. Mylan Institut., LLC, No. 12 C 
3846, 2012 WL 6567922,  at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 14, 2012) (holding that Federal Circuit law 
governs heightened pleading requirement). 
 195.  See Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1327 n.3 (enumerating the elements of inequitable 
conduct); Zep Solar, Inc. v. Westinghouse Solar, Inc., No. C 11-06493 JSW, 2012 WL 
1293873, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2012) (stating that “Federal Circuit law governs 
sufficiency of allegations of inequitable conduct”). 
 196.  Rantanen, supra note 64, at 101.  
 197.  See Carlson, supra note 70, at 10.  Where inequitable conduct pleadings have been 
found insufficient, courts have not infrequently granted leave to amend.  But leave is neither 
assured nor a guarantee of success.  See, e.g., Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v. Samsung 
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And during the period from June 2011 to April 2013, the Federal Circuit 
affirmed a district court’s finding of inequitable conduct only once.
198
 
The foregoing effects are magnified because there is no effective 
substitute for the inequitable conduct defense.  The doctrine of unclean 
hands, from which inequitable conduct derives, and which remains intact 
post-Therasense,
199
 is a distinct doctrine with its own considerations.
200
  
Unclean hands generally cannot be raised by a party who is foreign to the 
alleged unclean conduct at the time of its occurrence.
201
  In addition, 
whereas application of the inequitable conduct doctrine results in the 
unenforceability of the entire patent, the unclean hands defense merely 
allows courts to dismiss complaints filed by plaintiffs suing in bad faith.
202
 
The Supreme Court has never granted certiorari on a petition 
involving inequitable conduct in its modern incarnation.
203
  Unless it does 
so, the Federal Circuit’s harsh restrictions on the use of the inequitable 
conduct defense will be operative for the foreseeable future.  These 
restrictions, particularly Therasense’s adoption of but-for materiality, will 
have numerous negative effects.  First, they will function to reduce the 
incentive for patent applicants to be candid with the PTO and thereby 
 
Elecs. Co., 749 F. Supp. 2d 892, 903 (W.D. Wis. 2010) (denying in part and granting in part 
request for leave to amend inequitable conduct counterclaims).  
 198.  Rantanen, supra note 64, at 111; see also Chiang, supra note 3, at 1286 (noting that 
the Federal Circuit is approaching the point of never finding inequitable conduct to be 
proven). 
 199.  See Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1287 (noting that “the unclean hands doctrine remains 
available to supply a remedy for egregious misconduct”).  Egregious misconduct might 
provide a basis for equitable relief other than patent unenforceability where it falls short of 
inequitable conduct.   
 200.  See, e.g., Nordock Inc. v. Sys. Inc., 927 F. Supp. 2d 577, 605 (E.D. Wis. 2013) 
(holding that the trial court has broad discretion under the unclean hands doctrine). 
 201.  See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Mitsubishi Heavy Indus. Ltd., No. 3:10-CV-276-F, 2013 WL 
2338345, at *28 (N.D. Tex. May 28, 2013) (noting that “misconduct unrelated to the matter 
at litigation is not relevant to the demonstration of inequitable conduct during the 
prosecution of the patent at issue”); Nicole M. Murphy, Note, Inequitable Conduct Doctrine 
Reform: Is the Death Penalty for Patents Still Appropriate?, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2274, 2286 
(2009) (noting that a party foreign to the alleged misconduct cannot raise unclean hands 
defense). 
 202.  See Metris U.S.A., Inc. v. Faro Tech., Inc., 882 F. Supp. 2d 160, 169, 175-76 (D. 
Mass. 2011) (citing Therasense for the proposition that a finding of inequitable conduct 
results in unenforceability of an entire patent); Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 
290 U.S. 240, 245-46 (1933) (affirming dismissal of patent infringement action on basis of 
unclean hands). 
 203.  No petition was filed by defendants in Therasense.  In October 2013 the Supreme 
Court denied certiorari in a post-Therasense case concerning the inequitable conduct 
doctrine.  See Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC v. 1st Media, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 418 (2013); 
David Hricik, Supremes Deny Cert in Sony v. First Media: An Update, PATENTLY-O (Oct. 
15, 2013), http://patentlyo.com/hricik/2013/10/supremes-deny-cert-in-sony-v-first-
media.html.  
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undermine one of the primary goals of the U.S. patent system.
204
 
Second, the restrictions will reduce patent quality,
205
 insofar as the 
duty of candor owed by patent applicants to the PTO helps ensure quality 
patents.  Critics have long complained that the PTO, which in 2013 granted 
approximately 278,000 patents,
206
 grants far too many low-quality 
patents.
207
  According to one frequently cited study, courts have found 
invalid forty-six percent of patents litigated to judgment.
208
  Patent quality 
 
 204.  See Taylor, supra note 88, at 125 (observing that adoption by PTO of Therasense 
materiality standard “may encourage applicants to withhold relevant prior art.”).  See also 
Elizabeth Peters, Note, Are We Living in a Material World?: An Analysis of the Federal 
Circuit’s Materiality Standard under the Patent Doctrine of Inequitable Conduct, 93 IOWA 
L. REV. 1519, 1522 (2008) (noting vital role that doctrine of inequitable conduct plays in 
preserving fairness of U.S. patent system). 
 205.  “Patent quality” has been defined as “the capacity of a granted patent to meet (or 
exceed) the statutory standards of patentability—most importantly, to [cover inventions 
which are] novel, nonobvious, and clearly and sufficiently described.”  R. Polk Wagner, 
Understanding Patent-Quality Mechanisms, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2135, 2138 (2009).  Accord 
Sean B. Seymour, The Presumption of Patentability, 97 MINN. L. REV. 990, 990-91 (2013) 
(reinforcing the consensus opinion that a patent’s quality is measured in terms of its novelty, 
obviousness, and clarity of description).  A high-quality patent is “one that covers an 
invention that would not otherwise be made [but for the incentive of a patent] or one that 
ensures that a good idea is commercialized . . . .”  Bronwyn H. Hall & Dietmar Harhoff, 
Post-Grant Reviews in the U.S. Patent System—Design Choices and Expected Impact, 19 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 989, 991 (2004); accord Seymour at 991 n.3 (noting the positive 
business effects of patents created by their encouragement of inventive processes). 
 206.  Dennis Crouch & Jason Rantanen, Utility Patents Granted in 2013: A New Record 
(for the Fourth Consecutive Year), PATENTLY-O (Jan. 2, 2014), 
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/01/utility-patents-granted-in-2013-a-new-record-for-the-
fourth-consecutive-year.html.  
 207.  See, e.g., Anup Malani & Jonathan S. Masur, Raising the Stakes in Patent Cases, 
101 GEO. L.J. 637, 640-41 (2013) (“The PTO issues scores of invalid patents every 
year. . . .”); Beth Simone Noveck, “Peer to Patent”: Collective Intelligence, Open Review, 
and Patent Reform, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 123, 123 (2006) (“There is a crisis of patent 
quality.  Patents are being issued that are vague and overbroad, lack novelty, and fail the 
constitutional mandate ‘[t]o promote the progress of Science and useful Arts.”); Wagner, 
supra note 205, at 2136 (“[T]he need to improve patent quality is essentially undisputed.”). 
 208.  See John A. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of 
Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205 (1998) (illustrating the ratios of valid and invalid 
litigated patents).  This figure excludes settled cases, which could involve a greater 
frequency of valid patents.  Id.  Other older studies also have found high rates of invalidity.  
See, e.g., Kimberley A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases—An Empirical Peek Inside 
the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 392 (2000) (noting that judges upheld validity of 
patents in only sixty-four percent of cases during the period 1983-1999).  An unpublished 
2012 study found much higher invalidity rates.  This study examined 283 cases where patent 
validity was determined by a federal district court during the period from 2007 to 2011.  It 
concluded that cases in which claims in a patent were held valid decreased from twenty 
percent in 2007 to six percent in 2011, and averaged only fourteen percent during the study 
period. MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS, UNITED STATES PATENT INVALIDITY STUDY 2012, at 2, 
available at https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/Smyth_USPatentInvalidity_Sept12.pdf.  
The same study also found that when the district court invalidated a patent, the Federal 
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is a function of multiple factors.  One such factor is time – patent 
examiners average a mere eighteen hours per patent application
209
 and this 
short window has undermined the PTO’s ability to provide adequate 
examinations.
210
  A second factor is money.  Some recent evidence suggests 
that the PTO, whose “budget is largely derived from patent examination 
and post-allowance fees,”
211
 is biased toward granting patents.  
Specifically, the PTO preferentially grants “patents on technologies with 
high renewal rates and patent applications filed by large entities,” because 
such patents generate the most revenue.
212
 
A third critical factor is the scope of disclosure to the PTO.  Rule 56 
underscores this point: “[T]he most effective patent examination occurs 
when . . . the [PTO] is aware of and evaluates the teachings of all 
information material to patentability.”
213
  Pre-Therasense, the inequitable 
conduct doctrine addressed the patent-quality problem by increasing the 
flow of information to examiners.
214
  Post-Therasense, with the incentive 
for candor diminished by the Federal Circuit and the corresponding 
proposed revision of Rule 56, the PTO will become even more poorly 
informed about inventions and relevant art than it is already.
215
  This will 
undoubtedly have negative consequences, as it cannot help but to further 
erode patent quality.  Society benefits when the PTO grants high-quality 
patents and suffers when it grants low-quality patents.  The issuance of 
valid patents creates incentives for innovation and promotes the 
commercialization of beneficial technical advances,
216
 whereas bad patents 
 
Circuit affirmed that decision in more than 70 percent of the cases during the period 2002-
2012.  Id. at 8. 
 209.  Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 
1500 (2001). 
 210.  See Doug Lichtman & Mark Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption of 
Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 46-47 (2007) (noting that resource and time constraints 
hinder accurate evaluation of patents). 
 211.  Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Does Agency Funding Affect 
Decisionmaking?: An Empirical Assessment of the PTO’s Granting Patterns, 66 VAND. L. 
REV. 67, 69 (2013). 
 212.  Id. at 70. 
 213.  37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2009).  Numerous courts and commentators agree.  See, e.g., 
Avocent Redmond Corp. v. Raritan Americas, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 2d 229, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013) (“The public interest is best served when the USPTO is aware of all information 
material to patentability.”); Seymour, supra note 205, at 1039 (“The quality of an issued 
patent depends on the quality of the underlying Patent Office examination.  To a large extent 
the assurance of a good Patent Office examination is all about information.”).   
 214.  See Cotropia, supra note 60, at 755 (noting that historically, the inequitable 
conduct doctrine helped address the patent quality problem). 
 215.  Rantanen & Petherbridge, supra note 79, at 242 (concluding that the PTO “will be 
even more in the dark when conducting patent examinations after Therasense than it was 
before”).   
 216.  See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual 
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(with their presumption of validity) tend to block innovation. 
As will be shown below, the adoption of the AIA has served to 
exacerbate the foregoing negative effects of the Therasense decision.  The 
combination of Therasense and AIA has substantially limited the use of the 
inequitable conduct defense.  There has been a significant reduction in both 
the assertion of the defense
217
 and the success of the defense.  In the first 
year after Therasense was decided, federal district courts granted eleven 
motions for summary judgment seeking a finding of no inequitable 
conduct, while denying only three such motions.
218
  In the same time period 
federal district courts issued thirteen post-trial opinions finding no 
inequitable conduct and only three opinions finding such conduct.
219
  More 
recently, district court dismissals of inequitable conduct claims have 
continued to rise.
220
 
E.  Walker Process Antitrust Claims 
Beyond its negative impact on the use of the inequitable conduct 
defense, Therasense also will significantly limit the opportunity for alleged 
 
Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 129-30 (2004) (stating that one justification for 
intellectual property rights is to incentivize the creation of new ideas by protecting such 
ideas from being copied freely). 
 217.  See Ryan Davis, Inequitable Conduct a Dying Defense 2 Years Post-Therasense, 
LAW360 (May 23, 2013, 9:13 PM) available at 
http://www.law360.com/articles/444480/inequitable-conduct-a-dying-defense-2-years-post-
therasense (“Proving an inequitable conduct defense in a patent case has become so difficult 
because of the Federal Circuit’s Therasense ruling that attorneys rarely bother to mount it 
anymore . . . .”); Daniel J. Schwartz, Leveraging Strategies and Scheduling Complexities in 
Patent Cases to Design Successful Infringement Defenses, 2013 WL 574400, at *5  
(Aspatore, 2013) (noting that post-Therasense “there have been far fewer inequitable 
conduct decisions”); Oelke, supra note 96, at *5 (noting that the inequitable conduct defense 
is pled less frequently “given that the defense is far less likely to prevail following 
Therasense”). 
 218.  Carlson, supra note 69, at 17. 
 219.  Id.; see also White, supra note 3, at 717 (observing that combination of Therasense 
and AIA “effectively eliminated” the inequitable conduct doctrine); Cheng, Isackson & 
Gray, supra note 147 (noting the scarcity of post-Therasense cases finding inequitable 
conduct).  For a rare example of a post-Therasense court granting a motion for summary 
judgment of unenforceability due to inequitable conduct, see Caron v. QuicKutz, Inc., No. 
CV-09-02600-PHX-NVW, 2012 WL 5497869, at *14 (D. Ariz. Nov. 13, 2012) (holding 
that submission of unmistakably false affidavit constituted an affirmative act of egregious 
misconduct). 
 220.  See David A. Kelly, The Impact of the America Invents Act and Recent Court 
Decisions on Patent Law Practitioners and Their Clients, 2012 WL 6636449, at *11 
(Aspatore, Nov. 2012) (stating that district courts increasingly dismiss inequitable conduct 
claims); Bruce Wexler & Jamie Lucia, IP: Inequitable Conduct Post-Therasense, 
INSIDECOUNSEL (Aug. 13, 2013) http://www.insidecounsel.com/2013/08/13/ip-inequitable-
conduct-post-emtherasense-em (noting that district courts “have increasingly been 
willing . . . to dismiss or strike inequitable conduct defenses at the pleadings stage”). 
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patent infringers to assert Walker Process antitrust claims.  A patent is a 
monopoly by nature
221
 but a patent-holder can generally enforce its rights 
under an unexpired patent without fear of antitrust liability under an 
exception to antitrust law.
222
  However, the Supreme Court held in Walker 
Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp.
223
 that if a 
patent-holder obtained its patent by knowingly and willfully 
misrepresenting facts to the PTO, such behavior may be sufficient to strip it 
of its exemption from antitrust laws.
224
  In its decision, the Supreme Court 
cited the same early unclean hands cases that are the foundation of 
inequitable conduct law – Keystone, Hazel-Atlas, and Precision.
225
 
Walker Process claims are increasingly common.
226
  Such claims, 
which have been described as more egregious versions of inequitable 
conduct,
227
 are typically asserted as counterclaims by defendants in patent 
 
 221.  See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S, 100, 135 (1969) 
(referring to patent as a “legal monopoly”); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 
225, 229 (1964) (“The grant of a patent is the grant of a statutory monopoly.”). 
 222.  See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 
(1945) (“[A] patent is an exception to the general rule against monopolies and to the right to 
access to a free and open market.”); accord Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 
2223, 2238 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (stating that a patent is an exception to 
antitrust law).   
 223.  382 U.S. 172 (1965).  Subsequent case law permits the plaintiff to make an 
alternative showing – that, whether or not the patent-holder obtained the patent by fraud, the 
infringement suit was a mere sham to cover what is nothing more than an attempt to 
interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor.  See Nobelpharma AB v. 
Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1071 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (stating that such a sham 
deprives a party of immunity from antitrust laws).  This alternative showing is a separate 
theory of relief that, although sometimes conflated with Walker Process fraud, is governed 
by different standards.  Under Professional Real Estate Investors, Inv. v. Columbia Pictures 
Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1993) (internal quotations omitted), a party asserting a 
claim of sham litigation must show that (1) the lawsuit is objectively meritless such that no 
reasonable litigant could expect success on the merits, and (2) the baseless lawsuit “conceals 
an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor.”  In patent 
litigation, a sham suit (sometimes referred to as a “PRE claim”) must be subjectively 
brought in bad faith and based on a theory of infringement or invalidity that is objectively 
baseless.  See Cornucopia Prods., LLC v. Dyson, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1103 (D. Ariz. 
2012) (dismissing PRE claim); TransWeb LLC v. 3M Innovative Prop. Co., No. 10-4413 
(FSH), 2011 WL 2181189, at *15 (D.N.J. June 1, 2011) (explaining elements of sham 
litigation claim); see also Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1071 (noting that PRE and Walker 
Process provide alternative legal theories on which a patentee may lose its antitrust 
immunity, and both theories may be applied to the same conduct); S.W. O’Donnell, Unified 
Theory of Antitrust Counterclaims in Patent Litigation, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 3 n.8 (2004) 
(observing that, prior to Nobelpharma, the Federal Circuit was “on a path of congruence” 
between Walker Process and PRE). 
 224.  Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 177. 
 225.  Id. 
 226.  See Oelke, supra note 96 at *8-9 (observing a recent uptick in the litigation of 
hybrid cases that assert a mixture of patent and Walker Process claims). 
 227.  See SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., No. C 04-4379 JF (RS), 2008 WL 
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infringement suits.
228
  Under Federal Circuit law, direct purchasers of 
patented products also have standing to bring Walker Process claims, even 
if they lack standing to bring declaratory judgment actions to invalidate the 
patents.
229
  In order to succeed, the complaining party must show the 
patent-holder both (1) procured its patent by knowingly and willfully 
misrepresenting facts to the PTO or (in the case of an assignee) maintained 
and enforced the patent with knowledge of the fraudulent manner in which 
it was procured, and (2) monopolized or attempted to monopolize the 
relevant market, in violation of the Sherman Act.
230
  If the party can make 
both showings, it can establish antitrust liability and obtain treble damages 
under section four of the Clayton Act,
231
 equitable relief under section 16 of 
 
4615605, at *5 n.5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2008) (“Walker Process fraud essentially is a more 
egregious version of inequitable conduct.”); cf. Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1069 (noting that 
inequitable conduct is “a broader, more inclusive concept than the common law fraud 
needed to support a Walker Process counterclaim”). 
 228.  See Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1067 (alleged infringer counterclaimed, asserting 
antitrust violation); Cornucopia Prods., 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1098 (permitting limited 
offensive use of Walker Process claim where it was substantively indistinguishable from a 
typical Walker Process counterclaim); Kroger Co. v. Sanofi-Aventis, 701 F. Supp. 2d 938, 
960 (S.D. Ohio 2010) (“Typically, Walker Process claims are brought as counterclaims in 
patent infringement lawsuits . . . .”).  
 229.  See Ritz Camera & Image, LLC v. SanDisk Corp., 700 F.3d 503, 508 (Fed. Cir. 
2012).  Ritz Camera, decided in late 2012, arguably expands the universe of potential 
Walker Process claims, because patent holders can now be sued by a wide range of parties 
who allege that they paid inflated prices for goods protected by patents.  However, the high 
bar to proving fraud before the PTO minimizes the long-term impact of the case.  Indeed, in 
Ritz Camera the Federal Circuit specifically rejected the argument that its holding would 
trigger a flood of litigation and stem innovation, especially given the demanding proof 
requirements of a Walker Process claim.  Id.  The Federal Circuit noted that the Supreme 
Court had rejected the same flooding argument in Walker Process.  Id.   
 230.  Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 174, 176-77.  The first prong makes clear that 
invalidity of the patent is insufficient and a showing of intentional fraud in its procurement 
is required.  The second prong incorporates the rules of antitrust law generally.  Ritz Camera 
& Image, LLC, 700 F.3d at 506.  The Sherman Act provides, in relevant part, that “[e]very 
person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any 
other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several 
States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony . . . .”  15 U.S.C. § 2 
(2006).  A monopolization claim has two elements: “(1) the possession of monopoly power 
in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power, as 
distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business 
acumen, or historic accident.”  United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 
(1966).  “The relevant market is the field in which meaningful competition is said to exist.”  
IGT v. Alliance Gaming Corp., 702 F.3d 1338, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Image 
Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 1997)).  
Numerous Walker Process claims fail due to the plaintiff’s failure to identify a pertinent 
market or demonstrate the other party’s market power.  Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust, 
Inequitable Conduct, and the Intent to Deceive the Patent Office, 1 UC IRVINE L. REV. 323, 
344 (2011). 
 231.  15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006). 
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the Clayton Act, or both.
232
  Whether conduct in procuring or enforcing a 
patent suffices to strip a patentee of its immunity from antitrust laws is 
decided under Federal Circuit law, whereas regional circuit law applies to 
the other elements of antitrust law (for example, market power).
233
  State 
antitrust law frequently closely tracks the language of the Sherman Act, so 
antitrust claims asserted under state statutes in patent infringement cases 
are typically analyzed under the same rules and case law applicable to 
Sherman Act claims.
234
  At least one federal court has held that plaintiffs 
may assert state law Walker Process-type antitrust claims predicated on 
fraudulent conduct before the PTO.
235
 
Walker Process fraud must be pled with particularity under Rule 
9(b).
236
  To plead and prove the first prong (fraud on the PTO), a party 
asserting a Walker Process claim must establish each of the following 
elements: (1) the patentee obtained a patent by knowingly and willfully 
misrepresenting material facts to the PTO (or omitting to state material 
facts), (2) the patentee acted with intent to deceive the PTO, (3) the PTO 
justifiably relied on the misrepresentation or omission, and (4) the patent 
would not have issued but for the misrepresentation or omission.
237
 
A primary difference between inequitable conduct claims and Walker 
Process claims is temporal.  Whereas inequitable conduct generally 
 
 232.  Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 177-78; 15 U.S.C. § 26 (2006).  In Southern Snow 
Mfg. Co. v. SnoWizard Holdings, Inc., Civil Action Nos. 06-9170, 09-3394, 10-0791, 11-
1499, 2013 WL 620266, at *4-5 (E.D. La. Feb. 19, 2013), a federal district court extended 
Walker Process and held that the attempted enforcement of a trademark registration 
obtained by fraud can constitute an antitrust violation.  
 233.  Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1068 (Fed. Cir. 
1998); Cornucopia Prods., LLC v. Dyson, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1098 (D. Ariz. 2012) 
(“Federal Circuit law now governs the patent-specific portions of [a Walker Process] claim, 
while regional circuit law governs the antitrust-specific portion of the claim.”).  See also In 
re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 2332, Master Docket No. 3:12-cv-2389 (PGS), 2013 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126468, at *65 (D.N.J. Sept. 5, 2013) (noting that that Ritz Camera is 
persuasive authority, but not binding on the federal district court). 
 234.  See, e.g., TransWeb LLC v. 3M Innovative Prop. Co., Civil Action No. 10-4413 
(FSH), 2011 WL 2181189, at *12 (D.N.J. June 1, 2011) (“Because New Jersey’s antitrust 
statutes are construed in harmony with federal antitrust statutes, the Court need not 
separately analyze the state law claims.”); Kimberley-Clark Worldwide, Inc. v. First Quality 
Baby Prods., LLC, Civil No. 1:CV-09-1685, 2011 WL 1883815, at *2 n.1 (M.D. Pa. May 
17, 2011) (noting that requirements under New York’s Donnelly Act are identical to a 
monopolization claim under the Sherman Act); Correct Craft IP Holdings, LLC v. Malibu 
Boats, LLC, No. 6:09-cv-813-Orl-28KRS, 2010 WL 598693, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 17, 
2010) (noting that Florida Antitrust Statutes “closely track the language of the Sherman Act 
and are analyzed under the same rules and case law”). 
 235.  In re DDAVP Indirect Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 903 F. Supp. 2d 198, 215-19 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 236.  TransWeb, 2011 WL 2181189 at *12. 
 237.  C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1998); accord 
Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1069-70 (applying the same four-factor test). 
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concerns conduct and scienter during the patent prosecution process, 
Walker Process refers to these elements at the time a patent infringement 
action is commenced, which may occur many years after a patent issues.
238
 
A more important distinction concerns proof.  Prior to Therasense a 
party seeking to establish Walker Process fraud confronted a more onerous 
burden than a party seeking to establish inequitable conduct, insofar as 
Walker Process fraud required a higher showing of both intent and 
materiality.
239
  Under Walker Process, there must be clear and convincing 
evidence of intent to deceive the examiner and thereby cause the PTO to 
issue an invalid patent.
240
  With respect to fraudulent omissions, there must 
be evidence of intent separable from the simple fact of the omission.
241
  The 
intent prong, which apparently requires specific intent,
242
 is difficult to 
prove, so the common result is summary judgment in favor of Walker 
Process defendants.
243
  Walker Process fraud also requires but-for 
materiality,
244
 whereas inequitable conduct pre-Therasense did not.  
Finally, use of a sliding scale to balance materiality and intent was 
authorized by the Federal Circuit pre-Therasense in inequitable conduct 
cases,
245
 whereas no such scale has been approved for use in Walker 
 
 238.  Herbert Hovenkamp, Competition for Innovation, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 799, 
828. 
 239.  Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“To 
demonstrate Walker Process fraud, a claimant must make higher threshold showings of both 
materiality and intent than are required to show inequitable conduct.”); SanDisk Corp. v. 
STMicroelectronics, Inc., No. C 04-4379 JF (RS), 2008 WL 4615605, at *7 n.8 (N.D. Cal. 
Oct. 17, 2008) (commenting that the scienter requirement for inequitable conduct is “much 
lower” than for Walker Process fraud); Oelke, supra note 96 at *9 (noting the significant 
difference pre-Therasense between the levels of materiality and intent required to prove 
inequitable conduct and Walker Process fraud). 
 240.  Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1070; Cornucopia Prods., LLC v. Dyson, Inc., 881 F. 
Supp. 2d 1086, 1099 (D. Ariz. 2012). 
 241.  Dippin’ Dots, Inc., 476 F.3d at 1347. 
 242.  See American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1368 
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (stating that in a Walker Process claim based on attempt to monopolize, “a 
specific intent, greater than an intent evidenced by gross negligence or recklessness, is an 
indispensable element”); accord Argus Chem. Corp. v. Fibre Glass-Evercoat Co., 812 F.2d 
1381, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (quoting American Hoist’s requirement of specific intent).  But 
cf. Hydril Co. LP v. Grant Prideco LP, 474 F.3d 1344, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (explaining 
that Walker Process fraud requires “the intent to deceive or, at least, a state of mind so 
reckless as to the consequences that it is held to be the equivalent of intent (scienter)”). 
 243.  SanDisk Corp., 2008 WL 4615605 at *7 (“This intent requirement is a high bar that 
often results in adjudication in favor of the Walker Process defendant at summary 
judgment.”). 
 244.  Dippin’ Dots, 476 F.3d at 1347; accord Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1071 (holding 
that a party making a Walker Process claim must make “a clear showing of reliance, i.e., 
that the patent would not have issued but for the misrepresentation or omission”); SanDisk 
Corp., 2008 WL 4615605, at *5 (noting that materiality requires a showing that the patent 
would not have been issued but for the misrepresentation). 
 245.  See, e.g., American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d at 1363 
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Process cases.
246
 
The differing burdens meant that pre-Therasense, a finding of 
inequitable conduct did not by itself suffice to support a finding of Walker 
Process fraud,
247
 and, conversely, a finding that the patentee did not engage 
in inequitable conduct mooted a Walker Process claim.
248
  In short, Walker 
Process fraud could not be found in the absence of inequitable conduct.
249
  
The Federal Circuit has explained the proposition this way:  parties in 
patent infringement litigation seeking unenforceability on the ground of 
inequitable conduct raise a shield, parties seeking antitrust damages raise a 
sword,
250
 and parties break their Walker Process swords when they fail to 
first establish inequitable conduct.
251
 
 
(noting that materiality and culpability are often intertwined; thus, a stronger showing of one 
may require less of a showing of the other); see also Digital Equip. Corp. v. Diamond, 653 
F.2d 701, 716 (1st Cir. 1981)  (recognizing that materiality and culpability are intertwined). 
 246.  Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1071. 
 247.  Id. at 1070-71; In re Wellbutrin SR Antitrust Litig., Nos. 04-5525, 05-396, 2010 
WL 8425187, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2010) (“A showing of inequitable conduct is 
therefore insufficient to proceed with a Walker Process fraud claim.”). 
 248.  See, e.g., In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 2332, No. 3:12-cv-2389 (PGS), 
2013 WL 4780496, at *19-20 (D.N.J. Sept. 5, 2013) (dismissing Walker Process claims 
based on prior finding of no inequitable conduct in underlying patent case); SanDisk Corp. 
v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., No. C 04-4379 ZJF (RS), 2009 WL 1404689, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 
May 19, 2009) (“[J]ust as a finding of inequitable conduct may moot SanDisk’s patent 
infringement claim, a finding that SanDisk did not engage in equitable conduct may moot 
ST’s Walker Process claim . . . .”) (emphasis in original); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Genrad, 
Inc., 882 F. Supp. 1141, 1157 (D. Mass. 1995) (“A failure to prove inequitable conduct may 
eliminate the need to determine the [Walker Process] antitrust counterclaim.”). 
 249.  See Metris U.S.A., Inc. v. Faro Tech., Inc., 882 F. Supp. 2d 160, 174 (D. Mass. 
2011) (“[A] finding of inequitable conduct [is] a prerequisite for a showing of Walker 
Process fraud.”); Avery Dennison Corp. v. Continental Datalabel, Inc., No. 10 C 2744, 2010 
WL 4932666, at * 4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 30, 2010) (“[A] party that fails to prove inequitable 
conduct cannot establish a Walker Process violation that is premised on such conduct.”); 
Daiichi Sankyo, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., No. 030937 (SDW-MCA), 2009 WL 1437815, at *6 
(D.N.J. May 19, 2009) (“If a finding of inequitable conduct may be insufficient to meet the 
more rigorous standard for Walker Process fraud, it logically follows that Walker Process 
fraud cannot be found in the absence of inequitable conduct.”); FMC Corp. v. Manitowac 
Co., 835 F.2d 1411, 1417 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“[A] failure to establish inequitable conduct 
precludes a determination that [plaintiff] had borne its greater burden of establishing the 
fraud required to support its Walker Process claim.”); see also Leslie, supra note 230, at 336 
(noting that the Federal Circuit “makes it impossible to prove Walker Process fraud in the 
absence of inequitable conduct”). 
 250.  See Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1070 (“Inequitable conduct is thus an equitable 
defense in a patent infringement action and serves as a shield, while a more serious finding 
of fraud potentially exposes a patentee to antitrust liability and thus serves as a sword.”); 
Korody-Colyer Corp. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 828 F.2d 1572, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (stating 
that in raising a claim of inequitable conduct, “a party raises a shield,” while in contrast, a 
party asserting Walker Process claims “unsheaths a sword”). 
 251.  See FMC Corp., 835 F.2d at 1418 (concluding that when FMC failed to establish 
inequitable conduct, it “broke its Walker Process sword”).  
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Given the opportunity to moot antitrust claims, courts often conclude 
that the goals of convenience, efficiency, judicial economy, and the 
avoidance of juror confusion are best served by bifurcating under Rule 
42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
252
 and deciding the 
inequitable conduct defense first, before the antitrust claim is presented to a 
jury.
253
  The Federal Circuit has described the bifurcation for trial of patent 
issues and Walker Process issues as “now-standard practice.”
254
  
Bifurcation has also occurred at the discovery stage,
255
 in recognition of the 
substantial expense and burden associated with discovery in antitrust 
cases.
256
 
 
 252.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b) (permitting a court to order separate trials “[f]or 
convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize.”).   
 253.  See, e.g., Seiko Epson Corp. v. E-Babylon, Inc., No. 3:07-CV-896-BR, 2011 WL 
5554447, at *2 n.3 (D. Or. Nov. 15, 2011) (noting that the court previously stayed and 
bifurcated antitrust aspects of Walker Process claim pending resolution of inequitable 
conduct claim); Seiko Epson Corp. v. Glory S. Software Mfg., Inc., No. 06-CV-477-BR, 
2010 WL 256505, at *5 (D. Or. Jan. 19, 2010) (bifurcating and staying trial of Walker 
Process claim in interest of efficiency); SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., No. C 
04-4379 ZJF (RS), 2009 WL 1404689, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 19, 2009) (“[A] finding that 
SanDisk did not engage in inequitable conduct may moot ST’s Walker Process claim . . . . 
Accordingly, the Court concludes that convenience and judicial economy would be best 
served by trying the inequitable conduct defense first.”) (emphasis in original); Squared D 
Co. v. E.I. Elec., No. 06 C 5079, 2009 WL 136177, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 15, 2009) 
(bifurcating inequitable conduct and Walker Process claims); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. 
Genrad, Inc., 882 F. Supp. 1141, 1157 (D. Mass. 1995) (“[C]ourts often separate patent 
issues from antitrust counterclaim issues.”).   
 254.  See In re Innotron Diagnostics, 800 F.2d 1077, 1084 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (discussing 
23 cases utilizing the “now-standard practice” of bifurcating patent and antitrust issues); 
accord U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., No. 89 C 7533, 1994 WL 74989, at *2 
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 10, 1994) (noting “common practice” to bifurcate patent infringement and 
antitrust issues). 
 255.  See, e.g., Square D Co., 2009 WL 136177 at *2 (stating that bifurcation of issues 
can reduce the enormous expenses associated with discovery in antitrust cases); Chip-
Mender, Inc. v. Sherwin Williams Co., No. C 05-3465 PJH, 2006 WL 13058, at *13 (N.D. 
Cal. Jan. 3, 2006) (concluding that potential prejudice and other relevant factors necessitate 
the bifurcation of issues and stay of discovery); Implant Innovations, Inc. v. Nobelpharma 
AB, No. 93 C 7489, 1996 WL 568791, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 2, 1996) (determining that  
antitrust claims should be tried separately from patent claims in light of the great expense 
involved in antitrust discovery). 
 256.  See DSM Desotech Inc. v. 3D Systems, Inc., No. 08 CV 1531, 2008 WL 4812440, 
at *2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 28, 2008) (“[D]iscovery in any antitrust case can quickly become 
enormously expensive and burdensome to defendants.”) (emphasis in original); Roy W. 
Breitenbach & Alicia M. Wilson, Managing the Fact Discovery Tsunami: Tips When 
Defending a Federal Antitrust Case, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 18, 2011, at S8 (“In complex antitrust 
disputes, the amount of [electronically-stored information] often is so vast, and the 
preservation and production issues so complex, that e-discovery issues quickly spin out of 
control and destroy the entire defense budget.”); William H. Wagener, Note, Modeling the 
Effect of One-Way Fee Shifting on Discovery Abuse in Private Antitrust Litigation, 78 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1887, 1898-99 (2003) (“[C]ourts typically permit antitrust discovery to 
range further (and costs to run higher) than in most other cases.”).  But cf. Mark Anderson & 
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In Therasense the Federal Circuit did not signal that the components 
of Walker Process fraud have changed.
257
  None of the opinions in the en 
banc decision even considers the implications of the decision for Walker 
Process litigation.  But the court’s dramatic revision in Therasense of the 
standard for proving inequitable conduct has realigned the doctrine to make 
it “virtually congruent with intentional fraud under Walker Process.”
258
  
This realignment has major implications for Walker Process claims.  Even 
prior to Therasense, successful Walker Process claims were “few and far 
between,”
259
 with many such claims being dismissed on summary judgment 
motions.
260
  Successful antitrust claims post-Therasense will be even rarer.  
As noted, Walker Process claims cannot proceed in the absence of 
inequitable conduct.  Because the combination of Exergen and Therasense 
has made it so difficult to plead and prove inequitable conduct, many 
defendants who in the past might have been able to prosecute Walker 
Process claims will be barred from doing so even though inequitable 
 
Max Huffman, Iqbal, Twombly, and the Expected Cost of False Positive Error, 20 CORNELL 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 18 & n.84 (2010) (noting that a quantitative analysis of discovery 
expense in antitrust suits “does not appear to exist in current literature”). 
 257.  TransWeb LLC v. 3M Innovative Prop. Co., No. 10-4413 (FSH), 2011 WL 
2181189, at *12 (D.N.J. June 1, 2011) (stating that the Federal Circuit in Therasense failed 
to indicate that elements of Walker Process claims had changed in light of its decision). 
 258.  J. Thomas Rosch, Patent Law and Antitrust Law: Neither Friend nor Foe, but 
Business Partners, 13 SEDONA CONF. J. 95, 100 (2012); accord Metris U.S.A., Inc. v. Faro 
Tech., Inc., No. 08-CV-11187-PBS, 2011 WL 4346852, at *1 (D. Mass. Sept. 19, 2011) 
(“[I]t appears that Walker Process fraud is now largely coextensive with the new inequitable 
conduct doctrine.”).  One respect in which the doctrines are not entirely congruent concerns 
the adoption in Therasense of the egregious misconduct exception to but-for materiality.  
See Leslie, supra note 230, at 344 (“Although Therasense has narrowed the definition of 
materiality for inequitable conduct, the definition remains broader than materiality for 
Walker Process purposes.  Walker Process uses true but-for materiality, while Therasense 
adopted what may be termed ‘but-for plus’ since ‘affirmative egregious misconduct’ can be 
material even if the patent would have otherwise issued.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 259.  Rosch, supra note 258, at 99; see also David R. Steinman & Danielle S. 
Fitzpatrick, Antitrust Counterclaims in Patent Infringement Cases: A Guide to Walker 
Process and Sham-Litigation Claims, 10 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 95, 99 (2001) (calling 
Walker Process claims “extremely unsuccessful”).  Rare examples of evidence sufficient to 
show Walker Process fraud include (1) deleting references to on-point prior art from a 
patent application with no adequate explanation, Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, 
Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1062, 1072 (Fed. Cir. 1989); (2) failing to include prior art known to 
the patent applicant through multiple personal demonstrations of that art, Unitherm Food 
Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 375 F.3d 1341, 1360-61 (Fed. Cir. 2004), rev’d on other 
grounds, 546 U.S. 394 (2006); and (3) failing to include a full translation of a foreign patent 
where that patent was the only document in the initial application that, if fully understood by 
the patent examiner, would have resulted in a denial of the application.  Kaiser Found. 
Health Plan, Inc. v. Abbott Labs, Inc., 552 F.3d 1033, 1051 (9th Cir. 2009).  
 260.  Paul D. Swanson, The Patent Legal Malpractice Implications of ‘Walker Process’ 
Antitrust Claims, PATENT PRACTICE PROF’L LIAB. REP. (Mar. 5, 2013), available at 
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-patent-legal-malpractice-implication-94471/. 
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conduct claims are more likely to provide a sound basis for Walker Process 
claims than ever before.
261
  The Walker Process standard has not changed, 
but the hurdles for advancing to the antitrust phase of bifurcated patent 
litigation have been raised even higher.
262
 
The expected reduction in Walker Process litigation is likely to further 
reduce the incentive for patent applicants to make full disclosure to the 
PTO and may invite fraud.  The minimized prospect of facing an award of 
treble damages under the Clayton Act may encourage applicant fraud by 
rendering misconduct before the PTO cost-beneficial.
263
 
The virtual alignment of inequitable conduct and Walker Process 
fraud that was accomplished by Therasense also increases the likelihood 
that the Seventh Amendment
264
 right of Walker Process claimants to have 
their antitrust claims tried by a jury will be infringed.  Parties asserting 
antitrust claims have an undisputed right to a jury trial,
265
 but parties 
asserting a defense or affirmative claim of inequitable conduct have no 
Seventh Amendment right, because the latter assertions seek relief pursuant 
to the court’s equitable powers.
266
  Complications arise when bifurcation 
occurs.  Rule 42(b) expressly instructs that a court considering bifurcation 
 
 261.  See Rantanen & Petherbridge, supra note 79, at 250 (describing the requirements 
for establishing inequitable conduct and Walker Process fraud). 
 262.  Cf. Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Patent Exclusions and Antitrust After Therasense 29 
(Univ. of Iowa Legal Stud. Res. Paper No. 11-39, Dec. 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1916074 (arguing that Walker Process actions should be permitted 
to proceed where there is no inequitable conduct as Therasense defines it, but evidence of 
prior art later emerges). 
 263.  Stijepko Tokic, Enforcing the Duty of Disclosure after Therasense: Antitrust 
Implications, 40 AIPLA Q.J. 221, 258 (2012) (arguing that Therasense seriously reduces the 
likelihood of a consumer antitrust action and recovery because of a significantly higher 
burden of proving inequitable conduct). 
 264.  The Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “In Suits at 
common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial 
by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any 
Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.”  U.S. CONST. 
amend. VII. 
 265.  See Beacon Theaters, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 504 (1959) (“[T]he right to a 
trial by jury applies to treble damages under the antitrust laws . . . .”). 
 266.  See Am. Calcar, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 651 F.3d 1318, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 
2011) (“Inequitable conduct is equitable in nature, with no right to a jury . . . .”); Cabinet 
Vision v. Cabnetware, 129 F.3d 595, 599 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[Appellee Cabnetware’s] 
affirmative defense of inequitable conduct seeks relief by way of the court’s equitable 
powers; it is not a suit at common law and therefore cannot alone entitle the parties to a jury 
trial.”); Duhn Oil Tool, Inc. v. Cooper Cameron Corp., 818 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1204 (E.D. 
Cal. 2011) (“The Seventh Amendment jury trial right does not attach to claims based in 
equity, such as the defense of inequitable conduct.”); T. Leigh Anenson, The Triumph of 
Equity: Equitable Estoppel in Modern Litigation, 27 REV. OF LITIG. 377, 412-18 (2008) 
(noting that a plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial “only when there are common issues of fact 
material to the disposition of both law and equity”). 
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must always preserve inviolate the right of trial by jury as declared by the 
Seventh Amendment to the Constitution or as given by a statute of the 
United States.
267
  If inequitable conduct and antitrust issues are bifurcated, 
an initial bench determination that inequitable conduct did not occur may 
operate to preclude a subsequent jury trial on a Walker Process antitrust 
claim and thus violate the Seventh Amendment. 
Prior to Therasense, at least one federal district court acknowledged 
the Seventh Amendment issue and refused to bifurcate inequitable conduct 
and Walker Process claims.
268
  But many other pre-Therasense courts chose 
to ignore the issue and granted bifurcation requests.
269
  Although it is 
unclear why the issue was routinely ignored, courts (and litigators) may 
have assumed that a bench determination that no inequitable conduct 
occurred necessarily meant that no reasonable jury could find that Walker 
Process fraud occurred, given the more stringent requirements of the 
antitrust claim.
270
 
The Seventh Amendment issue is likely to loom even larger post-
Therasense, following the virtual alignment of the standards for proving 
inequitable conduct and Walker Process fraud.
271
  This realignment makes 
it increasingly likely that Walker Process claimants will be deprived of 
trials, because significantly fewer inequitable conduct claims will survive.  
The court explained in Metris U.S.A., Inc. v. Faro Technology, Inc.
272
 in 
2011 that “[i]f a judge’s determination of no inequitable conduct precluded 
a jury from later finding Walker Process fraud as a matter of law, then a 
viable argument could be made that the doctrines would collide with the 
protections afforded Walker Process claimants by the Seventh 
Amendment.”
273
 
 
 267. FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b). 
 268.  See Celgene Corp. v. Barr Labs., Inc., No. 07-286 (SDW), 2008 WL 2447354, at 
*3 (D.N.J. June 13, 2008) (refusing to bifurcate because bifurcation could violate the 
constitutional right to trial by jury).  Cf. Implant Innovations, Inc. v. Nobelpharma AB, No. 
93 C 7489, 1996 WL 568791, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 2, 1996) (concluding that a prior 
determination by the court of the inequitable conduct aspect of the patent claim would 
violate the Seventh Amendment, and ordering jury trial for both inequitable conduct and 
antitrust issues). 
 269.  Asim M. Bhansali & William S. Hicks, Trial Management after Therasense: 
Inequitable Conduct, Walker Process Fraud, and the Seventh Amendment, 21 (No. 2) 
COMPETITION 1, 6 (2012) (“[R]equests to bifurcate and stay Walker Process claims were 
often granted in the pre-Therasense era without any consideration of Seventh Amendment 
issues.”).  Some courts have ordered trifurcation.  See, e.g., Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. 
Comfortex Corp., 44 F. Supp. 2d 145, 155 (N.D.N.Y. 1999). 
 270.  Bhansali & Hicks, supra note 269, at 21. 
 271.  Id. at 8 (noting that alignment of inequitable conduct and Walker Process standards 
“has highlighted Seventh Amendment concerns arising from bifurcation that existed even 
before Therasense”). 
 272.  882 F. Supp. 2d 160 (D. Mass. 2011). 
 273.  Id. at 175.  See also SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., No. C 04-4379 ZJF 
404 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 16:2 
 
In summary, Therasense will constrict the availability of the 
inequitable conduct defense, and the new congruence of the standards for 
inequitable conduct and Walker Process fraud is likely to simultaneously 
constrict the availability of the antitrust claim and infringe the Seventh 
Amendment jury trial rights of Walker Process litigants. 
III. AMERICA INVENTS ACT 
Congress enacted the AIA several months after the Federal Circuit 
issued its en banc decision in Therasense.  The AIA, signed into law on 
September 16, 2011 and fully in effect in March 2013, is the most 
significant revision to the U.S. patent regime since the 1952 enactment of 
the Patent Act, which recodified the entirety of U.S. patent law.
274
  The 
AIA may be the most significant change to U.S. patent laws since the 1836 
Patent Act, which established the modern American system of patent 
examination. 
The AIA was the culmination of efforts to reform the U.S. patent 
system that had been under way since the early 2000s.  The first version of 
what became the AIA was introduced in June 2005 and subsequent 
versions were introduced in the following years.
275
  The failure of these 
early efforts resulted in frequent intervention by the Federal Circuit and 
Supreme Court to resolve significant patent issues.  In addition to Exergen 
in 2009 and Therasense in 2011, the intervention encompassed the Federal 
Circuit decision in In re Seagate Technology, LLC in 2007 (raising the 
standard for finding willful patent infringement),
276
 as well as Supreme 
Court decisions reformulating the standards for non-obviousness,
277
 
 
(RS), 2009 WL 1404689, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 19, 2009) (“When a jury decides the Walker 
Process fraud, the Seventh Amendment constrains a court’s determination of inequitable 
conduct.”); Gordon & Stack, supra note 43, at 91 (2011) (“Therasense may also 
bolster the argument that infringement defendants have a constitutional right to a jury trial 
on factual issues that are common to an inequitable conduct defense and a Walker Process 
claim . . . . To the extent that the underlying elements of proof are now identical, Therasense 
may strengthen the argument . . . .”)  
 274.  See Lee Petherbridge & Jason Rantanen, In Memoriam Best Mode, 64 STAN. L. 
REV. ONLINE 125, 125 (2012), 
http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/sites/default/files/online/articles/64-SLRO-125.pdf 
(describing the AIA as “the most substantial legislative overhaul of patent law and practice 
in more than half a century.”); PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2012 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY 3 
(Sept. 2012), http://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-services/publications/2012-patent-
litigation-study.jhtml (“Last year marked the most significant change to the US patent 
system in almost 60 years.”).  
 275.  Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part I of 
II, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 435, 435-512 (2011-12) (describing the development of the Leahy-
Smith America Invents Act). 
 276.  497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
 277.  KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419-22 (2007) (rejecting Federal 
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injunctive relief,
278
 patent exhaustion,
279
 and patent invalidity.
280
 
While the AIA does not expressly address inequitable conduct, several 
of the statute’s provisions may operate to significantly restrict use of the 
defense.  These provisions relate to post-issuance review and the best mode 
of using the invention.  Both changes are discussed below, along with their 
adverse implications for the inequitable conduct defense. 
A. Post-Issuance Review 
The first set of AIA provisions affecting inequitable conduct pertains 
to post-issuance review.  These provisions include post-grant review 
(PGR), inter partes review (IPR), and supplemental examination. 
1. Background 
The proceedings available after the grant of a patent are conducted 
through the PTO to reconsider issued patents and can result in 
confirmation, cancellation, withdrawal, or modification of patent claims.  
Prior to passage of the AIA, the only post-issuance review options were ex 
parte reexamination (adopted in 1980)
281
 and inter partes reexamination 
(adopted in 1999).
282
  The former option constituted the first non-judicial 
proceeding enabling a third party to challenge the validity of a patent.
283
  Ex 
parte reexamination is available for any patent during the period of its 
enforceability, which is typically the term of the patent plus six years 
(representing the statute of limitations for bringing an enforcement 
action).
284
  In both ex parte reexamination and inter partes reexamination 
the PTO Director could order a reexamination after a requester raised a 
substantial new question (SNQ) of patentability for any of the claims of the 
 
Circuit’s rigid application of obviousness standard). 
 278.  eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 390-94 (2006) (holding that 
four-factor test traditionally employed by equity courts in deciding whether to award 
permanent injunctive relief applies in patent litigation). 
 279.  Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 617-38 (2008) (holding 
that exhaustion doctrine applies to method patents). 
 280.  Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2238-54 (2011) 
(reinforcing use of clear and convincing standard for proving patent invalidity). 
 281.  Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. 96-517, ch. 30, § 302, 94 Stat. 3015 (listing 
requirements for requesting reexamination). 
 282.  American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, tit. IV, 113 Stat. 
1501A-0552, at sec. 4601 (explaining the inter partes reexamination procedure). 
 283.  Jeffrey P. Kushan, The Fruits of the Convoluted Road to Patent Reform: The New 
Invalidity Proceedings of the Patent and Trademark Office, 30 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 385, 
391 (2012).   
 284.  See 37 C.F.R. §1.501(a) (2012) (defining the period in which citations of prior art 
may be filed); 35 U.S.C. § 286 (2012) (setting forth applicable statute of limitations). 
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patent for which it sought reexamination.
285
  This amorphous standard 
borrowed from the  reasonable examiner standard used intermittently for 
many years to determine materiality under Rule 56.
286
  The ambiguity 
contributed to rubber-stamping of requests.  Approximately ninety-two 
percent of ex parte reexamination requests and ninety-four percent of inter 
partes reexamination requests were granted through June 2012.
287
  The 
Director’s determination of a SNQ was final and non-appealable.
288
 
The two review options have been criticized for multiple reasons.  The 
first is lack of timeliness and resulting uncertainty.  Ex parte 
reexaminations take an average of two years and pre-AIA the average 
pendency of an inter partes reexamination was more than three years.
289
  A 
second objection is perceived bias.
290
  Patent owners had no right to initiate 
inter partes examination, whereas both owners and third-parties can 
request ex parte reexamination.  In recent years approximately ninety 
percent of ex parte reexamination requests were filed by third parties,
291
 but 
 
 285.  35 U.S.C. §§ 303(a) (2012) (“Within three months following the filing of a request 
for reexamination under the provisions of section 302 of this title, the Director will 
determine whether a substantial new question of patentability affecting any claim of the 
patent concerned is raised by the request.”).   
 286.  Mark D. Janis, Rethinking Reexamination: Toward a Viable Administrative 
Revocation System for U.S. Patent Laws, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 48 (1997) (discussing 
the application of the reasonable examiner standard). 
 287.  EX PARTE REEXAMINATION FILING DATA – JUNE 30, 2012, U.S. PATENT & 
TRADEMARK OFFICE 1 (2012), available at 
assets.sbnation.com/assets/1619547/Ex_parte_reexam_stats.pdf [hereinafter USPTO EX 
PARTE REEXAMINATION FILING DATA]; INTER PARTES REEXAMINATION FILING DATA – JUNE 
30, 2012, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE 1 (2012), available at  
http://ptolitigationcenter.com/wp-
content/uploads/2010/02/IP_quarterly_report_June_30_2012.pdf  [hereinafter USPTO INTER 
PARTES REEXMINATION FILING DATA].  
 288.  35 U.S.C. §§ 302, 312; Heinl v. Godici, 143 F. Supp. 2d 593, 596-98 (E.D. Va. 
2001) (stating that reexamination is an intermediate or preliminary decision, not final 
agency action, and therefore not ordinarily subject to judicial review). 
 289.  Andrei Iancu & Ben Haber, Post-Issuance Proceedings in the America Invents Act, 
93 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 476, 477 (2011).  Cf. Harkins, supra note 69, at *6 
(“[I]nter partes reexaminations typically took three to five years.”); Eric J. Rogers, Ten 
Years of Inter Partes Patent Reexamination Appeals: An Empirical View, 29 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 305, 352 (2013) (noting that the mean pendency of completed 
inter partes reexaminations is 4.9 years).  Even these statistics are not a true reflection of the 
average pendency of inter partes reexaminations, because they only include those that were 
completed. 
 290.  See Kushan, supra note 283, at 391 (“[F]rom its inception, the ex parte 
reexamination proceeding has been seen as biased in favor of the patent owner.”); accord 
Sherry M. Knowles, Thomas E. Vanderbloemen & Charles E. Peeler, Inter Partes Patent 
Reexamination in the United States, 86 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 611, 612 (2004) 
(explaining that procedural benefits in reexamination procedures favor the patent owner). 
 291.  Dennis Crouch, A Rush to File Ex Parte Reexaminations and Now a Lull, 
PATENTLY-O (Nov. 4, 2012, 7:03 PM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/11/a-rush-to-
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the requester does not participate in such proceedings unless she is the 
patentee.  The third party’s nominal role is limited to presenting a 
substantial new question of patentability to the PTO for resolution.  If 
reexamination is granted the third-party’s involvement terminates.  This 
defect is magnified by the PTO’s susceptibility to “well-recognized 
externalities that favor sustaining patent claims.”
292
 In addition, until a few 
years ago it was common practice for the same examiner who originally 
issued the patent to be assigned to the ex parte reexamination.
293
  Not 
surprisingly then, during the period from July 1981 through June 2012, all 
claims were canceled in ex parte reexaminations only eleven percent of the 
time.
294
  By comparison, during the period from November 1999 to June 
2012, all claims were canceled (or disclaimed) in inter partes 
reexaminations forty-two percent of the time.
295
 
Another common criticism is that both options were limited in scope.  
Inter partes reexamination allowed challenges only on grounds of novelty 
or non-obviousness,
296
 and in both proceedings only patents and printed 
publications could be used to contest the patent.
297
  This is a limiting factor 
 
file-ex-parte-reexaminations-and-now-a-lull.html (stating that around ninety percent of ex 
parte reexamination requests are filed by third-parties); see also Joseph R. Re, “Parallel 
Prosecution”: Effect of Patent Prosecution on Concurrent Litigation, 73 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 965, 967-68 (1991) (noting that patentees initiate some 
reexaminations, primarily to strengthen and confirm the validity of their own patents prior to 
commencing enforcement litigation). 
 292.  Jason Rantanen, Lee Petherbridge & Jay P. Kesan, America Invents, More or 
Less?, 160 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 229, 243 (2012), 
http://www.pennlawreview.com/online/160-U-Pa-L-Rev-PENNumbra-229.pdf.  See also 
Jonathan  Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470, 478 (2011) (“[T]he PTO’s salary and 
bonus system is structured in such a way as to incentivize examiners to grant rather than 
deny patents.”).  
 293.  NANCY J. LINCK, BRUCE H. STONER, LEE E. BARRETT & CAROL A. SPIEGEL, POST-
GRANT PATENT PRACTICE 6 (2012). 
 294.  USPTO EX PARTE REEXAMINATION FILING DATA, supra note 287, at 2. 
 295.  USPTO INTER PARTES REEXAMINATION FILING DATA, supra note 287.  This 
percentage, while high, does not necessarily reveal success by third-party requesters, 
because the cancellation of patent claims might be irrelevant to infringement accusations 
against the requester.  Rogers, supra note 289, at 347 (explaining that the cancellation 
and/or amendment of patent claims resulting from the proceeding might be immaterial to 
accusations of patent infringement raised); see also LINCK, STONER, BARRETT & SPIEGEL, 
supra note 293, at 7  (“Based on these statistics, one may reasonably conclude that the 
patent owner fares better in ex parte reexamination than in inter partes reexamination, at 
least in part due to the lack of third party participation.”). 
 296.  Michael A. Carrier, Post-Grant Opposition: A Proposal and a Comparison to the 
America Invents Act, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 103, 113-14 (2011) (arguing that one limitation 
of inter partes reexamination is that it allows challenges only on grounds of novelty or 
nonobviousness).   
 297.  Kushan, supra note 283, at 392, 394 (explaining that only patents and printed 
publications, and not other types of evidence, can be used to contest the patent). 
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because an argument of invalidity often is based on unprinted prior art.
298
  
Finally, inter partes reexaminations were subject to strong estoppel 
provisions that operated as a major disincentive to utilize the proceedings, 
especially in conjunction with the inability of a third-party requester to 
cross-examine the patentee.
299
 
The foregoing disadvantages, primarily imposed on third-party 
challengers, collectively explain the limited use of the proceedings.
300
  
Nearly 4,500 patents are issued every week, whereas ex parte 
reexamination has applied, on average, to only 380 patents per year
301
 and 
the PTO received only 1,659 requests for inter partes reexamination from 
November 1999 to June 2012.
302
 
The pre-AIA regime of post-issuance review has been substantially 
modified with the introduction of multiple new procedures designed to 
minimize litigation costs and increase certainty.  The new procedures took 
effect on September 16, 2012, one year from the date of enactment of the 
AIA.  Ex parte reexamination procedures remain virtually unchanged, 
despite their various defects,
303
 but their importance has diminished 
compared to the new post-issuance patent review proceedings (post-grant 
review and supplemental examination) described below.  In addition, inter 
 
 298.  Rogers, supra note 289, at 350 (“Patent reexams are limited in scope by SNQ’s 
implicating only §§ 102 and 103, when much of patent claim invalidity argued during 
litigation involves §§ 112 and 102 that are based on unprinted, prior art.”). 
 299.  See REPORT TO CONGRESS ON INTER PARTES REEXAMINATION, U.S. PATENT & 
TRADEMARK OFFICE (2004), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/olia/reports/reexam_report.htm; Kushan, supra 
note 283, at 394; Carrier, supra note 296, at 114 (“[I]nter partes reexamination is burdened 
by two strong estoppel provisions.  One prevents a requester from challenging the validity 
of any fact determined in the examination.  The other prohibits a requester from later 
asserting the invalidity of a patent on any ground that it raised or could have raised.”) 
(internal quotations omitted); Rogers, supra note 289, at 322 (noting that ex parte 
reexaminations are not subject to these strong estoppel effects).  
 300.  See Masur, supra note 292, at 481 (noting that inter partes reexamination “imposes 
such disadvantages on third-party challengers that it is almost never used”). 
 301.  Carrier, supra note 296, at 113. 
 302.  USPTO INTER PARTES REEXAMINATION FILING DATA, supra note 287, at 1.  The 
use of inter partes reexamination accelerated in recent years.  During the fiscal years 2000 
to 2004, the PTO received a total of 53 inter partes reexamination filings.  During the fiscal 
years 2008 to 2012, the PTO received more than 1,350 such filings.  Id. 
 303.  See Stefan Blum, Note, Ex Parte Reexamination: A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing, 73 
OHIO STATE L.J. 395, 433 (2012) (noting that ex parte reexamination is “essentially intact” 
under the AIA).  The major change was a substantial increase in fees in September 2012.  
Crouch, supra note 291 (noting a substantial increase in fees in September 2012).  Fees 
were later reduced in March 2013.  The fee for requesting an ex parte reexamination 
decreased from $17,750 to $12,000.  Fees for supplemental examinations, petitioning for 
IPR, and petitioning for PGR also declined, as did standard fees for micro-entities.  See 
Dennis Crouch, USPTO Fee Changes on March 19, PATENTLY-O (Mar. 18, 2013; 9:15 
AM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2013/03/uspto-fee-change-on-march-19.html.  
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partes reexamination has been substantially altered and re-designated as 
“inter partes review.”  PGR and IPR have become the primary vehicles for 
litigating patentability at the PTO.  Each of the foregoing proceedings is 
examined below. 
2. Post-Grant Review 
Under the AIA’s new first-to-file rules, post-grant review can be 
requested by any person who is not the owner of the patent no later than 
nine months following the grant of a patent or re-issuance of a patent issued 
from applications filed after March 16, 2013.
304
  Given that in the 2012 
fiscal year it took an average of 32.4 months for a patent application to 
issue as a patent or be abandoned,
305
 PGR might not be commonly used 
before 2016 or 2017. 
A petitioner may request to cancel as unpatentable one or more claims 
of a patent on any ground for invalidity under 35 U.S.C. § 282, any 
requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112 (except for failure to disclose the best 
mode), and any requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 251.  PGR thus permits attacks 
based on, inter alia, invalidating prior art, prior public use, lack of 
enablement, lack of written description, lack of utility, lack of obviousness, 
lack of novelty, or prior sale or offer for sale.
306
  This is a considerably 
broader array of grounds than is available to challenge patents in 
reexaminations. 
Formerly, a party seeking inter partes reexamination was required to 
show that cited prior art raised a SNQ of patentability.  Under the AIA, a 
petition for PGR may be granted if (1) the information therein, if 
unrebutted, makes it “more likely than not that at least one of the claims 
challenged in the petition is unpatentable,”
307
 or (2) “the petition raises a 
novel or unsettled legal questions that is important to other patents or 
applications.”
308
  It is unclear what constitutes such a question and whether 
petitioner must establish that at least one claim is unpatentable if such a 
question exists. 
 
 304.  35 U.S.C. § 321(a), (c) (2011).  For more than 200 years the United States gave 
priority of right to those who were first in time to an invention.  The AIA changed that 
tradition and replaced it with a general rule under which patent rights are awarded to the 
first inventor to file a patent application.  See 35 U.S.C. § 100 (2011) (defining the first 
inventor to file rule). 
 305.  United States Patent and Trademark Office, Performance and Accountability 
Report FY 2012, supra note 76, at 14 (showing patent application average pendency  to be 
32.4 months). 
 306.  Robert Greene Sterne, et al., America Invents Act: The 5 New Post-Issuance 
Procedures, 13 SEDONA CONF. L.J. 27, 32 (2012) [hereinafter 5 Procedures]. 
 307.  35 U.S.C. § 324(a) (2012). 
 308.  35 U.S.C. § 324(b) (2012).   
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On its face, the new PGR standard is higher than the SNQ previously 
required for initiating an inter partes reexamination.  But once initiated, the 
preponderance of evidence standard will be used to determine the 
patentability of claims, as it is in ex parte reexaminations.  Accordingly, a 
petitioner seeking PGR will ultimately confront the same burden to prove 
that a claim is invalid as petitioners previously did in inter partes 
reexaminations. 
A party may seek PGR (or IPR) or instead opt to sue in district court, 
but neither PTO proceeding may be instituted by a party or a party’s real 
party in interest if that entity previously contested the validity of a claim of 
the patent in civil litigation.
309
  The PTO’s decision whether to open a PGR 
is final and non-appealable.
310
  PGRs are adjudicated by three-judge panels 
of the new Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB),
311
 which replaced the 
back-logged Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) within the 
PTO.
312
 
Pre-AIA, inter partes reexamination had no discovery component,
313
 
but PGR and IPR both permit limited discovery with poorly defined 
boundaries.  Discovery in both PGR and IPR  is narrower than discovery in 
 
 309.  35 U.S.C. §§ 315(a)(1), 325(a)(1) (2012).  The filing of a counterclaim of 
invalidity in an action commenced by the patent owner does not constitute a civil action 
challenging the validity of a claim of a patent.  §§ 315(a)(3), 325(a)(3) (2012). 
 310.  Versata Dev. Corp. v. Rea, No. 1:13-cv-328 (GBL/IDD), 2013 WL 4014649, at *5 
(E.D. Va. Aug. 7, 2013) (holding that court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because “the 
AIA expressly precludes judicial review of the decision to institute post-grant review”). 
 311.  35 U.S.C. § 326(c) (2012); MATTHEW A. SMITH, INTER PARTES REVOCATION 
PROCEEDINGS § 14:1 (2012) (stating that a panel of three judges generally conducts a post-
grant review).  The PTAB’s membership includes the Director, the Deputy Director, the 
Commissioner for Patents, the Commissioner for Trademarks, and administrative law 
judges.  Karen A. Lorang, The Unintended Consequences of Post-Grant Review of Patents, 
17 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, 8 (2013). 
 312.   35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2012) (“Any reference in any Federal law, executive order, rule, 
regulation, or delegation of authority, or any document of or pertaining to the Board of 
Patent Appeals and Interferences is deemed to refer to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board.”); 
see also Dennis Crouch & Jason Rantanen, Pending Appeals Not Impacted by BPAI -> 
PTAB Transformation, PATENTLY-O (Sept. 16, 2012, 10:34 AM), 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/09/pending-appeals-not-impacted-by-bpai-ptab-
transformation.html (explaining that the name change from BPAI to PTAB would have no 
effect on the pending ex parte appeals before the Board).  The BPAI’s backlog of pending 
appeals increased from 1,357 in 2006 to 22,356 in 2011, an increase of more than 1,600 
percent in five years.  Rogers, supra note 289, at 351.  By May 2013, the backlog exceeded 
25,000 cases, even following a significant reduction.  Dennis Crouch, Slow and Steady: 
PTAB Continuing to Address Backlog of Ex Parte Appeals, PATENTLY-O (May 1, 2013, 2:16 
PM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2013/05/slow-and-steady-ptab-continuing-to-
address-backlog-of-ex-parte-appeals.html. 
 313.  See Abbott Labs. v. Cordis Corp., 710 F.3d 1318, 1327 (Fed. Cir.  2013) (affirming 
grant of motion to quash two subpoenas duces tecum for use in inter partes reexamination 
proceeding).  
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federal district court, and discovery in IPR is narrower than it is in PGR.  In 
post-grant review the parties may take discovery directly related to factual 
assertions advanced by either party,
314
 whereas discovery in inter partes 
review is limited to depositions of witnesses who submitted affidavits or 
declarations and what is “otherwise necessary in the interest of justice.”
315
  
PGR’s broader discovery is appropriate, because the grounds for 
challenging a patent are more substantial in PGR than in IPR. 
The new materiality standard established in Therasense may affect 
inequitable conduct allegations that a patent challenger considers asserting 
in an infringement action filed after an inter partes review (or IPR).  For 
example, a PGR that invalidates “some but not all claims may be used to 
prove the materiality of a reference that was not cited in the original 
prosecution of a patent.”
316
  How often will this occur?  Pre-AIA 
approximately one percent of patents were litigated
317
 and litigation often 
proceeded concurrently with PTO proceedings.  Approximately seventy 
percent of patents in inter partes reexamination and thirty-three percent of 
patents in ex parte reexaminations also were in district court litigation,
318
 
even though the proceedings were designed to be an alternative to 
litigation.  Post-grant review presents the potential to shift numerous patent 
validity disputes from the federal courts to the PTO, given the opportunity 
to challenge a patent based on any invalidity theory, a lower standard of 
proof, the absence of any presumption of validity, and the fact that PGR 
may be much quicker than litigation.
319
  Whereas the AIA provides for 
PGRs (and IPRs) to be decided by the PTAB within twelve months from 
 
 314.  35 U.S.C. § 326(a)(5) (2012). 
 315.  35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(5) (2012).  The PTAB has outlined a five-factor analysis that it 
will use to determine whether to allow additional discovery that is otherwise necessary in 
the interest of justice.  See Dennis Crouch, Discovery Process in Post-Grant Proceedings, 
PATENTLY-O (Mar. 22, 2013, 11:48 AM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2013/03/abbott-
cordis-pgr.html.  See also 5 Procedures, supra note 306, at 41 (predicting, on the basis of 
historical interference practice, that the “otherwise necessary” option “will provide little, if 
any, avenue to obtain discovery”). 
 316.  Eric S. Walter & Colette R. Verkuil, Patent Litigation Strategy: The Impact of the 
America Invents Act and the New Post-Grant Patent Procedures 6, MORRISON & FOERSTER 
(2012), available at http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/120307-Patent-Litigation-
Strategy.pdf.  
 317.  Rantanen, Petherbridge & Kesan, supra note 292, at 229.  The number of patent 
actions commenced in federal district court reached 4,015 in 2011 – the highest number of 
annual filings ever recorded.  PricewaterhouseCoopers, supra note 274, at 6. 
 318.  LINCK, STONER, BARRETT & SPIEGEL, supra note 293, at ix; Rogers, supra note 289, 
at 319 (noting that reexamination “has become an integral part of patent litigation strategy”). 
 319.  Justin A. Hendrix & Robert F. Shaffer, POST GRANT PROCEEDINGS OF THE AIA 
PROVIDE NEW OPPORTUNITIES AND REQUIRE RECONSIDERATION OF OLD PATENT LITIGATION 
STRATEGIES, Finnegan (June 15, 2012), available at 
http://www.finnegan.com/resources/articles/articlesdetail.aspx?news=598696f7-7eba-4fcb-
83b8-2369caa91dd3. 
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institution of the proceedings (with the possibility of an additional six-
month extension for good cause),
320
 the median time to trial in patent 
litigation remained steady at approximately two and a half years during the 
period from 2005 to 2011.
321
 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, PGR is unlikely to be widely used, 
given the high cost of analyzing potential threats from thousands of 
patents.
322
  More likely, such review will be used in targeted fashion by 
companies focusing on emerging patent portfolios of strategic competitors.  
The nine-month window for seeking PGR also is likely to restrict the use of 
review as a non-litigation option, particularly for small- and medium-size 
businesses that lack the infrastructure necessary to monitor the issuance of 
competitors’ patents.
323
 
Perhaps the greatest disincentive to frequent use of post-grant review 
may be provided by its robust estoppel effect.  The AIA requires the PTAB 
to issue a final written decision concerning the patentability of any patent 
claim challenged by the petitioner and any new claim added during PGR.
324
  
Issuance by the PTAB triggers PGR’s estoppel effect.  If the decision is 
adverse to the petitioner, she is estopped from asserting invalidity before 
the PTO, International Trade Commission (ITC), or a federal court on any 
basis that was raised or reasonably could have been raised during the 
PGR.
325
  This differs considerably from the estoppel effect attaching to 
inter partes reexamination pre-AIA, which followed exhaustion of all 
appeals.  Under the AIA, estoppel is attainable within twelve to eighteen 
months, in contrast with the approximately six years an appeal from an 
inter partes reexamination took to make its way through the PTO and 
 
 320.  35 U.S.C. § 326(a)(11), (c) (2012). 
 321.  PricewaterhouseCoopers, supra note 206, at 21; cf. Barney, supra note 26, at *1 
(predicting that AIA will result in “many more post-grant review challenges” in the PTO, 
but not necessarily a corresponding reduction in federal court litigation). 
 322.  One projection of the average cost for PGR/IPR is $150,000 to $300,000 per party, 
“an order of magnitude less expensive than district court litigation.”  Matthew Cutler, Inter 
Partes Review and Post Grant Review are Game-Changers, IP LAW360 (Jan. 8, 2013), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/402322/why-inter-partes-and-post-grant-review-are-game-
changers; see also Megan M. La Belle, Patent Law as Public Law, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
41, 57 (2012) (observing that inter partes reexamination costs substantially less than 
litigation); Rogers, supra note 289, at 355-56 (comparing predicted cost of IPR of $600,000 
to average cost of patent litigation of $6 million per side). 
 323.  See Hung H. Bui, An Overview of Patent Reform Act of 2011: Navigating the 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act Including Effective Dates for Patent Reform, 93 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 441 (2011) (predicting that nine-month window will operate to 
limit use of PGR); Rantanen, Petherbridge & Kesan, supra note 292, at 229 (arguing that for 
many small businesses and inventors, PGR “will operate more as a patent system-use tax, 
adding to the cost and complexity of obtaining an enforceable patent”). 
 324.  35 U.S.C. § 328(a) (2012). 
 325.  35 U.S.C. § 325(e) (2012). 
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obtain a final opinion from the Federal Circuit.
326
  No doubt the speed with 
which estoppel takes effect will weigh heavily in the decision calculus 
concerning pursuit of PGR (or IPR).  Adverse final PGR decisions estop 
petitioners, real parties in interest, or privies of the petitioner.  They do not 
estop patent owners.  This uneven application of estoppel is likely to 
dissuade prospective petitioners from regarding PGR as an attractive 
substitute for litigation.
327
 
The AIA’s robust estoppel effect also is present in IPR, but it could be 
particularly acute in PGR
328
 where the grounds on which a petitioner may 
assert invalidity are unrestricted and there is no exemption from the scope 
of estoppel for newly discovered prior art.  The lack of restriction offers 
significant opportunities to find that a basis for invalidity either was raised 
or reasonably could have been raised, thereby triggering the estoppel effect.  
This broad estoppel is likely to operate as a significant deterrent to the use 
of PGR by petitioners, except where the facts supporting invalidity are very 
strong. 
As discussed below, the AIA’s new supplemental examination 
procedure offers a major opportunity for patentees to prevent prior art 
references or other information from being used as the basis for subsequent 
allegations of inequitable conduct.  This opportunity makes it likely that 
patent owners will seek supplemental examination of patents for prior art 
references cited in PGR or IPR, in order to immunize the patents from 
exposure to later charges of inequitable conduct if that information was 
used by the PTAB to invalidate.
329
 
3. Inter Partes Review 
The AIA’s new inter partes reviews will permit few if any occasions 
to bolster or assert an inequitable conduct defense.  IPR replaced inter 
partes reexamination on September 16, 2012, and applies to patents issued 
before, on or after that date—not merely those patents issued on or after 
November 29, 1999, as in the case of inter partes reexamination.  There are 
other important differences between the two procedures.  IPR allows the 
 
 326.  Phillippe Signore, Steve Kunin & Jonathan Parthum, Practice Implications of the 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, WESTLAW J. EXPERT COMMENT SERIES, PATENTS IN THE 
21ST CENTURY: THE LEAHY-SMITH AMERICA INVENTS ACT, 2012, at 28, 30, available at 
http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/120206-Patents-21st-Century.pdf.   
 327.  Sandip H. Patel, A Lop-Sided Estoppel in Post-Grant Review, LAW360 (Dec. 21, 
2011, 12:28 PM), http://www.marshallip.com/media/pnc/2/media.502.pdf.  
 328.  See Kayla Fossen, Note, The Post-Grant Problem: America Invents Falling Short, 
14 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 573, 593 (2013) (noting that robust estoppel effect of PGR may 
reduce overall use of the procedure); Walters & Verkuil, supra note 316, at 4 (“Post-grant 
review carries a greater potential likelihood for estoppel than inter partes review.”). 
 329.  Walters & Verkuil, supra note 316, at 6.  
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patentee to respond to the petition and explain why the review should not 
proceed, whereas in inter partes reexamination a response by the patentee 
was only allowed after the examiner instituted reexamination.  Further, 
unlike inter partes reexamination, a petition for IPR may not be filed until 
nine months after the grant of a patent or issuance of a reissue patent
330
 or 
after termination of a PGR, whichever happens later.
331
  Inter partes review 
thus is available to requesters seeking to challenge the validity of a patent 
after the nine-month window for filing post-grant review has closed. 
Inter partes review introduces a new standard to commence review 
that replaces the former SNQ standard.  This standard also differs from the 
new test applicable in PGRs.  The presentation of a novel or unsettled legal 
question is not a valid ground for granting IPR.  Rather, the petitioner must 
show that the information presented in her petition, together with any 
response from the patentee, establishes “that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least [one] of 
the claims challenged in the petition.”
332
  Another difference between IPR 
and PGR is that in the former, a patent may only be challenged on the 
ground that it lacks novelty in violation of 35 U.S.C. § 102 or that it was 
obvious in violation of 35 U.S.C. § 103, and only on the basis of prior art 
patents and printed publications.
333
 
As in the case of PGR, the PTO’s decision whether to open an inter 
partes review is final and non-appealable.  It is unclear whether the 
petitioner can request that the Director review the PTO’s denial of an IPR, 
and what recourse, if any, the petitioner has if IPR is granted for some, but 
not all, claims.  IPRs are adjudicated by three-judge panels of the new 
PTAB.
334
  As noted, discovery is available,
335
 but it tends to significantly 
favor patentees, insofar as they generally receive priority and are able to 
conduct discovery even before they file their responses to petitioners.  This 
serves to makes the strong estoppel provisions of IPR even stronger.  
Estoppel is triggered by the final written decision of the PTAB and applies 
to all issues that were raised or reasonably could have been raised in the 
 
 330.  Reissue provides a second opportunity for a patentee to have the PTO examine a 
patent on all the same statutory bases that were or might have been employed during the 
original examination.  A reissue application is the vehicle for conducting this second 
examination.  LINCK, STONER, BARRETT & SPIEGEL, supra note 293, at 22. 
 331.  35 U.S.C. § 311(c) (2012). 
 332.  35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2012).  It is unclear what it means to “prevail” in this context.  
It could mean that at least one claim is rejected.  Alternatively, it could refer to cancellation 
or substantial amendment. 
 333.  35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (2012). 
 334.  Eldora L. Ellison, Patent Reform is on the Immediate Horizon – New Options for 
Challenging Patents Before the USPTO (Sterne Kessler Goldstein Fox P.L.L.C.), June 27, 
2011, at 1, available at skgf.com/media/pnc/3/media.1373.pdf . 
 335.  35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(5) (2012). 
2014] INEQUITABLE CONDUCT  415 
 
review.
336
  Given the availability of discovery, it would not be difficult to 
successfully maintain that a broad range of issues could have been raised.
337
  
As with PGR, the robust estoppel effect applies to other proceedings in the 
PTO, as well as civil actions and proceedings before the ITC.
338
 
PTAB decisions are appealable directly to the Federal Circuit.  The 
losing party in an IPR cannot return “to the PTO for any proceeding, 
including ex parte reexamination and PGR.”
339
  Prior to enactment of the 
AIA, litigation did not preclude inter partes reexamination and, absent a 
discretionary stay, the proceedings could advance in tandem.  Inter partes 
reexaminations were used by parties to create a record to support their 
stances in ongoing litigation.  For example, litigants would use the 
procedure to develop a defense to a claim of inequitable conduct.
340
  The 
situation is different now.  It may be more difficult to obtain IPR than it 
was to obtain inter partes reexamination pre-AIA, because the standard for 
obtaining review has changed.  The prior SNQ standard was met in ninety-
four percent of inter partes reexamination requests.
341
  The new standard 
may yield a lower percentage. 
There are at least two other limiting factors.  First, IPR is unavailable 
where there is litigation concerning the patent and either more than one 
year has passed since the petitioner (or someone in privity with the 
petitioner) was served with the patent infringement complaint
342
 or the 
petitioner filed a civil action challenging the validity of a claim of the 
patent before filing the petition for IPR.
343
  Second, the PTO Director has 
the authority to impose a limit on the number of IPRs that may be instituted 
during each of the first four years of implementation.  This limit had been 
projected at 270.
344
  Inter partes reexamination was rare pre-AIA.  IPR may 
be even rarer,
345
 thus further restricting the option to litigants to bolster 
 
 336.  35 U.S.C. § 315(e) (2012). 
 337.  Andrei Iancu, Ben Haber & Elizabeth Iglesias, Challenging Validity of Issued 
Patents before the PTO: Inter Partes Reexam Now or Inter Partes Review Later?, 94 J. PAT. 
& TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 148, 155 (2012) [hereinafter Now or Later]. 
 338.  35 U.S.C. § 315(e) (2012). 
 339.  Now or Later, supra note 337, at 153. 
 340.  Ben M. Davidson, Reexamining Reexaminations, 34 L.A. LAW. 26, 29 (2012). 
 341.  USPTO Inter Partes Reexamination Filing Data, supra note 279, at 1. 
 342.  35 U.S.C. § 315(b) (2012). 
 343.  35 U.S.C. § 315(a)(1) (2012); Iancu & Haber, supra note 289, at 476. 
 344.  5 Procedures, supra note 306, at 37. 
 345.  IPR ultimately may be more rare, but early statistics do not necessarily support 
such a projection.  Between September 2012 and December 2013 the PTO received 766 
filings under the AIA’s new IPR provisions.  See AIA Statistics: Inter Partes Review, U.S. 
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/statistics.jsp (last 
visited Feb. 22, 2014).  In contrast, the PTO received 1,659 inter partes reexamination 
filings during the period November 1999 to June 2012.  See text accompaning supra note 
303. 
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their inequitable conduct defenses. 
4. Supplemental Examination 
The AIA’s new supplemental examination provisions are very likely 
to restrict the inequitable conduct defense as well.  Indeed, supplemental 
examination has been described as “the AIA’s cure for the ‘plague’ of 
inequitable conduct.”
346
  Under the new procedures, “[a] patent owner may 
request supplemental examination of a patent” any time after its issuance 
“to consider, reconsider or correct information believed to be relevant to 
the patent.”
347
  The new provisions, set forth in amended 35 U.S.C. § 257 
(Section 12 of the AIA), took effect in September 2012,
348
 apply to any 
patent regardless of issue date, and provide for reexamination if the 
Director concludes that the reference presented in the request presents a 
SNQ of patentability.
349
 
If he so concludes, then reexamination proceeds primarily according 
to the current ex parte reexamination rules, with some differences.  The 
most important difference is that the current restriction limiting ex parte 
reexaminations to consideration of prior art patents and printed publications 
is inapplicable in supplemental examinations and “information” is not 
limited or defined by the AIA.  Supplemental examinations can be based on 
 
 346.  See Bhattacharyya & McGurk, supra note 84, at 624. 
 347.  35 U.S.C. § 257(a) (2012). 
 348.  The PTO has projected that all of the approximately 110 requests it received 
annually from patent owners for ex parte reexaminations pre-AIA will be filed as requests 
for supplemental examinations post-AIA, and that it will receive approximately 1,430 
requests for supplemental examinations annually.  See Changes to Implement the 
Supplemental Examination Provisions of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act and to 
Revise Reexamination Fees; Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 48828, 48847-48 (Aug. 14, 2012).  
These projections have been disputed.  See Dennis Crouch & Jason Rantanen, Supplemental 
Examination Final Rules, PATENTLY-O (Aug. 13, 2012, 3:48 PM), 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/08/supplemental-examination-final-rules.html 
(predicting that the actual number would be “much, much smaller” than the PTO’s 
projection of 1,430).  During the period from September 2012 to December 2013, the PTO 
received 59 requests for supplemental examination.  See AIA Statistics: Supplemental 
Examination, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/statistics.jsp (last visited Feb. 2, 2014).  Sixteen 
of the requests were publicly available as of August 2013 and of those sixteen, fourteen had 
been considered by the PTO.  The PTO ordered reexaminations and/or found an SNQ in 
eleven of the fourteen (approximately seventy-eight percent).  Patent claims were rejected in 
eight of the eleven, following ex parte reexamination.  Eugene T. Perez & Utsav Gupta, 
Some Early Statistics for Supplemental Examination, LAW360 (Aug. 13, 2013, 11:32 AM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/462658/some-early-statistics-for-supplemental-
examination.  Cost may be one primary factor that is constraining the use of supplemental 
examination.  See Bhattacharyya & McGurk, supra note 84, at 638 (noting that 
supplemental examination “is expected to be very expensive”). 
 349.  35 U.S.C. § 257(a) (2011). 
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any information believed relevant to the patent.  For this reason, a patent 
owner may take advantage of supplemental examinations to alert the PTO 
to prior art patents and printed publications, as well as non-print prior art 
and non-prior art information held by the Federal Circuit to be material in 
inequitable conduct cases prior to Therasense.
350
  This is a much broader 
scope of information than the “patent and printed publications” limitation 
of ex parte reexamination.  A second important difference is that the patent 
owner, who filed the request for supplemental examination, is barred from 
submitting a statement.
351
 
Supplemental examination is not available if allegations of inequitable 
conduct have been “pled with particularity in a civil action.”
352
  If 
defendant alleges in court that certain conduct constitutes inequitable 
conduct, the patentee loses the ability to cure the defect through 
supplemental examination.  But this exception is likely to have very limited 
application, because evidence of inequitable conduct is frequently 
unavailable until discovery occurs
353
 and typically the timing of the onset of 
litigation is within the patentee’s control.  In most cases, patentees can be 
expected to exercise such control by filing an absolving request for 
supplemental examination prior to taking any action that might trigger a 
declaratory judgment action.
354
  Moreover, the requirement that inequitable 
conduct be pled with particularity in order to trigger the exception likely 
entails compliance with Exergen.  For all of the reasons described supra, it 
is very difficult to satisfy Exergen’s pleading standard. 
In the absence of the rare exception, supplemental examination will 
permit a patentee to effectively inoculate a patent against all but the most 
egregious forms of inequitable conduct by resubmitting the patent for 
reexamination based on corrected information.  Once that corrected 
information is considered, the patent cannot later be held unenforceable on 
 
 350.  Lisa A. Dolak, America Invents the Supplemental Examination, but Retains the 
Duty of Candor: Questions and Implications, 6 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 147, 151 (2012). 
 351.  35 U.S.C. § 257(b) (2012). 
 352.  35 U.S.C. § 257(c)(2)(A) (2012). 
 353.  See Formax Inc. v. Alkar-Rapidpak-MP Equip. Inc., No. 11-C-0298, 2013 WL 
2368824, at *6 (E.D. Wis. May 29, 2013) (“Allegations of inequitable conduct are often 
based on information uniquely within the possession of the patentee, and often cannot be 
brought until after significant discovery has been completed.”). 
 354.  See Tokic, supra note 263, at 262 (“Thus, it appears unlikely the exception will 
preclude patent holders from strategically manipulating the supplemental examination rules 
to escape inequitable conduct claims.”).  There is a second exception, set forth in 35 U.S.C. 
§ 257(c)(2)(B) (2012), but it too will be rarely used.  It relates to patent infringement actions 
under Section 281 of the Patent Act or actions in the ITC for unfair competition or 
importation under Section 337(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)).  Under 
the second exception, the effect of supplemental examination will not apply unless the 
examination and any reexamination resulting from it are finished prior to the date on which 
the action is brought.  35 U.S.C. § 257(c)(2)(B) (2012). 
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the basis of conduct relating to such information.  This is true even if a 
reexamination is not conducted.
355
  The legislative history of the AIA 
indicates that supplemental examination can serve to prevent a patent from 
subsequently being held invalid,
356
 and the PTO has publicly stated that 
“[a] patent owner may use supplemental examination to forestall a 
subsequent inequitable conduct challenge to the enforceability of the patent 
during litigation.”
357
  This signaling effect alone may be sufficient to ensure 
that inoculation occurs. 
The proceeding is available only to patent owners,
358
 who will be able 
to cure intentional failures to disclose prior art that would otherwise be 
grounds for a finding of inequitable conduct.  The AIA requires patentees 
to request and conclude supplemental examination before attempting 
enforcement.
359
  Where that occurs, examinations can be used as free passes 
by patent owners who deceive the PTO.  As such, supplemental 
examinations create a patent amnesty program.
360
  Amnesty is created not 
merely for issued patents.  It also is created for any other patent that, if it 
had been examined in light of information relevant to the patentability of 
the claimed invention reasonably available during the initial examination, 
might not have been issued or might have been issued in a much narrower 
form.
361
  This differs considerably from pre-AIA post-grant procedures, 
wherein the submission of information for consideration by the PTO was 
an effective admission of its materiality.
362
 The Federal Circuit has held 
that the submission of information during reexamination does not bar the 
subsequent assertion of an inequitable conduct defense based on such 
information, and in fact can provide a basis for the defense.
363
 
The overarching effect is that supplemental examination destroys any 
incentive for patentees to provide honest disclosure to the PTO during the 
patent application process, and thereby significantly undermines one of the 
primary goals of the U.S. patent system.  Post-grant review is unlikely to 
 
 355.  LINCK, STONER, BARRETT & SPIEGEL, supra note 293, at 120. 
 356.  Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part II of 
II, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 539, 539 (2012). 
 357.  Press Release, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, USPTO Publishes Final Rules 
for Supplemental Examination and Inventor’s Oath or Declaration (Aug. 13, 2012), 
available at http://www.uspto.gov/news/pr/2012/12-51.jsp.  
 358.  35 U.S.C. § 257(a) (2011). 
 359.  35 U.S.C. § 257 (2011). 
 360.  Rantanen, Petherbridge & Kesan, supra note 292, at 244 (concluding that 
supplemental examinations provide the opportunity “to immunize all but the most egregious 
misconduct before a competitor ever has an opportunity to learn of it”). 
 361.  Rantanen & Petherbridge, supra note 51, at 26-27. 
 362.  5 Procedures, supra note 306, at 58.  
 363.  See, e.g., Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1288 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011) (en banc) (noting that “inequitable conduct cannot be cured by . . . 
reexamination”). 
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negate the powerful impact of supplemental examinations, because such 
examinations are likely to touch a much broader body of patents.
364
 
Likewise, while the potential impact of the amnesty is blunted because 
the Director must make a confidential referral to the U.S. Attorney General 
for possible prosecution if the Director becomes aware during the course of 
a supplemental examination or related reexamination that material fraud 
may have been committed on the PTO,
365
 this reduction in impact is liable 
to be extremely limited.  The AIA does not identify the distinctions 
between inequitable conduct (which can be corrected) and fraud (which 
apparently cannot).
366
  Subsequent to Therasense, the two are closer than 
they have ever been.  The Director had the power to encourage prosecution 
of those who engage in material misconduct long before the AIA was 
enacted, but that power was almost never exercised.
367
  A 2013 review 
concluded that the two most recent prosecutions for dishonesty before the 
PTO occurred in 1976 and 1934.
368
  There is no reason to assume the 
situation will change following enactment.  Even if the PTO does make a 
referral to the Attorney General it still must conclude the supplemental 
examination.
369
  And the “chronically underfunded”
370
 PTO itself has 
shown virtually no interest in regulating patent attorneys who engage in 
misconduct.  Indeed, it stopped enforcement of the inequitable conduct 
doctrine in 1988.
371
 
Finally, insofar as the statute of limitations for the criminal law most 
likely applicable (18 U.S.C. § 1001, which establishes liability for false 
statements in matters involving the U.S government)
372
 is five years,
373
 
 
 364.  Rantanen, Petherbridge & Kesan, supra note 292, at 245. 
 365.  35 U.S.C. § 257(e) (2012). 
 366.  Frederick Frei & Sean Wooden, Inequitable Conduct Claims One Year After 
Therasense, MANAGING INTELL. PROP.: THE GLOBAL IP RESOURCE (Andrews Kurth, D.C.), 
July 18, 2012, at 5, available at 
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CC4QFjA
A&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.andrewskurth.com%2Fmedia%2Farticle%2F1620_Managin
g%2520IP%2520Article.pdf&ei=63yNUsXpKO3D4AOVvYGwAg&usg=AFQjCNETTfva
Xgmk_lEFDBAp97gMKuc77g&sig2=- 
BaRSyqQK6AbU7aMeZ2IBQ&bvm=bv.56988011,d.dmg&cad=rja. 
 367.  Rantanen & Petherbridge, supra note 51, at 26. 
 368.  Chiang, supra note 3, at 1297. 
 369.  Matal, supra note 356, at 539. 
 370.  Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The Federal Circuit 
Comes of Age, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787, 813 (2008).  However, the PTO’s budget did 
approximately double to $3 billion, from fiscal year 2006 to fiscal year 2014.  See Dennis 
Crouch & Jason Rantanen, USPTO’s Budget to Rise Significantly, PATENTLY-O (Jan. 17, 
2014), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/01/usptos-budget-to-rise-significantly.html. 
 371.  See Chiang, supra note 3, at 1271 (explaining that the PTO has not conducted 
inequitable conduct investigations for more than twenty years). 
 372.  18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1) (2012) makes it a crime to knowingly and willfully falsify, 
conceal or cover up by any trick, scheme or device a material fact in any matter within the 
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measured from the date each element of the crime has occurred,
374
 
prosecution for most material misconduct would be time-barred by the time 
a patent is scrutinized in a supplemental examination or ex parte 
reexamination.  In fiscal year 2012, it took an average of 32.4 months for a 
patent application to issue as a patent or be abandoned, even longer than 
the 32.2 months it took in fiscal year 2009.
375
  Given this almost three-year 
lag, which shows no major signs of improvement,
376
 it is likely that 
supplemental examinations will not be requested, and fraud will not be 
discovered, until after five years has elapsed.
377
 
Supplemental examinations are overtly designed to reduce patentees’ 
exposure to inequitable conduct claims,
378
 unnecessarily replicate the effect 
of Therasense,
379
 and thereby threaten to make the inequitable conduct 
defense a historic relic.
380
  The overall outcome is likely to be more fraud 
before the PTO,
381
 accompanied by a net increase in the cost of 
 
jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the federal government.  
 373.  The applicable five-year statute of limitations is set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a) 
(2012).  See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 740 F.2d 734, 736 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 374.  See United States v. Smith, 740 F.2d 734, 736 (9th Cir. 1984) (outlining when the 
statute of limitations begins to run).  Accord United States v. Lutz, 154 F.3d 581, 586 (6th 
Cir. 1998). 
 375.  U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Performance and Accountability Report Fiscal 
Year 2012, supra note 76, at 14.  
 376.  The fiscal year 2012 average total pendency of 32.2 months did reflect a decline 
from the 33.7 months in fiscal year 2011 and also bettered the PTO’s fiscal year 2012 target 
of 34.7 months.  See id. 
 377.  Chiang, supra note 3, at 1297 (“Because it is unlikely that fraud on the PTO will be 
discovered in five years—and patentees can virtually ensure this by waiting six years before 
doing anything with their patent—there is little credible deterrence from criminal 
prosecution.”); White, supra note 3, at 731. 
 378.  Sarah Tran, Patent Powers, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 595, 638 (2012).  But cf. Angie 
M. Hankins, Iuliana Tanase & Reiko Manabe, Is Inequitable Conduct Still a Viable 
Defense?, LAW 360  (Nov. 22, 2011), http://www.law360.com/articles/285249/is-
inequitable-conduct-still-a-viable-defense (“[S]upplemental examination appears to be 
directed toward close calls or error, rather than permitting the curing of intentional and 
egregious misconduct before the PTO.”).  
 379.  See Kelly, supra note 220 at *3 (observing that the incentive to use supplemental 
examination “seems greatly diminished” after Therasense); Kevin B. Laurence & Matthew 
C. Phillips, Supplemental Examination and the Proposed Rules, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
TODAY 7, 8 (Mar. 2012) (“Therasense significantly diminished the need for supplemental 
examination . . . .”). 
 380.  See Peter E. Strand, Disarming an ‘Atomic Bomb’: Federal Circuit Clips Wires for 
Inequitable Conduct, 24 No. 8 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 20, 22 (2012) (concluding that 
supplemental examinations may make the inequitable conduct defense “a dinosaur”). 
 381.  See Maurice Ross, A Year of Dramatic Change in Intellectual Property Law: Who 
are the Winners and Losers?, ASPATORE, 2013 WL 571327, at *8 (Jan. 2013) (“This new 
‘get out of jail free’ law, together with recent Federal Circuit jurisprudence making it almost 
impossible to prove inequitable conduct, conveys exactly the wrong message and provides 
perverse incentives for cheating and fraud.”); accord Priscilla G. Taylor, Bringing Equity 
Back to the Inequitable Conduct Doctrine?, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 349, 372 (2012) 
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competition, higher barriers to market entry, decreased innovation, lower-
quality patents, and a decline in the economic competitiveness of the 
U.S.
382
 
In summary, the AIA’s new provisions for supplemental examination 
and post-grant review, together with its modification of inter partes review, 
will substantially constrict the inequitable conduct defense. 
B. Best Mode 
Similar to the AIA’s post-issuance review provisions, the AIA’s new 
best mode provision also will operate to constrain the use of the inequitable 
conduct defense.  At least since the 1800s U.S. patent law has required an 
inventor to disclose the best mode associated with application of the 
principle of her invention.
383
  This best mode requirement has applied to all 
classes of inventions beginning with the 1952 Patent Act,
384
 which in 35 
U.S.C. § 112 requires the inventor seeking a patent to disclose the “best 
mode . . . of carrying out her invention.”
385
  The requirement does not 
require actual disclosure of the best mode, but instead only adequate 
disclosure to enable someone of ordinary skill in the art to practice the best 
mode without undue experimentation.
386
  Under the 1952 Patent Act the 
failure to disclose best mode during patent prosecution could result in 
rejection by the patent examiner.
387
 
Determining compliance with the best mode requirement is a two-
prong fact-based inquiry.  First, it must be determined whether, at the time 
 
(concluding that supplemental examinations could lead to increased incidence of inequitable 
conduct before the PTO). 
 382.  See, e.g., Rantanen & Petherbridge, supra note 51, at 31 (noting that AIA “presents 
a very real risk of increasing the number of low-quality patents”).   
 383.  The Patent Act of 1836 required a patent applicant to explain the principle of her 
invention and the “several modes” associated with application of that principle, as 
contemplated by the inventor.  Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117 (repealed 1870).  
The Patent Act of 1870 required a patent applicant to explain the principle of her invention 
and the best mode associated with application of that principle, as contemplated by the 
inventor, but this requirement applied only to machine patents.  Patent Act of July 8, 1870, 
ch. 230, § 26, 16 Stat. 198, amended by Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 593, 66 Stat. 792 
(1952). 
 384.  Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 112, 66 Stat. 792 (1952) (codified as amended at 35 
U.S.C. § 112 (2006)). 
 385.  35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
 386.  Joy MM Delaware, Inc. v. Cincinnati Mine Mach., Co., 497 F. App’x 970 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012); Ajinomoto Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 597 F.3d 1267, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2010).  
Routine details apparent to someone of ordinary skill in the art need not be disclosed to 
satisfy the best mode requirement.  In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release 
Capsule Patent Litig., 676 F.3d 1063, 1086 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 387.  Ryan G. Vacca, Patent Reform and Best Mode: A Signal to the Patent Office or a 
Step Toward Elimination?, 75 ALB. L. REV. 279, 293 (2012). 
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the patent application was filed, the inventor possessed a best mode for 
practicing the invention.  This is a subjective inquiry
388
 that focuses on the 
inventor’s state of mind at the time of filing.  Second, if the inventor did 
possess a best mode, it must be determined whether the written description 
disclosed the mode such that a person skilled in the art could practice it.  
This is an objective inquiry that focuses on the scope of the claimed 
invention and the level of skill in the art.
389
 
There is some confusion as to whether invalidation based on a best 
mode violation requires that the inventor knew of and intentionally 
concealed a better mode than was disclosed.  The Federal Circuit has not 
always been clear about this issue.  In some cases it seems to have required 
concealment,
390
 but in other cases it has stated that intent to conceal is not 
an element.
391
  In still other cases, the court has explained that it uses the 
term “concealment” as a shorthand way of inquiring about the adequacy of 
the disclosure.
392
  Section 112 does not on its face impose a concealment 
requirement.
393
 
Failure to disclose the best mode has furnished grounds for rejecting 
patent applications in the PTO and, more commonly, for declaring the 
 
 388.  Anvik Corp. v. Nikon Precision, Inc., 519 F. App’x 1019, 1024 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 389.  Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 518 F.3d 1353, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2008); 
Responsive Innovations, LLC v. Holtzbrinck Publishers, LLC, 911 F. Supp. 2d 526, 537 
(N.D. Ohio 2012). 
 390.  See Ateliers de la Haute-Garonne v. Broetje Automation USA Inc., 717 F.3d 1351, 
1357 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“Violation requires intentional concealment; innocent or inadvertent 
failure of disclosure does not of itself invalidate the patent.”); Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman 
Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“‘Invalidation based on a best mode 
violation requires that the inventor knew of and intentionally concealed a better mode than 
was disclosed.’”) (citing High Concrete Structures, Inc. v. New Enter. Stone & Lime Co., 
377 F.3d 1379, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).   
 391.  See In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Patent Litig., 
676 F.3d 1063, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (noting that an examination of intent to conceal is 
inconsistent with an objective inquiry).  See also Multimedia Patent Trust v. Apple Inc., No. 
10-CV-2618-H (KSDC), 2012 WL 6863471, at *9 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2012) (“The Court 
agrees with the Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride opinion.  Therefore, Apple and LG do not 
need to present evidence showing that the inventors intentionally concealed the better 
mode.”). 
 392.  See In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Patent Litig., 
676 F.3d at 1085-86 (discussing  use of the term “concealment” to describe a test of the 
adequacy of disclosure); U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 74 F.3d 1209, 1215-16 
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (“A best mode violation may occur if the disclosure of the best mode is so 
objectively inadequate as to effectively conceal the best mode from the public.”) (emphasis 
in original); see also Jason Rantanen, Best Mode: Only Mostly Dead, PATENTLY-O (May 27, 
2013; 11:53 AM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2013/05/best-mode-only-mostly-
dead.html (predicting that the Federal Circuit split “will likely remain forever unresolved”). 
 393.  See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012) (illustrating that section 112 does not mention a 
concealment requirement). 
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patents invalid or unenforceable in subsequent litigation.
394
  Invalidity for 
failure to satisfy the best mode requirement must be proven by clear and 
convincing evidence,
395
 and compliance with the requirement is both a 
question of fact
396
 and often highly factual.
397
  The Federal Circuit reviews 
findings of best mode disclosure violations for clear error.
398
 
The best mode requirement has several related justifications.  The first 
justification is to ensure that the public is placed on a level playing field 
with the patentee upon expiration of the patent.
399
  The second is to 
compensate the public for the cost of the monopoly created by a patent.
400
  
A third is to realize basic notions of fairness.
401
 
Best mode has endured in the U.S. despite being subject to criticism 
on several grounds.  First, best mode has failed to level the field because it 
is subjective—only the best mode contemplated by the inventor must be 
 
 394.  Lee Petherbridge & Jason Rantanen, The Pseudo-Elimination of Best Mode: Worst 
Possible Choice?, 59 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 170, 171 (2012) (noting that pre-AIA, 
courts were required to declare patents invalid where applicants knew of best mode and 
failed to disclose it); Brian J. Love & Christopher B. Seaman, Best Mode Trade Secrets, 15 
YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 7 (2012) (noting that “the primary means of enforcing best mode was 
in litigation”). 
 395.  In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Patent Litig., 676 
F.3d at 1087; AllVoice Computing PLC v. Nuance Commc’ns, Inc., 504 F.3d 1236, 1240 
(Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 396.  Bayer AG v. Schein Pharms., Inc., 301 F.3d 1306, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 397.  See Anvik Corp. v. Nikon Precision, Inc., 519 F. App’x 1019, 1021 (Fed. Cir. 
2013) (“The question whether the best mode requirement has been satisfied is highly 
factual.”). 
 398.  In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Patent Litig., 676 
F.3d at 1084; Zygo Corp. v. Wyko Corp., 79 F.3d 1563, 1566-67 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 399.  Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 870 F.2d 1292, 1302 n.8 (7th Cir. 
1989) (“[T]he best mode requirement is intended to allow the public to compete fairly with 
the patentee following the expiration of the patents.”); see also Joy MM Del., Inc. v. 
Cincinnati Mine Mach., Co., 497 F. App’x 970, 974 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“At its heart, the 
best mode requirement is concerned with preventing inventors from concealing the best 
mode of their inventions while being rewarded with the right to exclude others from making 
or using it.”); Chisum, supra note 33, at 280 (“The purpose of the best mode requirement is 
to prevent inventors from obtaining patent protection while concealing from the public the 
preferred embodiments of their inventions.”). 
 400.  Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“The best 
mode requirement creates a statutory bargained-for-exchange by which a patentee obtains 
the right to exclude others from practicing the claimed invention for a certain time period, 
and the public receives knowledge of the preferred embodiments for practicing the claimed 
invention.”); Matthew H. Solomson, Patently Confusing: The Federal Circuit’s Inconsistent 
Treatment of Claim Scope as a Limit on the Best Mode Disclosure Requirement, 45 IDEA 
383, 384 (2005) (“The purpose of the statutory disclosure requirements, in general, and the 
best mode requirement, in particular, is to compensate the public for the cost of the 
monopoly conferred on a patentee.”); cf. Petherbridge & Rantanen, supra note 274, at 126 
(describing the policy purpose of the best mode requirement as “something of an enigma”). 
 401.  Wesley D. Markham, Is Best Mode the Worst?: Dueling Arguments, Empirical 
Analysis, and Recommendations for Reform, 51 IDEA 129, 131 (2011). 
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disclosed, even if the best mode, in an objective sense, is not revealed to 
the public.
402
  Second, best mode also fails to meet its goal because the 
rapid pace of technological change may negate the best mode before the 
patent term ends.  Third, best mode increases litigation costs
403
 while 
providing modest benefits, and, because the rule is virtually unique to the 
U.S.,
404
 it places at a disadvantage foreign applicants who apply for patents 
in their home countries and then must amend their U.S. applications to 
comply with the best mode requirement.
405
  Finally, it has been argued that 
the courts have applied the best mode requirement inconsistently.
406
 
Most of the foregoing points can be rebutted.  First, while best mode is 
subjective, the inventor’s subjective intent may be proven by inference 
from objective evidence, such as performance data for various 
embodiments of the invention.
407
  Second, there is little or no evidence 
definitively linking best mode to an increase in patent litigation costs,
408
 
and the AIA’s abolition of failure to disclose best mode as a basis for 
finding invalidity or unenforceability will result in only modest savings and 
may even increase costs, because the volume of discovery is not expected 
to decline.
409
  Third, the notion that best mode is unique to the U.S. is 
untrue.  According to one survey, by 2005 at least twenty-four countries 
required best mode disclosure,
410
 and the global trend has reflected 
 
 402.  Vacca, supra note 387, at 288. 
 403.  Before the AIA was enacted, members of Congress and testifying witnesses 
repeatedly complained about the high cost associated with best mode determinations.  See 
Matal, supra note 356, at 582. 
 404.  Chisum, supra note 33, at 279; Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose 
Useful Information?, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 531, 553 (2012) (noting that best mode is not 
imposed in Europe).   
 405.  NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY 121 (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004), available at 
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=10976 (noting that only the U.S. has a best 
mode requirement and characterizing it as an “unusual additional requirement”); 
Petherbridge & Rantanen, supra note 394, at 171 (“Perhaps the most common argument for 
eliminating best mode was that it disadvantaged foreign inventors.”). 
 406.  See Solomson, supra note 400, at 420 (“[T]he Federal Circuit’s best mode 
decisions cannot be explained by a consistent set of principles.”); Steven B. Walmsley, Best 
Mode: A Plea to Repair or Sacrifice this Broken Requirement of United States Patent Law, 
9 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 125, 153 (2002) (criticizing best mode on basis that 
courts have used seven different standards for assessing the disclosure required to comply 
with the obligation). 
 407.  Love & Seaman, supra note 394, at 19. 
 408.  Markham, supra note 401, at 142-43 (noting that the hypothesized incremental cost 
of best mode cannot be disentangled from other variables that affect the same cost). 
 409.  Love & Seaman, supra note 394, at 16. 
 410.  Andrew R. Shores, Comment, Changes to the Best Mode Requirement in the 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act: Why Congress Got it Right, 34 CAMPBELL L. REV. 733, 
745 (2012). 
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adoption.
411
 
The AIA did not substantively change the best mode requirement 
(except insofar as the requirement now encompasses the best mode 
contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor).  Amended Section 35 
U.S.C. § 112 still requires patent applicants to disclose a best mode if they 
know of one.
412
  However, courts will no longer enforce this requirement, 
insofar as the AIA amended 35 U.S.C. § 282 to eliminate failure to disclose 
the best mode as a ground for asserting invalidity of the patent, 
unenforceability, or cancellation of any or all claims in a patent.
413
  Thus, 
under the AIA, patent applicants must disclose the best mode to receive a 
patent, but if a patent is obtained despite a failure to so disclose, no 
challenge to the patent rights can be made based on such a failure.  The 
prohibition on invalidating a patent claim for failure to disclose best mode 
encompasses ex parte reexamination and post-grant review.  The foregoing 
mixed outcome appears to represent a compromise between critics of best 
mode who wanted to abolish it entirely and proponents who wanted to 
preserve it in some fashion.
414
 
Prior to adoption of the AIA intentional best mode violations could be 
deemed inequitable conduct.
415
  It is not entirely clear whether inequitable 
conduct based on intentional concealment of the best mode remains a 
viable defense in civil litigation post-AIA.  Nothing in the statute explicitly 
excludes such a defense.  The AIA only excludes failure to disclose the 
best mode as a direct basis for invalidity or unenforceability, but 
defendants generally did not assert such a failure in pre-AIA litigation.  
 
 411.  Dale L. Carlson, Katarzyna Przychodzen & Petra Scamborova, Patent Linchpin for 
the 21st Century?—Best Mode Revisited, 45 IDEA 267, 283-85 (2005).  The authors refer to 
the assertion that only the U.S. imposes a best mode requirement as a “common 
misconception.”  Id. at 281. 
 412.  35 U.S.C. § 112(a), amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 4. 
 413.  35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(3)(A) (2012).  This amendment was not given retroactive effect 
for cases that were filed before the America Invents Act was enacted.  Anvik Corp. v. Nikon 
Precision, Inc., 519 F. App’x 1019, 1021 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 414.  Love & Seaman, supra note 394, at 8.  Cf. Matal, supra note 356, at 584 (“The 
legislative history provides no explanation for Congress’s failure to simply repeal the best-
mode requirement entirely.  Nor is one apparent.”). 
 415.  See Consol. Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco Int’l Ltd., 910 F.2d 804, 808 (Fed. Cir. 
1990) (holding that failure to disclose best mode is inherently material and “reaches the 
minimum level of materiality necessary for a finding of inequitable conduct”); Chisum, 
supra note 33, at 281 (“If a best mode violation is intentional, it can be deemed inequitable 
conduct, resulting in unenforceability of the entire patent and other adverse 
consequences . . . .”); see also Responsive Innovations, LLC v. Holtzbrinck Publishers, 
LLC, 911 F. Supp. 2d 526, 544 (N.D. Ohio 2012) (noting that the failure to disclose best 
mode will not constitute inequitable conduct in every case); Old Town Canoe Co. v. 
Confluence Holdings Corp., 448 F.3d 1309, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (confirming that failure 
to disclose best mode is inherently material, but finding no intent to deceive PTO and 
therefore no inequitable conduct). 
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Rather, they asserted inequitable conduct before the PTO as the direct basis 
for a finding of unenforceability.  However, the foregoing distinction is 
unlikely to prevail, because the AIA does not distinguish between direct 
and indirect bases for validity and unenforceability.  Congress, when it 
enacted the AIA, was aware that best mode violations were frequently 
styled as inequitable conduct claims, and this probably explains why the 
AIA excludes failure to disclose the best mode as a basis for both invalidity 
and unenforceability.
416
  The failure to disclose best mode almost certainly 
has been eliminated as a direct and indirect basis for asserting invalidity or 
unenforceability.
417
 
Prior to enactment of the AIA, best mode was not a primary defense 
and it was rarely successful.
418
  Now it has been eliminated as a defense 
altogether.  While the best mode requirement has been nominally retained, 
it has been rendered a virtual nullity in any proceeding in which the issue 
of compliance with the requirement might arise.
419
 
It has been suggested that best mode retains some utility under the 
AIA, for a couple of reasons.  First, even if evidence supporting the defense 
has become inadmissible at trial, a patent applicant’s knowledge of a best 
mode may be reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible 
evidence relevant to a claim of inequitable conduct or unclean hands.
420
  
Second, if discovery reveals an undisclosed best mode, the doctrine of 
 
 416.  Vacca, supra note 387, at 293 & n.108. 
 417.  See Petherbridge & Rantanen, supra note 274, at 126-27 (concluding that the AIA 
“has, as a practical matter, effectively eliminated the best mode requirement from patent 
law”).  But cf. Harkins, supra note 69, at *10 (“At least theoretically . . . if a defendant can 
show that the patent applicant intentionally withheld the best mode, that may constitute 
inequitable conduct.  It remains to be seen how courts will handle that argument, since 
failing to disclose best mode is not a typical fraud on the USPTO.”); Markham, supra note 
401, at 156 (“In effect, eliminating best mode as a defense in patent litigation would fold 
any best mode related issues that arise into a court’s general inequitable conduct analysis.”); 
Jayson Singh Sohi, Comment, Changes to the Best Mode Requirement: Weakening 
Enforcement Undermines the Purpose of Patent Law and Exacerbates an Ethical Patent 
Trilemma, 17 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 157, 168 (2013) (arguing that the only likely means of 
redress for post-AIA violations of the best mode requirement “will have to come in the form 
of an inequitable conduct inquiry”).   
 418.  See Bayer A.G. v. Schein Pharms., 301 F.3d 1306, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“In the 
history of this court and our predecessor courts we have held claims invalid for failure to 
satisfy the best mode requirement on only seven occasions.”); Kelly, supra note 220 at *3 
(“[F]ew patents over the past twenty years [prior to 2012] have been invalidated on best 
mode grounds.”); Markham, supra note 401, at 149-52 (concluding that (a) the best mode 
defense succeeded in district court only eighteen percent of the time during the period 2005-
2009; (b) the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court’s holding that there was a best mode 
violation only once during the period 2002-2009; and (c) the BPAI never affirmed in a 
published decision an examiner’s best mode rejection during the period 1981-2009). 
 419.  Robert A. Armitage, Understanding the America Invents Act and its Implications 
for Patenting, 40 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 87-93 (2012). 
 420.  Love & Seaman, supra note 394, at 21. 
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unclean hands may provide a remedy.
421
  As to the first point, however, the 
combination of Exergen, Therasense, and the AIA’s new post-issuance 
proceedings has essentially eviscerated the inequitable conduct defense.  
As to the second point, the doctrine of unclean hands has never been an 
effective substitute for inequitable conduct for the reasons discussed supra.  
As noted, a party who is foreign to the alleged unclean conduct at the time 
of its occurrence generally cannot raise a claim of unclean hands.  And 
whereas application of the inequitable conduct doctrine results in the 
unenforceability of the entire patent, the unclean hands defense merely 
allows courts to dismiss complaints filed by plaintiffs suing in bad faith. 
The AIA’s revision of best mode may create an incentive for inventors 
to actively conceal the best mode,
422
 as long as the risk of detection by the 
PTO is sufficiently low.  In fact, the risk of detection by the PTO is 
virtually nonexistent, because the patent examiner will almost never have 
evidence sufficient to permit her to conclude that the inventor, at the time 
of filing the application, knew of a better mode of practicing the claimed 
invention.
423
  The PTO acknowledges this point in the Manual of Patent 
Examining Procedure.
424
 
The effective elimination of best mode and its concomitant 
constriction of the inequitable conduct defense undermine the quid pro quo 
basis of patent law, which is that the patent applicant should play fair and 
square with the patent system.  It is unfair if the applicant can receive from 
the public the right to exclude, while at the same time maintaining part of 
the invention as a trade secret by concealing from the public the preferred 
embodiment of the invention.
425
  Prior to the AIA, best mode also played a 
critical role in establishing the level of inventiveness necessary for a patent 
 
 421.  Id. 
 422.  John Villasenor, The Comprehensive Patent Reform of 2011: Navigating the 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 184 BROOKINGS POLICY BRIEF 1, 4 (Sept. 2011), 
available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/9/patents%20villasenor/09_p
atents_villasenor.pdf.  
 423.  Shores, supra note 411, at 738-39 (“[T]he PTO’s current examination procedures 
make enforcement of the best mode requirement during the examination virtually 
impossible.”); Vacca, supra note 387, at 294. 
 424.  See MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2165.03 (8th ed. 2001, 9th rev. 
2012), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/mpep-2100.pdf (“The 
information that is necessary to form the basis for a rejection based on the failure to set forth 
the best mode is rarely accessible to the examiner . . . .”). 
 425.  Wahl Instruments, Inc. v. Acvious, Inc., 950 F.2d 1575, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1991) 
(“The purpose of the best mode requirement is to restrain inventors from applying for a 
patent while at the same time concealing from the public preferred embodiments of their 
inventions which they have in fact conceived.”) (emphasis in original); Amgen, Inc. v. 
Chugai Pharm. Co., Ltd., 927 F.2d 1200, 1209-10 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“The best mode 
requirement thus is intended to ensure that a patent applicant plays ‘fair and square’ with the 
patent system.  It is a requirement that the quid pro quo of the patent grant be satisfied.”). 
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to issue.  As explained by Professors Petherbridge and Rantanen, “the best 
mode requirement cooperates with nonobviousness doctrine to protect the 
balance between incentive and access in the patent system.”
426
  The 
effective elimination of the best mode requirement terminates that 
protection.  In short, the AIA limits the inequitable conduct defense at 
cross-purposes with fundamental objectives of the U.S. patent system. 
CONCLUSION 
Through a combination of judicial and political action, Therasense 
and the AIA have unduly narrowed the inequitable conduct defense.  The 
Federal Circuit limited the defense explicitly and in substance by restricting 
its elements and establishing a more lenient disclosure obligation.  
Congress constrained the defense implicitly and largely through 
procedures.  The AIA removed best mode violations as a basis for asserting 
inequitable conduct, and it established provisions for post-issuance review 
that provide patentees with a safe harbor from allegations of inequitable 
conduct.  The restrictions imposed collectively by Therasense and the AIA 
will tend to undermine fundamental objectives of patent law.  At a 
minimum, the undue contraction of the inequitable conduct defense will 
substantially reduce the incentive for patent applicants to make full and 
early disclosure to the overall detriment of the U.S. patent system.  At the 
same time, Therasense will operate to substantially reduce the opportunity 
for parties to assert Walker Process antitrust claims.  Overall, the cure has 
been worse than the plague. 
 
 
 426.  Petherbridge & Rantanen, supra note 274, at 129. 
